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1. The sixth report on jurisdictional immunities of States 
and their property is a continuation of the five successive 
reports I already submitted to the International Law Com-
mission. The introductory note in the fifth report on this 
topic 2 is still applicable as a practical guide to the present 
report, which will cover the remaining exceptions to State 
immunity in part III. As an introduction to the substantive 
parts of the present report, which will bring the Commis-
sion closer to the conclusion of its study and preparation of 
1 The five previous reports were: (a) preliminary report, Yearbook . .. 
1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.4/323; (b) second report, 
Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 199, document NCN.4/33 I and 
Add.l; (c) third report, Yearbook .. . 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 12, docu-
mentA/CN.4/340andAdd.l;(d) fourth report, Yearbook .. . 1982. vol. II 
(Part One), p. 199, document NCN.4/357; (e) fifth report, Yearbook ... 
1983. vol. II (Part One), p. 25, document A/CN.4/363 and Add. I. 
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draft articles on the topic, section A below gives the 
updated status of the draft articles so far submitted, some 
of which have been considered and provisionally adopted, 
and indeed further adjusted and revised, while others are 
still under active examination by the Drafting Committee, 
and yet others have been set aside for the time being for 
consideration after the submission of the rest of the draft 
articles. 
A. Status of the draft articles already submitted 
2. To date, 15 draft articles have been submitted to the 
Commission in the five reports already considered. Of 
these 15 draft articles, the first five are contained in part I, 
"Introduction", the second five in part II, "General prin-
ciples", and the third five in part III, "Exceptions to State 
immunity". 
1. PART I. INTRO'lUCTION 
3. In part I (Introduction), article 1 (Scope of the present 
articles) as provisionally adopted in 1980 3 has been revised 
and readjusted so as to confine the scope of the draft 
articles more explicitly to "the immunity of one State and 
its property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
State".4 
4. Article 2 (Use of terms), as submitted in the second 
report of the Special Rapporteur for temporary guidance, 
has been partially considered in at least two separate con-
nections.5 First, following the revision of draft article 1, 
limiting the scope of the daft articles, a definition of the 
term "court" was introduced in paragraph 1 (a) of 
article 2. 6 Secondly, paragraph 1 (f), defining "trading or 
commercial activity",7 has been withdrawn and replaced 
by the new paragraph 1 (g), defining "commercial con-
tract".8 
"Article 1. Scope oJ the present articles 
"The present articles apply to questions relating to the immunity of 
one State and its property from the jurisdiction of another State." 
See Yearbook . .. 1980. vol. II (Part Two), p. 141. 
"Article 1. Scope oJthepresent articles 
"The present articles apply to the immunity of one State and its 
property from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State." 
See Yearbook . .. 1982. vol. II (Part Two). p. 99; for the commentary, ibid .• 
pp.99-l00. 
, For the original text of article 2, ibid .. pp. 95-96. footnote 224. 
"Article 2. Use oj terms 
"1. For the purposes of the present articles: 
"(a) 'court' means any organ of a State, however named, entitled to 
exercise judicial functions; 
Ibid .• p. 100; for the commentary. ibid. 
7 See footnote 5 above. 
"Article 2. Use oj terms 
"1. For the purposes of the present articles: 
"(g) 'commercial contract' means: 
"(i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale or purchase 
of goods or the supply of services; 
"(ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a financial nature. 
5. Other terms defined in article 2, paragraph 1,9 have not 
been fully considered. The definitions of "immunity" and 
"jurisdictional immunities" in former subparagraphs (a) 
and (b) are perhaps self-evident and no longer needed. The 
definitions of "territorial State" and "foreign State" in 
subparagraphs (c) and (d) have been withdrawn and the 
technique adopted of referring instead to one State in re-
lation to another State. The definition of "State property" 
in subparagraph (e), and paragraph 2 ofthe article, remain 
to be considered. New terms may yet be included as con-
sideration of further draft articles progresses. 
6. Article 3 (Interpretative provisions) has been partially 
considered in connection with the exception of "commer-
cial contracts" as contained in article 12 and defined in 
article 2, paragraph 1 (g), already provisionally adopted. 
The Commission also provisionally adopted paragraph 2 
of article 3, recognizing the use of the "nature test" as well 
as the "purpose test" for determining the commercial or 
non-commercial character of a contract or transaction. 1o 
7. Paragraph 1, giving an illustration of the various ele-
ments which constitute a State for the purpose of immunity 
and the types of power covered by the expression "juris-
diction" of another State, remains to be considered. I I 
8. Article 4 (Jurisdictional inmunities not within the 
scope of the present articles) has been briefly discussed in 
connection with draft article 15 (Ownership, possession 
and use of property), especially its paragraph 3. This 
article, as well as article 5 (Non-retroactivity of the present 
articles), is still to be considered more fully after the Com-
mission has considered the rest of the draft articles. 12 
2. PART II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
9. Part II (General principles) is all but complete except 
for the basic article, article 6 (State immunity), which, 
despite its previous provisional adoption, 13 remains to be 
re-examined with a view to possible reformulation so as to 
including any obligation of guarantee in respect of any such 
loan or of indemnity in respect of any such transaction; 
"(iii) any other contract or transaction, whether of a commercial, 
industrial, trading or professional nature, but not including a 
contract of employment of persons. 
See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 34; for the commentary, ibid .. 
pp.34-35. 
9 See footnote 5 above. 
10 "Article 3. Interpretative provisions 
"2. In determining whether a contract for the sale or purchase of 
goods or the supply of services is commercial, reference should be made 
primarily to the nature of the contract. but the purpose of the contract 
should also be taken into account if, in the practice of that Statc, that 
purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial character of the 
contract." 
See Yearbook ... 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 35; for the commcntary, 
ibid .. pp. 35-36. 
II For the text of article 3, see Yearbook. " 1982. vol. II (Part Two), 
p. 96, footnote 225. 
12 For the texts of articles 4 and 5, ibid .. footnotes 226 and 227. 
!3 "Article 6. State immunity 
"\. A State is immune from the jurisdiction of [the courts oj] 
another State in accordance with the provisions of the present arti-
cles. 
Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property 9 
give greater satisfaction to the various points of view 
expressed. The study and analysis leading to the formu-
lation of draft article 6 have not been seriously challenged, 
but its wording requires further improvement and re-
adjustment. There is sufficient general agreement that 
immunity is a fundamental principle of international law 
supported by the general practice of States. Only its fullest 
extent has yet to be more precisely defined. A State is 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
State. The rest of the draft articles will further clarify, 
qualify or modify the scope and extent of the application of 
this principle. Final revision of article 6 will therefore have 
to await consideration of the remaining draft articles, so as 
toallow a more generally accepted restatement of the basic 
principle to materialize. 14 In the mean time, it may be 
convenient to reaffirm the existence of a basic general 
principle of State immunity in article 6 as further elab-
orated and qualified by other general principles in part II of 
the draft articles, to the extent of and subject to the excep-
tions and limitations contained in part III. As is gradually 
becoming increasingly apparent, in each of the particular 
areas designated as exceptional, the extent of State immun-
ity is being delineated. In each of these areas, immunity 
exists to varying degrees and extent, beyond which no 
immunity need be recognized or accorded. 
10. Except for article 6 (State immunity), the remaining 
four articles of part II (General principles) have been pro-
visionally adopted without too much opposition. Article 7 
(Modalities for giving effect to State immunity) 15 was 
accepted by consensus subject to final approval of article 6, 
since it contains an express reference to State immunity 
under article 6. But article 7 covers wider ground than 
modalities for fulfilment of the obligation to give effect to 
State immunity. It also sets out the. circumstances when a 
State is said to be impleaded, whether directly or indirectly, 
and the different situations or occasions in which a pro-
ceeding not instituted against a State as such is still 
regarded as being against a State. Inherent in the provisions 
of article 7 is the differentiation between the higher and 
lower echelons of bodies forming part of the State or under 
its administration or control, and the requirement for acts 
to be performed in the exercise of governmental or sov-
ereign authority for State immunity to be extended to 
cover agencies and instrumentalities of more remote con-
nection with the central organ or machinery of govern-
ment. Similarly, representatives of a State are immune 
only in respect of acts performed in their representative 
capacities and not otherwise, except for diplomatic agents 
who are entitled to immunity ratione personae in addition 
to their immunity ratione materiae, both of which belong 
to the sending State in the ultimate analysis and which can 
be waived only by the sending State. 
"2. Effect shall be given to State immunity in accordance with the 
provisions of the present articles." 
See Yearbook . .. 1980. vol. II (Part Two), p. 142; for the commentary, 
ibid .• pp. 142 et seq. 
14 See Yearbook ... 1982. vol. II (Part Two), p. 100, footnote 239. 
Several alternative formulations have been proposed, such as: 
"A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another 
State except as provided in the present articles"; or " ... except as 
provided in articles 12 to 20"; or " ... to the extent and subject to the 
limitations provided in the present articles". 
IS Ibid.; for the commentary, ibid .• pp. 100 et seq. 
11. Article 8 (Express consent to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion),16 article 9 (Effect of participation in a proceeding 
before a court) \1 and article 10 (Counter-claims) 18 deal 
with the various aspects of consent to the exercise of juris-
diction, expressly given as in article 8, or by conduct such 
as participation in a legal proceeding, as in article 9, or the 
effect of counter-claims by or against a State, as in article 
10. Articles 8 and 9 were provisionally adopted in 1982 and 
article lOin 1983, thus completing the provisions on gen-
eral principles dealing with consent as an important 
element in the establishment or application of State im-
munity. 
12. Articles 6 to 10 constitute the general principles of 
State immunity and are placed in part II, entitled "General 
principles". Should the title be changed to "General pro-
visions", a corresponding change will be needed for part 
III, which could read "Extent of State immunity in speci-
fied areas" instead of "Exceptions to State immunity". 
3. PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY 
13. Part III (Exceptions to State immunity) begins with 
article 1 J (Scope of the present part) 19 which, as revised by 
the Special Rapporteur 20 after a preliminary exchange of 
views in the Commission, is intended to serve as a link 
between parts II and III of the draft articles. It would also 
serve to introduce the necessary or implied condition of 
reciprocity permissible in the granting or refusal of State 
immunity in a given case in a specified area of activities or 
conduct of a State. It is also designed to confirm the excep-
tional nature of subsequent articles providing for a limited 
application of State immunity. Part III in its entirety and in 
each of its specific provisions from article 12 to article 20 
deals with actual limitations of State immunity. 
14. Four exceptions have so far been proposed by the 
Special Rapporteur in articles 12 to 15, of which two have 
been provisionally adopted by the Commission together 
with their respective commentaries, namely article J 2 
(Commercial contracts)21 together with its ancillary pro-
16 Ibid .• p. 107; for the commentary, ibid .• pp. 107 et seq. 
17 Ibid .• p. 109; for the commentary, ibid., pp. 109 et seq. 
18 See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 22; for the commentary, 
ibid .• pp. 22 et seq. 
19 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as fol-
lows: 
"Article 11. Scope of the present part 
"Except as provided in the following articles of the present part, effect 
shall be given to the general principles of State immunity as contained 
in part II of the present articles." 
See Yearbook . .. 1982. vol. II (Part Two), p. 95, footnote 220. 
20 "Article 11. Scope of the present part 
"The application of the exceptions provided in part III of the present 
articles may be subject to a condition of reciprocity or any other con-
dition as mutually agreed between the States concerned." 
Ibid., p. 99, footnote 237. 
21 "Article 12. Commercial contracts 
"I. If a State enters into a commercial contract with a foreign 
natural or juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of 
private international law, differences relating to the commercial con-
tract fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State is 
considered to have consented to the exercise of that jurisdiction in a 
(Continued on IIfxl page.) 
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visions 22 and article 15 (Ownership, possession and use of 
property).23 The adoption of article 12, which had pre-
sented the greatest difficulties, constituted an important 
breakthrough in the efforts to secure a more generally 
acceptable solution to the main and central problem of 
State immunity. Article 15 had not given rise to much 
comment or opposition, although the reasons for accepting 
it could be based on diverse grounds, centring on the uni-
que applicability and monopoly of the lex situs and there-
fore the supremacy ofthe/orum rei sitae. at least in so far as 
immovables are concerned. Reasoning in private inter-
national law finds stout support in public international law 
doctrine of the supreme authority of the territorial sov-
ereign. The principle of territoriality overrides all other 
considerations, including that of sovereign immunity, 
which is personal to the State claiming entitlement to 
immunity. 
15. Two other exceptions were proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur in his fifth report, namely article 13 (Contracts 
of employment)24 and article 14 (Personal injuries and 
("'Ol'!llrlf(':!! (Ulllilluet/.1 
proceeding arising out of that commercial contract, and accordingly 
cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in that proceeding. 
"2. Paragraph I does not apply: 
"(a) in the case of a commercial contract concluded between States 
or on a Government-to-Government basis; 
"(b) if the parties to the commercial contract have otherwise ex-
pressly agreed." 
See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 25; forthecommentary, ibid .. 
pp. 25 et seq. 
22 Article 2, paragraph I (g), and article 3, paragraph 2 (see footnotes 8 
and 10 above). 
2J "Article 15. Ownership. possession and use of property 
"I. The immunity of a State cannot be invoked to prevent a court of 
another State which is otherwise competent from exercising its juris-
diction in a proceeding which relates to the determination of: 
"(a) any right or interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, or 
any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its possession 
or use of, immovable property situated in the State of the forum; or 
"(b) any right or interest of the State in movable or immovable 
property arising by way of succession, gift or bona vacantia; or 
"(c) any right or interest of the State in the administration of property 
forming part of the estate of a deceased person or of a person of unsound 
mind or of a bankrupt; or 
"(d) any right or interest of the State in the administration of prop-
erty of a company in the event of its dissolution or winding up; or 
"(e) any right or interest of the State in the administration of trust 
property or property otherwise held on a fiduciary basis. 
"2. A court of another State shall not be prevented from exercising 
jurisdiction in any proceeding brought before it against a person other 
than a State, notwithstanding the fact that the proceeding relates to, or is 
designed to deprive the State of, property: 
"(a) which is in the possession or control of the State; or 
"(b) in which the State claims a right or interest, 
if the State itself could not have invoked immunity had the proceeding 
been instituted against it, or ifthe right or interest claimed by the State is 
neither admitted nor supported by prima facie evidence. 
"3. The preceding paragraphs are without prejudice to the immun-
ities of States in respect of their property from attachment and ex-
ecution, or the inviolability of the premises ofa diplomatic or special or 
other official mission or of consular premises, or the jurisdictional 
immunity enjoyed by a diplomatic agent in respect of private immov-
able property held on behalf of the sending State forthe purposes of the 
mission." 
See Yearbook . .. 1983. vol. II (Part Two), p. 36; for the commentary. ibid .. 
pp. 36 et seq. 
24 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as fol-
lows: 
damage to property).2S There was a lack of enthusiasm for 
these two exceptions since they found no support in the 
general practice of States. Nevertheless, a trend seems 
to have emerged in recent legislation and treaty practice 
projecting such limitations for future progressive de-
velopment. After the first round of discussion in the Com-
mission, the Special Rapporteur submitted a revised draft 
of these two articles to the Drafting Committee. 
16. The application of the exception concerning con_ 
tracts of employment as provided in the revised article 13 26 
seems narrowly confined to the small number of cases in 
which the employer State, of its own free will, decides to 
place 10cal\y recruited non-national employees under the 
"Article 13. Contracts of employment 
"I. Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the juris-
diction of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings relating 
to a 'contract of employment' ofa national or resident of that other State 
for work to be performed there. 
"2. Paragraph I does not apply if: 
"(a) the proceedings relate to failure L employ an individual or 
dismissal of an employee; 
"(b) the employee is a national of the employing State at the time the 
proceedings are brought; 
"(c) the employee was neither a national nor a resident of the State of 
the forum at the time of employment; or 
"(d) the employee has otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accord-
ance with the law of the State of the forum, the courts of that State have 
exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter." 
Ibid.. p. 18, footnote 54. 
25 The text originally submitted by the Special Rapporteur read as fol-
lows: 
"Article 14. Personal injuries and damage to property 
"Unless otherwise agreed, a State is not immune from the jurisdiction 
of the courts of another State in respect of proceedings relating to injury 
to the person or death or damage to or loss of tangible property, if the act 
or omission which caused the injury or damage in the State of the forum 
occurred in that territory, and the author of the injury or damage was 
present therein at the time of its occurrence." 
Ibid .. p. 19, footnote 55. 
26 The revised text of article 13 submitted by the Special Rapporteur 
read as follows: 
"Article 13. Colllracts o/elllp/oymelZl 
"I. Unless otherwise mutually agreed between the States con-
cerned, a State which employs an individual for services to be per-
formed, in whole or in part, in the territory of another State, and has 
effectively placed the employee under the social security system of that 
other State, is considered to have consented to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by a court of that other State in a proceeding relating to the contract 
of employment. 
"2. Paragraph I does not apply if: 
"(a) the individual has been appointed under the administrative law 
of the employer State, and is performing functions in the exercise of 
governmental authority; 
"(b) the proceeding relates to non-appointment or dismissal of an 
individual seeking employment or re-employment; 
"(c) the individual is a national of the employer State at the time the 
proceeding is instituted; 
"(d) the individual was neither a national nor a habitual resident of 
the State of the forum at the time when the contract of employment was 
concluded, unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties to the 
contract of employment; 
"(e) the individual has otherwise agreed in writing, and the court of 
the State of the forum does not retain exclusive jurisdiction by reason of 
the subject-matter of the proceeding or the subordinate rank of the 
employee performing services of a solely domestic or non-governmen-
tal nature." 
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social security system of the host State in preference to its 
own. This may constitute a clear indication of intention to 
consent to the exercise of local jurisdiction and the appli-
cability of local labour law in regard to that particular 
contract of employment. This exception does not concern 
either appointment or non-appointment of an employee, 
or dismissal, or non-renewal of the contract of employ-
ment. It may concern breaches of the terms of the contract 
of employment to which local labour law and regulations 
oflocallabour relations apply. Thus a large volume of State 
immunity is preserved in the field of contracts of employ-
ment. 
17. The revised text of article 14 (Personal injuries and 
damage to property)27 is very limited in the scope of its 
application so as to cover only recovery of pecuniary com-
pensation for insurable risks of accidents resulting from 
inland transport of passengers and goods by rail, road, 
waterways or air, and the liability of the occupier ofprem-
ises for risks which are also insurable. It is designed not to 
deprive individuals of otherwise available relief without in 
any way inconveniencing the foreign Government. It does 
not concern transboundary torts or letter-bomb cases. But 
the insurance companies involved would no longer be able 
to hide behind the cloak of sovereign immunity, and this 
may serve in a way to encourage government agencies 
operating in another State to take out insurance policies 
where such are not required or already compulsory. Both 
articles 13 and 14 remain with the Drafting Committee and 
will be considered at the thirty-sixth session. 
18. Following the above account of the work so far 
accomplished and the draft articles still to be reconsidered 
and revised or readjusted before provisional adoption, it 
may now be convenient to proceed with a presentation of 
other possible exceptions or particular areas in which the 
extent of State immunity deserves the closest scrutiny and 
the most meticulous consideration. 
B. Debate in the Sixth Committee at the thirty-
eighth session of the General Assembly 
19. At the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, 
about 80 representatives took part in the debate on the 
report of the Commission on the work of its thirty-fifth 
27 The revised text of article 14 submitted by the Special Rapporteur 
read as follows: 
"Article 14. Personal injuries and damage to property 
"I. Unless otherwise mutually agreed between the States con-
cerned, a State which, through one of its organs, or agencies or instru-
mentalities acting in the exercise of governmental authority, maintains 
an office, agency or establishment in another State or occupies premises 
therein, or engages therein in the transport of passengers and cargoes 
either by air or by rail or road, or by waterways, is considered to have 
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of that other State in 
a proceeding relating to compensation for death or injury to the person 
or loss of or damage to tangible property, if the act or omission which 
caused the injury or damage in the State of the forum occurred in that 
territory, and the person responsible for or contributing to the injury or 
damage was present therein at the time of its occurrence. 
"2. Paragraph I is without prejudice to the rights and duties of 
individuals in one State vis-clovis another State which are specifically 
regulated by treaties, or other bilateral agreements, or regional ar-
rangements, or international conventions specifying or limiting the 
extent of liabilities or compensation." 
Ibid., footnote 59. 
session. No fewer than two thirds spoke on chapter III of 
the report, on jurisdictional immunities of States and their 
property, touching on one or several aspects of the topic. 28 
The fact that consideration of the topic in progress en-
livened the debate in the Sixth Committee is in itself an 
encouraging sign, confirming the general belief that the 
topic is of practical importance and the need and relative 
urgency for it to be completed in the near future. The 
Special Rapporteur believes it may be useful at this point to 
give his overall impressions of the debate on the topic and 
to provide further clarifications where lingering doubts 
and hesitations subsist. 
1. IRRELEVANCE OF CONTINUING DIFFERENCES 
IN IDEOLOGY 
20. Ideological differences with regard to the personality 
of the State or the capacity and functions of the State con-
tinue to exist. There is no likelihood that such a contro-
versy could be resolved one way or the other. It became 
apparent from the debate that, according to one school of 
thought, a sovereign State cannot have two different per-
sonalities. A State cannot act otherwise than as a sovereign 
entity. All functions undertaken by the State are govern-
mental and official. A State does not act nor can it perform 
an act in a like manner as an individual. This theory is not 
only prevalent among socialist States but also adhered to in 
some non-socialist countries. 29 On the other hand, this 
distinction has been recognized from the very beginning of 
State immunity in thejudicial practice of several countries, 
notably Italy, Belgium and Egypt. The ideological differ-
ences in this connection cut across the distinctions between 
socialist law and non-socialist law, civil law and common 
law, Islamic law and non-Islamic law, or other similar 
classifications oflegal systems. It would appear to serve no 
useful purpose for the Special Rapporteur or the Commis-
sion to endeavour to resolve these differences. On the con-
trary, in its study the Commission has so far tried to avoid 
taking any side in the confrontation between such unavoid-
able differences. Possible solutions proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur therefore do not rely on any such distinc-
tions. 
21. While the Commission has been able to reach the 
conclusion, tentatively as it may seem, that State immun-
ity is a general principle, and that its limitations are excep-
tions to the general principle, which is of course composed 
of several elements and qualifications as elaborated in 
articles 6 to 10, the proposed exceptions have not been 
based on any such differences which could give rise to 
objections from one quarter or another. Thus all the criti-
cisms and objections raised in the Sixth Committee against 
the application of any such distinctions, whether between 
acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, to which consid-
erable lip-service continues to be paid in a growing quan-
tity of judicial decisions, or between public acts and private 
28 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, 
Sixth Committee, 36th to 50th, 54th and 70th meetings, See also the 
statement introducing the report and the concluding observations by the 
Chairman of the Commission, ibid., 34th meeting, paras. 12-20, and 54th 
meeting, para. 52. 
29 See, for example, the statement by Miss Fraschini, the representative 
of Uruguay, ibid .. 45th meeting, para. 45. 
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acts, or between official and governmental capacity or per-
sonality and unofficial and non-governmental capacity or 
personality, or between the various functions undertaken 
by a Government or State organ, do not apply to the draft 
articles proposed and provisionally adopted by the Com-
mission. 
22. The criticism levelled against the lack of justification 
or practical difficulties in the application of the functional 
criterion or any such distinctions need not therefore retain 
the attention of the Commission, which proceeds on the 
assumption that such differences in ideology persist and 
endeavours to find solutions regardless of such differences. 
None of the solutions proposed will therefore be based on 
any of the distinctions or criteria which have been the 
subject of penetrating, and at times justified criticism. 
2. EMERGENCE OF SUBTLE DIFFERENCES 
IN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
23. The expression "jurisdictional immunities" to many 
and in several legal systems tends to presuppose the exis-
tence of jurisdiction, i.e. invocable or exercisable juris-
diction, depending on the point of view from which the 
initiation of a legal proceeding is considered; the plaintiff 
may invoke jurisdiction while the court may exercise it. 
Generally speaking, it seems logical enough that the ques-
tion of immunity from jurisdiction does not and cannot 
arise unless and until it is clear that such jurisdiction, from 
which the defendant could claim to be immune, does exist. 
Following this conceptual or theoretical approach, the 
scope or limit of jurisdiction is not at issue in any exam-
ination or investigation of the question of State immunity. 
In practice, however, the disconnection between jurisdic-
tion and jurisdictional immunity is not so clear-cut. When 
jurisdiction of a court is challenged, it could be challenged 
on the ground of jurisdictional immunity, because it im-
pleads the foreign sovereign directly or indirectly, or on 
any other ground, such as the "act of State" doctrine, or 
lack of jurisdiction under the laws of the organization of the 
court ratione materiae because the subject-matter of the 
dispute lies outside the scope of its jurisdiction or beyond 
its limits, or ratione personae because the person involved 
is exempt from the jurisdiction or forlack of capacity to sue 
and be sued of either one of the party-litigants. Nor is the 
court bound to decide upon the question of immunity 
before determining the extent of its jurisdiction in any case 
or vice versa. 
24. Procedural discrepancies have compounded the dif-
ficulties of approaching the issue. In most systems, juris-
dictional immunity need not be raised by the party. 
Although it can be raised at any stage of the trial, it can also 
be considered by the court proprio motu or d'office. In other 
systems, it is a question of ordre public and the court is 
bound to consider its own competence in any event. In 
general, other branches of the Government, such as the 
State Department, the Procureur de la Republique or the 
Avvocato dello Stato could raise the question with the court 
by making a suggestion of immunity or intervening as 
amicus curiae. In some systems, "jurisdictional immun-
ity" is so inextricably linked and intimately confused with 
invocability or exercisability of jurisdiction that there is no 
tangible, subtle distinction left in effect between immunite 
de juridiction and incompetence d'attribution, especially in 
civil-law countries where the court has little discretion, 
upon proof of its competence en fa matiere, to decline or 
refuse to exercise jurisdiction. It has no choice but to sit 
and decide the case. When the court declares itself incom-
petent, the effect is the same as dismissal of a case for lack 
of jurisdiction or on the ground of jurisdictional im-
munity. 
25. This subtle distinction has to be maintained in order 
to appreciate the necessity for the pre-existence ofjurisdic-
tion in many classes of case before proceeding to decide on 
the question of immunity. Without this distinction, it 
would make no difference whether the defendant was en-
titled to State immunity or not, or whether in fact as well as 
in law the court had no jurisdiction in the first place, 
regardless of the personality or the personal attributes of 
the defendant. Reference to the existing jurisdiction or the 
permissible scope of exercisable jurisdiction is determined 
by the internal law of the State of the forum. The law on this 
point may be found in some cases in the constitution of the 
State or in the judicature act or in the law of the organiz-
ation of the courts of justice. Whatever it may be called, it 
determines the scope and extent of jurisdiction in any 
given case, and whenever there is a foreign element in the 
proceeding, the law determining the invocability or exer-
cisability or appropriateness of jurisdiction of a court is 
known as the applicable rules of private international law 
or conflict of laws, whether or not there is a question of 
conflict of laws or of concurrence of jurisdictions. 
26. It is a fortunate coincidence that many representa-
tives 30 have pointed out that, in the present study of juris-
dictional immunities of States and their property, the 
Commission is neither required nor called upon to exam-
ine, co-ordinate or harmonize the question of extent or 
scope of jurisdiction of the courts of any State, nor to 
regulate internationally or by way of uniform rules the 
applicable rules of private international law or conflict of 
laws of every State. One has to start from the proposition 
that jurisdiction exists or that there is jurisdiction which is 
valid and recognized generally. Of course, disputes be-
tween States as to the propriety of the exerc~se of concur-
rent jurisdictions or priority of jurisdiction belong to other 
fields of private and public international law. They do exist 
and always continue to exist in relation to this topic as well 
as countless other topics involving the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion whenever there is a foreign element in the dispute. It is 
not the purpose of the present study to resolve all questions ~ 
covered under a much larger heading of national jurisdic-
tion or extent of judicial jurisdiction of a national court. 
One point should be made clear beyond dispute, however, 
whatever the views regarding the distinction between im-
munite de juridiction and incompetence d'attribution: 
whenever the court decides to exercise its jurisdiction and 
to consider the meritsofthe case, it has also decided that it 
is competent and has jurisdiction in accordance with its 
applicable rules of private international law governing the 
question of jurisdiction in such matters. In so doing, the 
court has also decided that the defence of jurisdictional 
immunity raised by one of the parties was not available to 
take the case out of its jurisdiction. Thus doubts could only 
30 See, for example, the statements by Sir Ian Sinclair, the representative 
of the United Kingdom, ibid., 39th meeting, para. 93, and by Mr. De Stoop, 
the representative of Australia, ibid., 50th meeting, para. 49. 
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exist when the court declines to exercise jurisdiction, since 
the issue of extent or scope of jurisdiction may have been 
confused or merged with the question of jurisdictional 
immunity. When jurisdiction is assumed and exercised, 
both questions have been clearly determined, namely the 
existence of jurisdiction and the non-applicability of State 
immunity. 
3. DIMINISHING CRITICISM AND GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF 
THE NECESSITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF STATE 
IMMUNITY 
27. One encouraging element resulting from increasing 
appreciation of the problems confronting the Commission 
is the decrease in opposition to and decline in criticism of 
its work, with regard both to the areas of investigation and 
to the seriousness of the objections. It must be insisted 
several times that the source materials before the Commis-
sion constitute the sum total or quasi-sum total of existing 
State practice and that the selection of cases presented 
under each rubric is not at random, nor discriminaury, 
before this fact is understood and accepted. It also took 
time and effort to point out that practically every legal 
system has followed a path that is not always uniform, 
regardless of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, and 
that the seeming distortions are not the Special Rappor-
teur's own doing but inherent in the practice of States itself. 
It has become at times impossible to untwist or unbend the 
course of legal developments so as to stretch it into a 
straight line. Like a river, whose natural course is dictated 
by geological conditions and the volume and fre9uency ~f 
rainfall, so the judicial practice of States on thlS t~P1C lS 
conditioned by several factors of common sense, 10glC and 
even expediency. 
28. Clearly, some of the misgivings will remain, owing to 
the complexity of the subject-matter under investigation 
and existing differences in the various legal systems, dif-
ferences not only in ideology, but also in approach, meth-
odology and outcome. Such differences either appear 
reconcilable or could be put aside in order to allow a more 
orderly international regulation to operate; but lack of in-
depth appreciation may continue. Care should be taken 
lest lack of practice in a given State be misconstrued as 
existence of practice favouring absolute immunity, when 
in actual fact there has been no decision upholding any 
State immunity anywhere. In the same way that it can~ot 
be said that a particular legal system has adopted a restnc-
tive practice, nor can the opposite be inferred simply from 
the absence of practice to the contrary. It has become 
increasingly more apparent that the question of jurisdic-
tional immunities of States deserves international atten-
tion and cannot be left to the judicial decisions of muni-
cipal courts alone, nor exclusively to nationallegislation.31 
The codification and progressive development of intern a-
tionallaw on the topic by an international institution will 
alone be likely to provide an adequate and satisfactory 
answer to most of the questions involved. 
;1 Several representatives in the Sixth Committee indicated that no 
legislation was contemplated in their countries. At the informal meeting of 
legal advisers of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee held in 
New York from 23 to 25 November 1983, it was agreed to await further 
developments in the work of the Commission before considering new 
initiatives. 
29. This growing realization is imperative ifchaos is ever 
to be replaced by order. State immunity as a principle is to 
be upheld, but several specified areas should be investi-
gated to determine the precise extent of immunity, its 
applicability and the conditions or limitations qualifying 
its application. These specified areas may be viewed as 
exceptional spheres where State immunity may not oper-
ate or apply to its maximum capacity, but is otherwise 
limited by more impelling reasons of practical necessity or 
sheer common sense or good faith. Reciprocity is another 
consideration that has its valid application and mounting 
persuasive force. If States are at the same time, though not 
in the same case, giver and recipient of immunity, reci-
procity is inevitable, though not necessarily controllable. 
4. COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT ARTICLES 
30. A large number of speakers in the Sixth Committee 
took time to comment in a highly constructive and very 
encouraging way on the draft articles provisionally 
adopted or recently submitted. The Special Rapporteur 
could not help being inspired by many of the commenta-
tors, who are without exception well-wishers. 
31. Article 10 (Counter-claims) received positive en-
dorsement in principle. No one spoke against the substance 
or principles contained in its provisions. Some merely sug-
gested possible drafting improvements, which will be re-
examined during second reading. This is not insignificant 
in view of the vastly different rules of procedure that exist 
in various legal systems. The Drafting Committee is to be 
congratulated for its agility in meeting most of the points 
encountered in the formulation of the three paragraphs to 
cover different situations in the prevailing systems in vari-
ous parts of the world. 
32. Article 11 (Scope of the present part) is designed to 
introduce the notion of "reciprocity" as an element which 
will ensure flexibility in the application of the exceptions 
proposed in part III of the draft articles. It has been 
observed quite correctly that reciprocity will serve to 
reduce the scope of application of State immunity rather 
than expand it. It will not reduce the exceptions, although 
in actual practice there appear to be diametrically opposite 
schools ofthought. One is found in the practice ofIndia 32 
and concerns more the executive than the judiciary, since 
the rule seems to favour general immunity except where, 
by virtue of reciprocity, the principle of State immunity 
has no application in the other country concerned. Another 
school followed by Italy would allow State immunity only 
if, by way of reciprocity, it can be clearly proven that the 
Italian State would likewise be accorded jurisdictional 
immunity. This doctrine of reciprocity applies especially 
with regard to immunity of State property from attach-
ment and execution. Proof has to be furnished of existing 
legislation of the other State or else confirmed in writing by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through normal diplomatic 
channels. 33 Thus property of a foreign State is not auto-
12 See, for example, the statement made at the thirty-fourth session of 
the Commission by Mr. ]agota (Yearbook ... 1982. vol. I, pp. 189-190, 
1729th meeting, paras. 6-12). Mr. Rao expressed a similar view at ~he 
informal meeting oflegal advisers of the Asian-African Legal ConsultatIve 
Committee in New York on 25 November 1983 (unpublished). 
;; See, for example, decree law No. 1621 of 30 August 1925 on the 
(Conlilltu'd 011 next page,) 
••• 7.77.".:: II".U.'IIIS.' •• -.?- '_: a;. __________ . ___ • 
14 Documents of the thirty-sixth session 
matically accorded immunity from attachment or execu-
tion, unless, by virtue of reciprocity, it can be established 
that, under existing legislation of that country, property of 
the Italian State is accorded immunity from attachment 
and execution. Whichever way the doctrine of reciprocity 
is to be applied, it would only operate to limit rather than 
expand the scope of State immunity. 
33. It has also dawned on the Special Rapporteur, listen-
ing to the various comments made in the course of the 
debate in the Sixth Committee during the thirty-eighth 
session of the General Assembly, that the nature of the 
exceptions in part III could also be clarified in the pro-
vision of article 11. For instance, it has been stated all along 
that the principle of State immunity is relative in the sense 
that consent is decisive. Thus, even if the cases under con-
sideration were to fall squarely within one of the exceptions 
provided for in the draft articles, nothing could prevent the 
court ofa State from granting immunity. In any event, the 
court may also follow the lead of the executive in any given 
case for any reason that it considers to be imperative. Even 
convenience could be operative as a reason for the court 
declining to exercise its otherwise competent jurisdiction 
on the ground that it is a forum non conveniens, or that 
other forums are more convenient and therefore more 
appropriate. 
34. Article 12 (Commercial contracts) has attracted the 
most comment, together with the related provisions of 
article 2, paragraph 1 (g), and article 3, paragraph 2. The 
majority of speakers seemed to think that it had struck a 
satisfactory balance. There were those who would like to 
see a more restrictive formulation, and also those who 
would consider these provisions superfluous. Admittedly, 
the problems did not arise in regard to socialist countries, 
but no strong objection was raised against allowing the 
world community, including the non-socialist countries, to 
endeavour to resolve this difficult and complex question 
among themselves. Yet others expressed the view that the 
Commission was on the right track, but hoped that further 
improvement could be introduced to maintain an even 
better equilibrium between the interests of various groups 
of States, the rich and the poor, developed and developing, 
socialist and non-socialist, and other opposite types of 
interest. To be more precise, criticism was levelled from 
some quarters regarding the use of the expression "appli-
cable rules of private international law" -so much used in 
the context of conflict oflaws-which refers to an internal 
legal system With a foreign element, concerning the scope 
and extent of existing competence or jurisdiction of a court 
of law rather than State immunity. The interests of de-
veloping countries would be better served if the exception 
of commercial contracts were further linked to a significant 
territorial or other substantial connection or contact with 
the forum State, especially if it were further reinforced or 
secured by the establishment of a local office or agency 
operating within the territory of the forum State, whence 
the dispute resulting from a commercial contract has 
emerged. The second reading of this draft could produce a 
still more satisfying improvement. As it is, the draft rep-
resents a breakthrough and offers a possible way out of the 
labyrinth in which the law finds itself. 
(Footnote 33 continued) . 
property of foreign States in Italy, Rivista di diritto int~rn~zlon~le (Ro.me), 
18th year (1926), p. 159, "Atti esecutivi sopra bem dl Statl esten nel 
Regno". 
35. Article 13 (Contracts of employment) has also been 
the subject of favourable as well as less kindly expressed 
views. The revised version was definitely preferred but 
opinions still varied from one extreme to another. The 
Drafting Committee will have to meet another challenge 
here. 
36. Article 14 (Personal injuries and damage to property) 
has come up against some strong opposition, unless it is 
confined to pecuniary compensation and coverage for 
insurable risks. Opinions were also divided. The interests 
of foreign States and the safety and welfare of local in-
habitants are at stake, though not necessarily in direct 
conflict, since the insurance company comes into the pic-
ture as the middleman who claims the best of both worlds. 
The Drafting Committee will also face considerable diffi-
culties in this connection, though, it is hoped, by no means 
insurmountable ones. 
37. Article 15 (Ownership, possession and use of prop-
erty) has attracted little comment. It was on the whole 
considered satisfactory, except for the saving clause con-
cerning diplomatic and consular premises in paragr~ ph 3, 
which could be made clearer. Ultimately, it might be 
necessary to spell out in part IV of the draft articles, in no 
uncertain terms, the immunity of State property from 
attachment and execution. Such immunity, as the rep-
resentative of France pointed out,34 could not be identified 
with the inviolability and protection provided in the two 
Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.35 Perhaps the gap 
will have to be filled, and part IV rather than article 15 
appears to offer an appropriate place. 
C. Continuing progress in legal developments 
38. Since the previous report, submitted in 1983, legal 
developments have occurred in abundance and in rapid 
succession, so that any observation made on the practice of 
a State today may no longer be valid tomorrow. Before 
proceeding to confirm or make any necessary alterations to 
the projected structure of the rest of the present study, it 
may be necessary to glance quickly at the legal develop-
ments that have occurred since the preparation of the fifth 
report. 
1. SHARP INCREASE IN RESTRICTIVE PRACTICE 
39. Whatever the outcry or denial of emerging trends, 
there appears to be an unmistakable upsurge in legal devel-
opments which clearly indicates a strong tendency in 
favour of further restrictions of State immunity in every 
imaginable field, most important of all in the allowance of 
actual attachment and execution of State property where it 
really hurts-affecting not only the sovereign dignity of the 
State, but more practically the means by which meaningful 
diplomatic intercourse or interchange of good offices and 
international transactions are engaged. 
34 See the statement by Mr. Guillaume, the representative of France 
(Official Records of the General Assembly. Thirty-eighth session. Sixth 
Committee. 41st meeting, para. 29). 
35 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (United Nations, 
Treaty Series. vol. 500, p. 95), and 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (ibid .• vol. 596, p.261). 
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40. Recent practice in the United States of America has 
been noted for the liberal interpretation that its courts have 
been prepared to give to the wording of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976,36 so as to disallow State 
immunity where the commercial transaction, wherever 
concluded and performed, could cause direct effect in the 
United States, or entail financial consequences therein, or 
bring tangible benefits or advantages such as repatriation 
of profits to the home base in the State of the forum. In 
actual practice, however, United States courts could be 
said to have imposed self-restraint in certain decisions 
holding the injury to have occurred outside the territory of 
the forum State 37 or that the commercial transaction in 
question had no bearing or adverse effect in the United 
States. 38 In any event, the Act in question was designed to 
establish a well-recognized exception to jurisdictional im-
munities customarily accorded to foreign Governments, 
and not in any way whatsoever to expand or enlarge exist-
ing territorial or national jurisdiction of United States 
courts, nor to create new special jurisdiction where none 
had existed before. 39 
41. In that particular connection, it is not United States 
pI dctice that has gone furthest in favour of the exercise of 
jurisdiction in regard to commercial activity, rather the 
most recent case-law of the United Kingdom, where the 
House of Lords admitted the assumption of sister-ship 
jurisdiction upon the physical presence of a sister ship.40 
42. Yet in terms of doctrinal confirmation of the nature 
test for a commercial transaction, notwithstanding the 
public or sovereign purpose of the contract from the point 
of view of the State, the Constitutional Court of the Federal 
36 United Srares Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97; repro-
duced in United Nations, Marerials on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and rheir Properry (Sales No. E/F.8l.V.IO), pp. 55 et seq. 
For United States case-law, see, for example, Texas Trading and Mil-
ling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central Bank of Nigeria 
(1981) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 647 (1981), p. 300; see also 
United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , p. 527); Har-
ris Corporation v. National Iranian Radio and Television (1982) (Federal 
Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 691 (1983), p. 1344). Cf. a similar trend which 
has emerged in the case-law of France: see, for example, Corporaci6n del 
Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe Le Groupement d'impor-
tat ion des meraux (1972) (Revue generale de droit international public 
(Paris), vol. 77 (1973), p. 1240). 
37 See, for example, Sedco, Inc. (Petr6leos Mexicanos) (1982) (Federal 
Supplement, vol. 543 (1982), p. 561). Pemex, as an instrumentality of the 
Mexican Government, was held to be immune from jurisdiction, and the 
blow-out concerned was held to be non-commercial and also within the 
discretionary activity protected by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976. 
38 See, for example, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. 
Republic of Guinea (1982) (Federal Reporter, 2nd Series, vol. 693 (1983), 
p. 1094). The court declined jurisdiction for lack of a substantial link 
between the commercial activity and the United States. 
39 See, for example, Warnerv. Territory of Hawaii (I 953)(ibid., vol. 206 
(1953), p. 851). See also American Law Institute, Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised), Tentative Draft No.2 
(27 March 1981) (Philadelphia, Pa.), pp. 171-221, Part IV: Jurisdiction 
and Judgments, chap. 2, especially p. 178: "The law ... does not establish 
causes of action or create or destroy legal obligations ... ". The Act refers to 
any civil action against a foreign State as defined in the Act and which is 
not entitled to immunity under the provisions of the Act or under any 
applicable international agreement. 
40 See, in particular, The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981) (The All 
England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064). Two sister ships of the 
1 Congreso del Partido, namely the Marble Islands and the Playa Larga, 
were at the origin of the action. 
Republic of Germany must now be regarded as a champion 
in upholding jurisdiction by application of the nature test 
to the exclusion of all other tests and proceeding thereby to 
allow attachment and also the eventual possible execution 
of the assets of the property of a foreign sovereign State (in 
one case, the National Iranian Oil Company).41 German 
case-law was careful to disallow such a drastic measure 
against the bank account of a foreign State for the operation 
of an embassy (a case concerning the Philippine Em-
bassy),42 although other bank accounts not connected with 
the operation of the embassy might not be so leniently 
treated. 
43. In this connection, Unitcd States courts may be lead-
ing the field in holding that the burden lies on the foreign 
embassy concerned to furnish proof that the bank account 
to be attached was for the purpose of operating the embassy 
and in ruling that a mixed account is liable to attachment 
and therefore unprotected by State immunity.43 
44. This sharp twist in the recent practice of countries 
holding a restrictive view of immunity is far more alarming 
than the theoretical absence of jurisdictional immunity, 
followed by a judicial pronouncement or even condem-
nation without any prospect of satisfaction or execution of 
the judgment. What appears in the fifth report of the 
Special Rapporteur regarding Italian practice in the field of 
contracts of employment 44 must now be disavowed. 'In 
cases judged since the preparation of that report (1983), 
bank accounts of embassies were attached for payment of 
social security and other emoluments under contracts of 
employment.45 
2. ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE UPHOLDING 
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
45. As much as the Special Rapporteur is willing to recog-
nize and accept as authoritative and persuasive any current 
judicial decisions supporting the doctrine of absolute im-
munity, none has been found in the period since the prep-
aration of the fifth report. A memorandum submitted by a 
member of the Commission 46 has proved of the greatest 
value as evidence of existing adherence to an absolute view 
of State immunity. Clearly, the absolute doctrine as pro-
pounded in the memorandum and supported by some 
members of the Commission is entitled to the greatest 
weight as an authoritative statement of the law in a given 
4. See the decision of 12 Api! 1983 by the Federal Constitutional Court 
concerning the complaint of unconstitutionality submitted by the National 
Iranian Oil Company (Entscheidungen des Bundesveifassungsgerichts 
(Tiibingen), vol. 64 (1984), p. I). 
42 See the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 13 December 
1977 in X v. Republic of the Philippines (United Nations, Materials on 
Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , p.297). 
43 See, for example, Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of Tan::ania 
(1980) (Federal Supplement, vol. 507 (1981), p. 311). 
44 Document AlCNAI363 and Add. I (see footnote I (e) above), 
para. 48. 
" The Ccremoniale Diplomatico della Repubblll'a has intervened on 
two occasions in actions, one involving the Embassy of Algeria and the 
other the Embassy of the Islamic Republic ofIran, for payment of social 
security and other emoluments. See Appunto (Rome), !O June 1983. 
46 Yearbook ... 1983. vol. II (Part One), p. 53, document 
AlCNAI371. 
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State, whether socialist or non-socialist. It has certainly 
afforded a sound foundation for the Commission in its 
continuing search for a better balanced approach to this 
difficult conceptual problem. 
46. It is high time an absolute view was cited so as to 
present firm opposition to the restrictive trends that 
appear to be asserting themselves. The question is how to 
slow down, arrest or even reverse the trends so as to main-
tain what jurisdictional immunities there might still be for 
States and their property. The trends would not be sus-
pended simply by enunciation of an opposing doctrine or 
by mere declaration of an absolute principle. Even ifsuch a 
gesture were to be followed up by national legislation, it 
would only allow immunity one-sidedly to foreign States, 
and only by a process of reciprocal treatment would juris-
diction in tum be upheld and exercised. Just as it is correct 
to predicate that most of the developing countries have not 
adopted the practice of restrictive immunity, it is equally 
accurate to state that none of the socialist countries has 
adopted a restrictive view of State immunity. But to state 
any such proposition, however emphatically, is still far 
from providing concrete evidence of a judicial decision 
allowing immunity in cases where it would have been 
denied in countries practising restricted immunity. Re-
grettably, nothing short of an affirmative judicial decision 
could be viewed as establishing the acceptance of absolute 
immunity in the judicial practice of States. It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Special Rapporteur to 
invent or concoct such a decision in a vacuum. 
47. Judicial decisions that have gone a long way to 
approaching an absolute rule of State immunity are to be 
found in the practice of British and American courts, 
dating back to The "Pesaro" (1926) 47 and The "Porto Alex-
andre" (1920),48 which must now be considered to have 
long been overruled and discarded. As has been seen, the 
judicial practice of the States that had upheld absolute 
immunity has now radically changed. As far as the research 
of the Codification Division reveals, there are no such 
judicial decisions in the practice of other States. 
47 See Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro"(l926) (United States Reports, 
vol. 271 (1927), p. 562). 
48 United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p.30. 
See also The "Parlement beIge" (I 880)(ibid., vol. V (1880), p. 197)and The 
"Cristina" (1938) (The Law Reports, House oj Lords, Judicial Committee 
oJthe Privy Council, 1938, p.485). 
3. CONTINUING PURSUIT OF THE CURRENT PROGRAMME 
48. In the circumstances, the more appealing alternative 
would appear to be to accelerate the pace of work in pursuit 
of the current programme. This would at least provide an 
assured way of containing the restrictive trends. By exam-
ining the particular areas where exceptions are believed to 
have been recognized, and by circumscribing and delin-
eating the scope of the application of such exceptions in the 
specified areas, taking into account all the theoretical dif-
ferences identified and the various points of view noted, 
and bearing in mind the differences in legal, political and 
economic systems prevailing in various States, an ap-
proach may be found which could yield salutary results. 
49. In the pages that follow, it is therefore proposed to 
examine draft articles in the following specified areas of 
part III. 
Article 16. Patents, trade marks and other intellectual 
properties; 
Article 17. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties; 
Article 18. Shareholdings and membership of bodies 
corporate; 
Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service; 
Article 20. Arbitration. 
50. It should be recalled at this point that the selection of 
the above specified areas has not been without precedent. 
Rather, precisely because such areas have been considered 
exceptional in a number of instruments, multilateral con-
ventions,49 regional or bilateral treaties, or legislative en-
actments,SO the present study cannot afford to overlook 
whatever authoritative source materials or practice may 
exist in order to prepare the groundwork upon which to 
erect a solid edifice of legal propositions. 
49 See, for example, the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
and its Additional Protocol (Council of Europe, European Treaty Series 
(Strasbourg), No. 74 (1972» and the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned 
Vessels (Brussels, 10 April 1926) and Additional Protocol (Brussels, 24 
May 1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, pp. 199 and 
215; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional1mmuni-
ties . . " pp. 173 et seq.). 
50 See, for example, the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
oj 1976 (see footnote 36 above); the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 
1978 (see footnote 58 below); Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 
(see footnote 62 below); and Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979 (see 
footnote 61 below). 
Draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (continued) 
PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY (continued) 
ARTICLE 16 (Patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties) 
A. General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF "PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND OTHER 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES" 
51. The object of article 16 is to examine the extent of 
State immunity in another specified area, that involving 
"patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties". 
Under the general heading of article 16 are grouped three 
categories of intellectual and industrial property. The first 
group is designated as "patents" and includes industrial 
designs and inventions for industrial or manufacturing 
purposes. The second group, entitled "trade marks", 
covers the use of trade names, service marks or other sim-
ilar rights pertaining to merchandise on sale in the markets 
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poses. The third group comprises the remaining types of 
industrial or intellectual property, such as copyright, trans-
lation rights, reproduction rights, literary works. artistic 
objects, musical compositions, lyrics, video tapes, discs, 
and audio and audio-visual tapes. 
52. Industrial or intellectual properties under the heading 
of article 16 are therefore rights protected by States, 
nationally as well as internationally. The protection pro-
vided by States within their respective territorial jurisdic-
tions varies according to the organized system of registra-
tion of such rights, for which protection is guaranteed by 
internal law and enforced by appropriate machinery. The 
system for deposit, examination, investigation and even-
tual registration is administered in each State in accord-
ance with its prevailing legislation and customs. It is not 
unusual that, in industrially or economically developed 
countries, the protection provided is more effective and 
infringement is discouraged or severely punished, while in 
less developed or developing countries, such a system may 
either be non-existent or be at a very embryonic stage, 
since expert knowledge is required before registration of 
any invention, patent or industrial design. Copyrights of 
literary works, artistic objects and musical compositions, 
reproduction,..translation or performance of which must be 
authorized in advance, often against fees or royalties, are 
more widely known the world over, for they are also asso-
ciated with cultural heritage and works of art protected by 
recognition of an author's rights, regardless of the commer-
cial or non-commercial nature of the reproduction, perfor-
mance, publication or distribution. 
2. PROTECTION AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
53. Legal protection offered by the State of the forum 
provides a strong foundation and a valid legal basis for the 
assumption and exercise of jurisdiction. Protection is gen-
erally consequential upon registration or even upon appli-
cation for registration or upon deposit of such an appli-
cation. It may also exist otherwise in certain systems 
where, even prior to actual acceptance for registration, 
some measure of protection is conceivable. Protection 
depends on the existence and sanctity of the national legis-
lation and the effectiveness of the system in operation in a 
particular society. Thus not only is the appropriate legis-
lation applicable, but also there has to be an effective sys-
tem of registration in force to afford a sound legal basis for 
jurisdiction. 
54. It follows that effectiveness is only practicable within 
the territorial confines of the State concerned. Thus the 
system in operation could be invoked for protection in 
cases of infringement of intellectual properties or violation 
of the rights protected only in so far as infringements or 
violations occurring within the territory of the State of the 
forum are concerned. In the case of infringements or vio-
lations outside such territorial limits, other remedies or a 
different kind of protection available in another State 
under the jurisdiction of another authority would have to 
be invoked. 
55. It could also be stated that the basis for jurisdiction is 
. ~he existence of a substantial territorial connection or 
Important contact with the State of the forum. Without the 
occurrence of violations or infringements within its terri-
tory, there would be no justification for the exercise of 
jurisdiction. This is so because the legislative protection 
given is available only territorially, the State not being in a 
position to extend its protective arms beyond the limits of 
its own national territory. 
3. CLOSENESS TO TRADE AND USE OF PROPERTY 
56. It is clear that the area specified under article 16 bears 
the closest relationship to "commercial contracts" under 
article 12 and "ownership, possession and use of property" 
under article 15. In the latter two articles, the two excep-
tions appear to have been fairly widely accepted in the 
practice of States. Article 16 could be considered as an 
extension of the exception of trading transactions recog-
nized under article 12, the difference being that, in article 
16, the purpose of the protection is to prevent "unfair 
competition" in trade and to regulate the imposition of 
trade restrictions such as anti-trust legislation. The protec-
tion of patents, trade marks and other intellectual prop-
erties is designed to ensure greater fairness in commercial 
practices. The result of this protection could be felt inter-
nally as well as in international trade, as the origin of the 
goods may be in one State and their distribution might 
infringe rights in another State. While the measure of pro-
tection is territorially limited, its beneficial consequences 
could be transboundary, if not world-wide, regardless of 
the place of origin, production or manufacture of the 
goods; the place of infringement could be at the receiving 
end, in the country of either wholesalers or retail traders. 
Even under modern theories regarding rules of conflict of 
laws for unfair competition or restraint on trade, the law of 
the country where the infringement occurs is a decisive 
factor and this could be the proper forum to exercise j uris-
diction. 
57. By analogy with article 15, copyrights and other intel-
lectual property rights constitute a collection ofproprietary 
rights or rights to use or reproduce which could be desig-
nated as properties under the classification of "incorporeal 
hereditaments", i.e. intangible rights, or rights without a 
corpus. Recognition and protection of such industrial 
designs or other intellectual properties is a matter for the 
law of the place where the particular right is registered. In 
other words, the lex situs of such intangible properties is 
the law of the place of their registration. Thus the appli-
cable law, as well as the invokable or exercisable jurisdic-
tion, seem to cross at the same convenient point so as to 
make the court of the State where protection is offered for 
the registration of such rights as well as of the place of their 
infringement the only competent forum, and as such a 
forum conveniens under the applicable rules of private 
international law. 
4. CONSENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR 
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
58. Ifa State seeks the protection of another State for the 
registration of a patent, invention or industrial design, it 
has clearly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
territorial authority from which it is seeking protection 
within the territory of another State. This would seem 
equally true when a State seeks to claim or contest a claim 
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to such rights, or is otherwise involved in a dispute con-
cerning infringements of such rights or properties. Of 
course, if the State does not contest the rights but admits 
the violations or infringements, it would be difficult in the 
same breath to invoke its sovereign immunity for an ac-
tivity which is not only commercial and non-governmen-
tal, but also involves unfair competition and trade prac-
tices. It would seem logical for consent to be presumed or 
implicit in the event ofinfringements, just as in the event of 
contestation. In the latter event, the foreign State would be 
claiming the protection of the State of the forum and, as 
such, would be another claimant of the rights at issue or in 
dispute. 
59. Such a line of reasoning is attractive, whether the 
search for protection by another State is evidence of con-
sent if this is regarded as a right to use an incorporeal 
property, or ifit is considered to be a waiver or abandon-
ment of immunity when a State competes in trade in the 
territory of another State, especially in the field of unfair 
competition of trade practices, beyond entering an ordi-
nary commercial contract. Whatever the rationale behind 
the suggestion of non-immunity in this specified area, 
whether on the grounds of implied consent by analogy with 
article 12 or article 15, or whether it is likened to commer-
cial contracts under article 12 or to the use of property 
under article 15, common sense appears to dictate absence 
of objection to this restriction on State immunity. The 
practice of States may bear witness to this preliminary 
finding. 
B. The practice of States 
1. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
60. It should be observed, before exploring the practice of 
States in this specified area, that legal developments in the 
field of patents, trade marks and other intellectual prop-
erties are matters of comparatively recent occurrence. 
Trade names and trade marks may have been the earliest of 
intellectual properties to have been given national and 
international protection. Patents ofinventions and indus-
trial designs were relatively unknown in the developing 
world, and it is not until very recently that attention has 
been drawn in developing countries to the need to provide 
incentives for initiatives of invention and ingenuity, even 
in more primitive societies. Thus State practice has not 
been too rich in this area where another State is a party to 
litigation before a national authority. Earlier case-law of 
developed countries has very few instances of such dis-
putes. Judicial and governmental practice of States can 
only be found in the contemporary period. 
61. Another explanation may be found in the fact that 
States did not normally engage in trade themselves until 
very recently, and now that they do, they have not indulged 
in unfair competition, save in very rare, exceptional 
instances. With the assistance of a theory of consent by 
conduct or by necessary implication, a State very often 
finds itself appearing as claimant or indeed plaintiffbefore 
the courts of another State, thus avoiding the invocation of 
State immunity. Again with the aid of such a doctrine, 
acceptance of this exception to State immunity does not 
need to be based on too much practice. 
62. The present inquiry is limited to the protection of 
patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties at the 
national level; beyond that there exists another layer of 
protection, at the international level, which might be inter-
State or intergovernmental relations or protection offered 
by an international system or organization, such as WIPO, 
or by a series of international conventions, such as the 
Paris Copyright Convention. 51 The present study is con-
ducted at the national, as opposed to the international 
level. Thus, when a State seeks the authority, judicial or 
administrative, of another State to protect its rights against 
infringements, it may be an initial step in the process of 
exhaustion of local remedies. 
63. In actual practice, a State may succeed to the rights 
and obligations of private firms or trading or manufactur-
ing companies, by way of nationalization or otherwise, and 
also become answerable for the infringements of patents by 
the corporations it has nationalized or acquired. This is not 
an uncommon phenomenon in this day and age, when 
developing countries and 'ocialist as well as capitalist 
States have also deemed it expedient to nationalize an 
industry or enterprise or the production and management 
of natural resources such as oil, gas, electricity, water and 
other sources of energy. Banking and other financial insti-
tutions are no exceptions to the wave of nationalization to 
remedy or improve national economies. 
2. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
64. Judicial decisions directly in point are not so plentiful 
for reasons that are apparent from the foregoing general 
observations. The case-law regarding patents, trade marks 
and other intellectual properties is regarded as a specialized 
field for practitioners. Only specialists in anyone of the 
three groups are well versed in the jurisprudence in a par-
ticular branch of the industry or artistry protected. Thus 
cases involving foreign States or Governments or their 
agencies and instrumentalities are rare. Nevertheless, the 
few leading cases that are available are instructive and so 
noteworthy that they deserve the most attentive consider-
ation. 
65. The leading case in this particular area is indisputably 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Austria in Dralle v. 
Republic of Czechoslovakia (1950).52 This decision ranks as 
one of the causes celebres in the historical development of 
the case-law of Austria and is well known throughout the 
world for the thoroughness with which the court examined 
not only Austrian case-law, but also the judicial practice 
and jurisprudence of as many important countries as are 
known in the annals of legal science. Not only European 
cases, but also Latin-American and Asian cases were cited 
and examined by the court. In this case, the respondent was 
the Czechoslovak State, engaging in business under the 
name of a firm. The dispute related to the use of trade 
51 Universal Copyright Convention, revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 
(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 943, p. 178). 
52 Osterreichische Juristen Zeitung (Vienna), vol. 5 (1950), p. 341, case 
No. 356; International Law Reports, 1950 (London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 155, 
case No. 41; lournaldu droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 77 (1950), 
p. 749. The text of the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court is repro-
duced (in English) in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Im-
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marks which applied to goods made by the German parent 
company, sold in Austria and registered in the name of the 
Czechoslovak subsidiary nationalized by the Czecho-
slovak State. The German parent company sought an 
injunction to prevent the Czechoslovak Government from 
using the trade marks. The extraterritorial effect of the 
confiscation of trade mark rights was denied in relation to 
the Austrian marks. It was also held that, since Austria 
rejected the concept of a uniform trade mark in relation to 
foreign marks, this also applied to internationally regis-
tered foreign marks. Since the nationalized marks were 
subsequent to the rights of the plaintiff or his licenser, the 
injunction could be granted. It was held that: 
1. Under international law. foreign States are exempt from the juris-
diction of the Austrian courts only in so far as relates to acts' performed by 
them in the exercise of their sovereign powers; 
2. Similarly. under municipal law. foreign States are subject to Aus-
trian jurisdiction in all contentious matters arising out of legal relations 
within the sphere of private law. 53 
Referring to the facts of the case, the court observed 
that: 
... Today the position is entirely different; States engage in commercial 
activities and. as the present case shows, enter into competition with their 
own nationals and with foreigners. * Accordingly, the classic doctrine of 
immunity has lost its meaning, and, ratione cessante. can no longer be 
recognized as a rule of international law. 54 
66. Whatever may be the criteria used to distinguish 
between actajure gestionis not covered by State immunity 
and acta jure imperii entitled to immunity, the Supreme 
Court of Austria was as convincing as it was convinced in 
its historical approach and judicial reasoning that the busi-
ness activity conducted in Austria was not protected by 
State immunity and that the question relating to the use of 
trade marks by foreign firms registered in Austria was 
determined by Austrian domestic law under Austrian 
jurisdiction. No immunity was recognized in respect of 
questions relating to the foreign trade mark rights in dis-
pute. The Czechoslovak Government could be said to be as 
much a claimant of the foreign mark rights as the party 
seeking relief from the court. 
67. Another less well-known case is the decision of 
30 June 1977 by the Land High Court (Oberlandesgericht) 
of Frankfurt in the Federal Republic of Germany con-
cerning the Spanish Government Tourist Bureau.55 The 
dispute related to the unauthorized performance of 
copyrighted film scores and compensation for the infringe-
ment of copyrights. The claim for damages was statute-
barred but was made on the additional ground of unjust 
enrichment. The performances were held not to constitute 
a permissible public use under the Literary Copyright Act. 
I t was also held that film scores retained their separate legal 
existence even if they were composed for a particular film, 
because as a rule they could also be utilized for their own 
sake.56 Infringement of copyrighted film scores by show-
ings of such films served, at least indirectly, the "gainful 
purposes" of the Spanish StateY The court had no diffi-
53 United Nations, Materials .... p. 202. 
5. Ibid., p. 195. 
55 X v. Spanish Government Tourist Bureau. ibid.. pp. 294 et seq. 
56 Ibid.. p. 297. 
57 Ibid.. p. 294. 
culty in holding that the Spanish State carrying on business 
under private law within the Federal Republic of Germany 
was subject to its jurisdiction. The activities of Spanish 
Government tourist bureaux were held to be of a private-
law nature and thereby not entitled to immunity, nor were 
violations of copyrights exempt from local jurisdiction 
even if performances and showings were made by govern-
ment bureaux of official agencies of a foreign State. 
68. In the absence of more recent decisions to the con-
trary or recognizing State immunity in relation to in-
fringements of rights to the use of patents, trade marks or 
other intellectual properties, the leading cases cited, espe-
cially the Austrian decision containing references to the 
practice of States, must be viewed as clear indications of 
an irreversible trend in support of restriction in this 
particular area, as is in fact being confirmed by other forms 
of State practice. 
3. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
69. It will be seen whether the trend in governmental 
practice is pointing in the same direction or in the opposite 
one. 
(a) National legis/at ion 
70. It is not without interest to note that the United 
Kingdom, whose case-law has traditionally been asso-
ciated with the most unqualified practice of sovereign 
immunity, included the following provision as section 7 of 
its State Immunity Act 1978:58 
Exceptions from immunity 
7. A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(a) any patent, trade mark, design or plant breeders' rights belonging to 
the State and registered or protected in the United Kingdom or for which 
the State has applied in the United Kingdom; 
(b) an alleged infringement by the State in the United Kingdom of any 
patent, trade mark, design, plant breeders' rights or copyright; or 
(c) the right to use a trade or business name in the United King-
dom. 
71. This prOVISIOn has no direct counterpart in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United 
States,59 in which the commercial activity covered in sub-
section (a) (2) of section 1605 60 may in fact be said to have 
overshadowed, if not substantially overlapped, the use of 
copyrights and other similar rights. There has been no clear 
decision to reject or support this proposition. On the other 
hand, the British Act is reproduced in substance in sec-
tion 9 of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979,61 and 
;, United Kingdom, T1e Pub/ic General Acts. 1978. part I, chap. 33, 
p. 715; text reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities .... pp. 41 e/ scq. 
59 See footnote 36 above. 
60 Cf. section 5 of Canada's 1982 "Act to provide for State immunity in 
Canadian courts" (The Cal/ada Gazette. Part III (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15 
(22 June 1982). p. 2949. chap. 95). 
61 Text reproduced in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities ... , pp. 28 et seq. 
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almost verbatim in section 8 of Pakistan's State Immunity 
Ordinance, 1981.62 Other Governments studying the pos-
sibility of adopting national legislation on this topic also 
contemplate inclusion ofa similar provision covering this 
exception in this particular area.63 
72. The adoption of a restrictive provision in the national 
legislation ofa few countries, however important, may not 
be indicative, let alone conclusive, of an emerging trend, 
but the application of such legislation may produce a 
widening restrictive effect in view of the practice of many 
Governments, notably those ofIndia and Italy. The impo-
sition ofa commensurate countermeasure in such circum-
stances is expressly envisaged in the third paragraph of 
article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the 
USSR and the Union Republics.64 
(b) International or regional conventions 
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
73. The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 65 
came into force in 1976 between Austria, Belgium and 
Cyprus. It has since been ratified by the United Kingdom 
and Portugal. The Netherlands is also contemplating rati-
fication, while the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy 
are probably already putting the provisions into practice, 
stretching them to their logical extremes. It is no longer 
true that the European Convention is accepted only by 
Western European countries or members of the European 
Economic Community. Austria is certainly following a 
distinctly different policy, while Cyprus has been regarded 
as Asian in the United Nations. The Convention pro-
vides: 
Article 8 
A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a 
court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate: 
(a) to a patent, industrial design, trade mark, service mark or other 
similar right which, in the State of the forum, has been applied for, regis-
tered or deposited or is otherwise protected, and in respect of which the 
State is the applicant or owner; 
(b) to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the 
62 The Gazette of Pakistan (Islamabad), 11 March 1981 (text reproduced 
in United Nations, Materials; .. , pp. 20 et seq.). Cf. section 8 of South 
Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 (ibid., pp. 34 et seq). 
6J See, for example, the draft Australian legislation of 1984 on the 
immunities offoreign States, Foreign States Immunities Bill 1984, sections 
10-20 (reproduced in International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.), 
vol. XXIII, No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1398 et seq;). Malaysia is also 
conducting a study. 
64 That provision reads: 
"Article 61; Suits against foreign States; Diplomatic immunity; 
"Where a foreign State does not accord to the Soviet State, its repre-
sentatives or its property the same judicial immunity which, in accordance 
with the present article, is accorded to foreign States, their representatives 
or their property in the USSR, the Council of Ministers of the USSR or 
other authorized organ may impose retaliatory measures in respect of that 
State, its representatives or that property of that State." 
Text reproduced (in English) in United Nations, Materials on Judsdic-
tional Immunities; ;., p. 40. 
65 See footnote 49 above. 
forum, of such a right belonging to a third person and protected in that 
State; 
(c) to an alleged infringement by it, in the territory of the State of the 
forum, of copyright belonging to a third person and protected in that 
State; 
(d) to the right to use a trade name in the State of the forum. 
74. This international convention, although not univer-
sal in its application or participation, cannot be brushed 
aside as insignificant in view of the importance which 
industrially advanced countries attach to the protection of 
intellectual property; the principle of reciprocity seems to 
militate in favour of its widening acceptance in practice. 
(ii) Inter-American Draft Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunity of States 
75. While the Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States as prepared by the Inter-
American Juridical Committee 66 is still in its initial stages 
and far from being a final text, the problem relating to 
patents, trade marks and other intellectual properties may 
be considered overlapped by the wider exception of trade 
or commercial activities in the first paragraph of its arti-
cle 5.67 The second paragraph states that trade or commer-
cial activities of a State are construed to mean the perfor-
mance of a particular transaction or commercial or trading 
act pursuant to its ordinary trade operations. 
4. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
76. In the absence of clear communis opinio doctorum, as 
noted by the Supreme Court of Austria in the celebrated 
Dralle case concerning foreign trade marks (see para-
graph 65 above), the way is clear for progress to be made 
along the lines of the majority view or of an existing trend, 
if any. Since the question is of relatively recent origin, the 
opinions of publicists have not been so clear-cut or deci-
sive, although it could not be denied that contemporary 
views are by and large inclined towards a more restrictive 
practice of jurisdictional immunity in this particular area 
as well. 
77. Thus, for example, the Committee on State Immun-
ity of the International Law Association, in September 
1982, recommended a set of draft articles for a convention 
on State immunity,68 article III of which contained the 
following provision: 
Article III. Exceptions to immunity from adjudication 
A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the forum 
State to adjudicate in the following instances inter alia: 
66 Draft approved on 21 January 1983 in Rio de Janeiro (OENSer. 
G-CP/doc.1352183, of 30 March 1983). See also International Legal 
Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXII, No.2 (March 1983), p. 292. 
67 "Article 5 
"States shall not invoke immunity against claims relative to trade or 
commercial activities undertaken in the State of the forum. 
68 The draft convention was adopted by ILA at its Sixtieth Conference 
(Montreal, 29 August-4 September 1982). See ILA, Report of the Sixtieth 
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E. Where the cause of action relates to: 
1. Intellectual or industrial property rights (patent, industrial design, 
trade mark, copyright, or other similar rights) belonging to the foreign State 
in the forum State or for which the foreign State has applied in the forum 
State; or 
2. A claim for infringement by the foreign State of any patent, indus-
trial design, trade mark, copyright or other similar right; or 
3. The right to use a trade or business name in the forum State. 
5. A CLEAR TREND 
78. If any question, dispute or difference relating to the 
rights or interests ofa State in a patent, trade mark or other 
intellectual property registered, applied for or otherwise 
protected by another State is subject to the applicable law 
and jurisdiction of the court of that other State, it is not too 
far-fetched to assume that the State owning or applying for 
registration of such rights would have in fact accepted the 
protection of another State and hence consented to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the forum State in all proceed-
ings relating thereto. Half of the battle is over, since in most 
cases relating to such rights the foreign State is invariably 
in the position of a claimant. If the State is claiming the 
rights or is applying for such rights, its consent to the 
exercise of jurisdiction is presumed to have been given by 
its own conduct. If, however, the State is alleged to have 
infringed the rights of a third person and it disputes or 
contests the allegation, then it is also inevitably a claimant, 
for otherwise it will not have to be joined as a party to the 
litigation, except in the event of an injunction being sought 
against the State for the continuing use of such rights in the 
State of the forum. Then the State is obliged either to forgo 
the use of such rights or to contest the claim. In the latter 
event, the State will in fact be in the position of a joint 
claimant or co-claimant of the disputed rights. 
79. A trend in the practice of States and legal opinion 
seems to have emerged clearly in support of absence of 
immunity, or the subjection of the foreign State claiming, 
contesting or applying for such rights to the jurisdiction of 
the forum State. There appears to be no other clear trend in 
a different or opposite direction. 
C. Formulation of draft article 16 
80. The draft article for this particular area of patents, 
trade marks and other intellectual properties might accord-
ingly be formulated as follows: 
Article 16. Patents, trade marks and 
other intellectual properties 
1. The immunity of a State cannot be invoked to prevent 
a court of another State which is otherwise competent from 
exercising its jurisdiction in a proceeding which relates to 
the determination of: 
(a) the right to use a patent, industrial design, trade 
mark, service mark, plant breeders' right or any other simi-
lar right or copyright which has been registered, deposited 
or applied for or is otherwise protected in another State, and 
in respect of which the State is the owner or applicant; 
or 
(b) the right to use a trade name or business name in that 
other State. 
2. A court of another State shall not be prevented from 
exercising jurisdiction in any proceeding brought before it 
which relates to: 
(a) an alleged infringement by or attributable to a State, 
in the territory of that other State, of a patent, industrial 
design, trade mark, service mark, plant breeders' right or 
any other similar right or copyright belonging to a third 
person and protected in that other State; or 
(b) an alleged infringement by or attributable to a State, 
in the territory of that other State, of the right to lise a trade 
name or business name belonging to a third person and 
protected in that other State. 
ARTICLE 17 (Fiscal liabilities and customs duties) 
A. General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF "FISCAL LIABILITIES AND CUSTOMS DUTIES" 
81. A State is not normally liable to taxation or customs 
duties levied by another State, except in cases where it 
establishes a business-official or commercial-or main-
tains an office or agency in the territory of another State. 
The maxim par in parem imperium non habet or jurisdic-
tionem non habet must be read in the context where there is 
no overlapping of activities of a State in the territory or 
under the territorial sovereign authority of another State. It 
is generally undisputed that the principle of "territoriality" 
or "territorial sovereignty" is more absolute and is not 
subject to limitations or qualifications by the national or 
personal sovereignty, or sovereign authority or personality 
of another State. 
82. It follows as a matter of course that, in most cases of 
contact, confrontation, clash or conflict, the territorial sov-
ereign exercises supreme authority over and within its ter-
ritory. An outside sovereign or extraterritorial power must 
be presumed to have submitted to the sovereign authority 
of the territorial State and could only exert or exercise such 
governmental or sovereign authority as had been pre-
viously agreed to by the territorial sovereign, which could 
either waive its sovereign authority or consent to the exer-
cise of a limited governmental power by the visiting extra-
territorial authority. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to 
the recognition of a colonial status or regime, directly 
against the concept of jus cogens. 
83. Conceptually, liability in terms of jural relationship is 
the correlative of power, as opposed to immunity which is 
the correlative of non-power. Thus to admit the supremacy 
or superiority of the territorial sovereign is already one big 
step towards acceptance of liability, once the extraterri-
torial State projects its image or personality within the 
territorial sphere of a sovereign authority of another 
State. 
84. The matter has to a large extent been regulated in so 
far as diplomatic, consular or ad hoc missions are con-
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and exemptions from certain categories of taxation is 
based on functional necessity and justified by the principle 
of reciprocity. Beyond reciprocity and functional necessity, 
exemption from taxation is granted as a matter of generos-
ity or courtesy; it stems from the comity of nations, based 
on considerations of reciprocal treatment rather than 
opinio juris or legal obligation. Besides, there is nothing 
to prevent two or more States or a group of States from 
agreeing to accord tax concessions inter se (or even uni-
laterally) as part of a generalized system of special pref-
erences, whether for internal revenues or levies for import 
of goods or for other tariff or non-tariff barriers. The 
rationale behind the authority to tax or to collect levies lies 
in the supremacy of the territorial sovereign. 
85. Article 17 may be entitled "Fiscal liabilities and cus-
toms duties" to denote absence of immunity from the 
jurisdiction to tax or collect revenues. Lack of exemption 
or of immunity from the territorial jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate upon questions of taxes or tax assessment is the equi-
valent of liability for taxation and payment of duties. This 
heading also includes property taxes and rates for the util-
ities and facilities connected with immovable property. 
2. JURISDICTION TO TAX OR COLLECT IMPORT DUTIES 
86. The legal basis for the jurisdiction or power of a State 
to tax any person, including a foreigner or another State, is 
to be found in the territorial connection of the source of 
income or the importation or entry of goods into the ter-
ritory of the territorial State. The power to tax can some-
times be excessive-if it extends beyond the territorial 
scope or confines it has to be justified on another ground, 
such as nationality or origin of the revenue, or indeed 
residence, even if partial or temporary. 
87. Jurisdiction in fiscal matters and importation of 
goods or merchandise normally belongs to the revenue and 
customs department of the Ministry of Finance or the 
Treasury. Thus revenue collection and the power to im-
pose levies and customs duties are sanctioned by law but 
enforced by the officers of the revenue department or cus-
toms officers, or indeed through other more decentralized 
authorities such as cities, counties and municipalities in 
respect of rates, property taxes or road taxes for vehicles 
and other means of transport such as motor launches, 
helicopters and aircraft. In the penultimate analysis, ap-
peal may be made to the Minister of Finance or the Lord 
Mayor of a city or other high administrative officer, whose 
decision could be challenged in a court of law in legal 
proceedings. Thus a State could be implicated or involved 
in a proceeding before the court of another State for failure 
to pay taxes or import duties in respect of income earned 
on behalf of the State in the territory of that other State or 
for the importation of goods into that other State without 
an agreement to exempt or to waive the taxes or duties to 
be collected. On the other hand, a State could, of its own 
free will, participate in a proceeding in a court of another 
State relating to the amount or assessment of taxes, 
revenues or duties, or to the very question of its own lia-
bility for taxation by the revenue authority of the State of 
the forum. In the latter instance, the State may be said to 
have consented by clear conduct to the exercise of juris-
diction by the court of the forum State. 
3. MARGINAL UTILITY OF AN EXPRESS PROVISION 
88. A question may be validly asked as to the practical 
use of a provision excepting "fiscal liabilities and customs 
duties" from the principle of State immunity. Once the 
exception of commercial contracts is admitted, the impor-
tation of goods in connection with a commercial trans-
action is clearly not exempt from the jurisdiction of the 
territorial or forum State. Nor indeed is the State immune 
from the jurisdiction of a court of another State in respect 
of taxation for the revenue or income derived from the 
trading or commercial activities conducted within the ter-
ritory of that other State. There may perhaps be no great 
need to include a specific provision expressly dealing with 
lack of immunity with regard to "fiscal liabilities and cus-
toms duties" payable by an extraterritorial State. But for 
the sake of clarity, and to put an end to lingering doubts, 
there appears to be some usefulness, or at least a marginal 
utility, in dissipating unnecessary hesitancy, thereby clear-
ing the path for greater simplicity in the application of 
otherwise complex rules of State immunity. 
89. Furthermore, there seems to be no doubt as to the 
correctness of the proposition that, where jurisdiction 
exists for one State to collect revenues or duties from an 
agency or instrumentality of another State, liabilities to pay 
such revenues and duties are established, unless the terri-
torial State specifically waives its power to tax for any 
reason or considerations of its own free will. Proceedings 
before the court of another State relating to "fiscalliabili-
ties and customs duties" accordingly lie outside the scope 
of application of State immunity, constituting as they do a 
substantive exception to the general principles of jurisdic-
tional immunities of States and their property. Conversely, 
to formulate such an exception provides an opportunity to 
delimit the scope and extent of its application, and hence 
an opportunity to reassert and preserve immunity of State 
property from some kinds of taxation, as long as it is used 
as diplomatic or consular premises, and the immunity 
from income taxes accorded to members of diplomatic and 
consular missions under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 
and 1963.69 
B. The practice of States 
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
90. Judicial decisions against a foreign State or foreign 
government agency compelling payment of taxes, dues, 
charges or rates are rare. This is so not because they have 
successfully invoked jurisdictional immunity or been held 
to be exempt from liability to pay such taxes or revenues, 
but more frequently because there is no point in refusing to 
pay such taxes. The fact that another State is admitted and 
permitted to run a business or use a motor vehicle in the 
territory of the forum State indicates unmistakably its will-
ingness to recognize and respect the local laws or ground 
rules, including the power of the local authority to tax and 
the extraterritorial State's liability to pay local taxes in 
accordance with local regulations. Adjudication is but an 
69 See footnote 35 above. 
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ultimate recourse that need not be taken, once a State 
acknowledges the supremacy of another State over its own 
territory. Failure to do that may result in a more serious 
conflict, entailing graver consequences. 
91. There are no decided cases in the practice of most 
countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Aus-
tralia. A line of cases could be found in the practice of the 
United States of America between May 1952, the date of 
the "Tate Letter",70 and January 1977, the date ofer.try 
into force of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 0/1976, 
most of which concerned the possibility of levying prop-
erty taxes on State property of a foreign Government. 
Thus, in three parallel actions, City 0/ New Rochelle v. 
Republic o/Ghana, Republic o/Indonesia, and Republic 0/ 
Liberia (1964),71 immunity of property from foreclosure 
proceedings to satisfy real estate tax liens was recognized in 
three parallel State Department notes dated 8 June 1964. 
The United States Attorney was instructed to appear and 
file a suggestion of immunity with the court on the ground 
that the property in question was "being used as the resi-
dence of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the 
United Nations" and as such "not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the County Court of the County of Westchester, 
State of New York". With respect to the request for action 
to have the claim for taxes on the property in question 
withdrawn, however, the Ambassador was informed that 
"in the Department's view such property is not immune 
from real property taxation under customary international 
law" .12 
92. Thus, unless otherwise agreed in a bilateral treaty, 
headquarters agreement or multilateral convention, prop-
erty taxes in the United States are payable, although in the 
above three cases as well as in an earlier case concerning the 
Kingdom of Afghanistan,13 immunity from suit was recog-
nized in a claim against property levied upon for non-
payment of real estate taxes as a measure of enforcement of 
tax collection. The State Department held a similar view in 
regard to non-assessment of taxes against foreign govern-
ment-owned property used for public non-commercial 
purposes, namely the consulate of the Republic of Argen-
tina in New York. In that case, Argentina was plaintiffin an 
action to recover taxes assessed against its consulate in 
New York.74 The lower court held that, in the absence ofa 
treaty to the contrary, a foreign State's property was not 
exempt from taxation and that Argentina was not entitled 
to recover real estate taxes on consular property. The 
10 See the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur (see footnote I (d) 
above), para. 94. 
11 New York Supplement, 2d Series, vol. 255 (1965), p. 178. 
12 See Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1977 
(Washington, D.C.), 1979), appendix: "Sovereign immunity decisions of 
the Department of State, May 1972 to January 1977", p. 1050, No. 44. The 
Department of State construed section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement 
of 1947 between the United States of America and the United Nations "as 
not extending immunity from real estate taxes to missions to the United 
NatIOns". That position was first stated in a note to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations on 23 November 1955 (ibid.). 
. '1 Knocklong Corporation v. Kingdom of Afghanistan (1957) (New York 
'\,UI'pIC'lllent, 2d Series, vol. 167 (1958), p. 285); see Digest of United States 
I raCllce ... , /977, op. cit., p. 1034, No. 14. 
" Republic of Argentina v. City of New York (I 967)(New York Supple-
fII('llt. 2d Series, vol. 283 (1968), p. 389); judgment affirmed (1968) (ibid., 
\ 01
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, 290 (1968), p. 706); judgment modified (I 969)(ibid., vol. 303 (1970), 
P 44). 
Department of Justice as amicus curiae on appeal brought 
to the attention of the Court of Appeals a letter dated 
2 September 1965, to the effect that 
The Department of State is of the opinion that under recognized prin-
ciples of international law and comity· the several States of the United 
States, as well as their political subdivisions, should not assess taxes 
against foreign government-owned property used for public non-commer-
cial purposes." 
The New York Court of Appeals held that foreign State 
property devoted to public governmental use is immune 
under customary international law from local real estate 
taxes, but that Argentina's claim for a refund was not 
timely. 
93. In another case, in which the United States sought to 
enjoin a tax foreclosure sale by the City of Glen Cove 
against a residence of the Permanent Representative of the 
Soviet Union to the United Nations,76 the State Depart-
ment stated in a letter to the Attorney General that it "ac-
cepts as true the diplomatic representations" of the Soviet 
Government that the property "is used as a residence of its 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations and his 
deputies having the rank of Ambassador or Minister ... ".77 
It would appear that the liability for taxes depended on the 
discretion of the Department of State in the first place but 
the actual decision, beyond the action taken by the taxing 
authority, would have to come from the court of com-
petence. The law does not appear to be clear. Relativity 
abounds around the possibility of existing treaty commit-
ments in a particular case, and yet the residual rule, in the 
absence ofa bilateral arrangement, seems to hover between 
the various authorities within the same Government. A 
distinction was drawn between liability for taxation and 
possible immunity from jurisdiction to foreclose a lien on 
the property used for governmental and non-commercial 
purposes, which is closer to immunity from execution but 
subjection to taxation. A later case relating to attempted 
taxation by local authorities of uranium stored for Japa-
nese utility companies in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and pur-
chased pursuant to undertakings between the Govern-
ments of Japan and the United States did not throw any 
further light on this mystery. No decision was made by the 
State Department as the request from the Embassy of 
Japan was withdrawn on the basis of a settlement,78 
94. Judicial decisions and the opinions of the executive 
in the cases referred to above appear inconclusive if not 
outright inconsistent. On the one hand, there appears to be 
authority for the proposition that the power to tax and 
liability for taxation coexist even as regards a foreign 
State's property, and that the only possible exception is 
consent or waiver by the territorial State established in the 
form of treaty provisions. No clear precedent exists for the 
15 See the letter from the Department of State's Acting Legal Adviser, 
Mr. Richard D. Kearney, to the Comptroller of the City of New York, 
Digest of United States Practice ... , 1977, op. cit., p. 1053, No. 48. 
16 United States v. City of Glen Cove (1971) (Federal Supplement, 
vol. 322 (1971), p. 149); judgment affirmed (1971) (Federal Reporter, 2d 
Series, vol. 450 (1972), p. 884) . 
11 See Digest of United States Practice ... , /977, op. cit., p. 1069, 
No. 71. 
78 Ibid., p. 1077, No. 100. See also C. Brower, "Litigation of sovereign 
immunity before a State administrative body and the Department of 
State: The Japanese uranium tax case", American Journal ofInternatiollal 
Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 71 (1977), p. 438. 
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absolute immunity of diplomatic or consular premises 
from taxation beyond courtesy or comity, depending on 
the discretionary power of the territorial State to dispense 
with the tax assessment. It is relatively certain that foreign 
State property used for governmental and non-commercial 
purposes would be exempt from attachment, seizure, fore-
closure proceedings and other measures of execution, es-
pecially as far as the executive is concerned. Payment of 
taxes already assessed would not appear to be recovera-
ble. 
95. Such practice, unsettled and unsettling as it may 
seem, is no more precise elsewhere. The only other relevant 
decision is probably a Canadian case decided in 1958 79 
relating to an attempt by the local authority to collect rates 
on premises leased on behalf of the United States for the 
purpose of constructing a radar installation pursuant to a 
joint defence scheme with the Canadian Government. The 
Canadian Supreme Court held that the land was immune 
from rates, although the decision was probably not unin-
fluenced by the fact that there was an express invitation by 
Canada to the United States to undertake the work and that 
the defence, rather than the commercial, character of the 
project was emphasized. 
2. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
96. In a way not uncharacteristic of the Canadian and 
United States decisions, which are inherently connected 
with the positions taken by the political branches of the 
Government, and not altogether separable from the dis-
cretionary power of the executive, governmental practice 
seems to be preponderantly in favour of settlement of this 
delicate point by bilateral agreements. Thus the Govern-
ment of Thailand, for example, had concluded agreements, 
as it is entitled to do in law and as it often does in practice, 
with friendly Governments or international organizations 
dispensing with the liability to pay ad valorem duties on 
transfer of title deeds or reducing such fiscal liabilities by a 
half. Rates can similarly be adjusted and readjusted in 
accordance with the favourable treatment to be accorded 
to official premises or property of Governments or inter-
national organizations used for official, governmental and 
non-commercial purposes. 
97. Practice therefore varies from complete exemption or 
absolute immunity, to complete subjection or liability to 
taxation in full, via intermediate stages of partial subjec-
tion to rates and taxes. This is also true of import duties in 
Thailand, exemption from which may be accorded under 
bilateral arrangements or headquarters agreements, as 
fully authorized by the general enabling clause or provision 
in an act in the Revenue Code, as well as by the royal decree 
for customs tariff exemptions. 
98. This state of flux in international practice would 
appear to call for a re-examination of the entire question of 
fiscal liabilities and customs duties. An attempt should 
therefore be made to restate or reformulate residuary rules 
in this specified area, while leaving intact the inviolability, 
7. Municipality of the City and County of Saint John, Logan and Clay-
ton v. Fraser-Brace Overseas Corporation et al.; see United Nations, 
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities .. " pp. 232 et seq. 
and hence immunity, of State property from all forms of 
seizure, attachment, foreclosure or execution. 
(a) National legislation 
99. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 xO 
contains a provision on the point at issue. Section 11 of 
that Act reads: 
Exceptions ji-om immunity 
II. A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its lia-
bility for: 
Ca) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any agricultural 
levy; or 
(b) rates in respect of premises occupied by it for commercial pur-
poses. 
100. A similar provision is contained in section 13 of 
Singapore's State Immunity Act. 197981 and in section 12 
of Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance. 1981.82 The 
United States and Canadian counterparts do not contain 
parallel provisions. However, the liability of foreign 
Governments to pay United States income tax is to be 
regulated by income tax regulations on "Income of Foreign 
Governments". The United States Department of the 
Treasury's "Notice of proposed rule-making"83 provides 
guidance for taxing foreign sovereigns on their income 
from commercial activities within the United States. 
Roughly speaking, income of foreign Governments from 
investments in the United States in stocks, bonds or other 
domestic securities, owned by an integral part or controlled 
entity of a foreign sovereign, or from interest on bank 
deposits belonging to such an integral part or controlled 
entity, is exempt from taxation under section 892 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. 84 whereas amounts derived from 
commercial activities in the United States are taxable 
under section 881 or 882. According to the proposed new 
rules, certain activities are regarded as non-commercial 
and income derived therefrom is exempt from taxation. 
Apart from investments and interest on bank accounts or 
dividends not connected with the conduct of trade or busi-
ness, performances of exhibitions devoted to the promo-
tion of acts by cultural organizations and mere purchase of 
goods for the use of the foreign sovereign are not treated as 
commercial. 
(b) International or regional conventions 
101. International or regional conventions appear to re-
main silent on this point. Perhaps silence was preferred, 
leaving the practice to grow out of the general confusion. 
Neither the 1972 European Convention on State Immun-
80 See footnote 58 above. 
81 See footnote 61 above. 
82 See footnote 62 above; see also section 12 of South Africa's Foreign 
States Immunities Act, 1981 (ibid.). 
83 Federal Register, vol. 43, No. 158 (15 August 1978), pp. 36111 et seq.; 
see also United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . ... pp.63 
et seq. 
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ity85 nor the 1983 Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States 86 contains a compre-
hensive provision on immunity from taxation either of the 
State itself, or of its property. The inter-American draft 
convention merely states: 
Article 6 
States shall not claim immunity from jurisdiction either: 
(d) in tax matters regarding activities under paragraph one of article 5, 
for property located in the forum State; 
The activities in question include "trade or commercial 
activities undertaken in the State of the forum".87 
3. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
1 02. Legal opinions are perhaps undecided or even indif-
ferent on a number of relevant points, not knowing for 
certain whether a provision dealing with this specified area 
should be included in the part on exceptions. If so, the 
extent or scope of the content of the exception, its quali-
fications and limitations will also have to be ascertained 
and formulated with a reasonable measure of precision and 
confidence. The draft prepared by the Committee on State 
Immunity of the International Law Association and 
adopted at Montreal in 1982 88 makes no pronouncement 
on this significant but delicate issue. On the positive side, 
progressive development of international law should in-
clude an appropriate provision. 
4. A TWILIGHT ZONE 
103. This particular area of "fiscal liabilities and customs 
duties" may constitute a twilight zone in the opinion of 
writers, at least as to the desirability and necessity of 
including a specific provision. This somewhat nebulous 
area could be illuminated by articulating a draft provision 
to indicate the likelihood of positive rules being adopted 
on the application or non-application of State immunity in 
regard to fiscal liability, including income tax, purchase or 
sales tax, excise duties, ad valorem stamp duties, import 
levies and duties, rates and other taxes on property. The 
inclusion of such a provision would seem to be war-
ranted. 
C. Formulation of draft article 17 
104. Article 17 could be formulated as follows: 
Article 17. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties 
1. Unless otherwise agreed, a State cannot invoke im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State in a 
proceeding relating to its liability for: 
8, See footnote 49 above. 
86 See footnote 66 above. 
87 See footnote 67 above. 
88 See footnote 68 above. 
(a) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any 
agricultural levy; or 
(b) ad I'a/orem stamp duty or a charge or registration fee 
for registration or transfer of property in the forum State; 
or 
(c) income tax derived from commercial activities con-
ducted in the forum State; or 
(d) rates or taxes on premises occupied by it in the forum 
State for commercial purposes. 
2. Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be interpreted as an 
exception to the immunity of a State for its dipl.omatic and 
consular premises from seizure, attachment or measures of 
execution, or to allow foreclosure, sequestration or freezing 
of such premises or of State property otherwist: inter-
nationally protected. 
ARTICLE 18 (Shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate) 
~.. General considerations 
I. SCOPE OF "SHAREHOLDINGS AND MEMBERSHIP OF 
BODIES CORPORATE" 
1 05. When a State buys share or holds shares in a com-
pany constituted under the law and registered by virtue of 
the company law of another State, or acquires equities or 
becomes a member in an association or partnership 
formed, organized or chartered under the legal system of 
another State, it may be said to have entered into a legal 
relationship in that other State. Physically, the State need 
not leave its territory nor cross the boundary of that other 
State to acquire shares, membership or partnership in any 
corporation, association or society established in the terri-
tory of another State by virtue of its internal law. 
106. The fact that a State holds shares or becomes a 
member of a body corporate organized and operating in 
another State would seem to indicate its willingness to 
recognize the validity of the legal relationship it has created 
or entered into under the legal system of that other State. In 
so doing, the State is also bound to respect the local laws of 
the State of incorporation or registration, or of the siege 
social or headquarters, and to abide by the charter of the 
corporation or unincorporated partnership concerned. The 
purpose of article 18 is to examine and delimit the scope of 
"shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate" by a 
State as an exception to its immunity from the jurisdiction 
of the State of incorporation or association. 
2. ApPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF INCORPORATION AS A 
SOUND BASIS FOR EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
107. In all matters relating to the relationship between 
shareholders inter se or between the shareholders and the 
company or body corporate of any form, the law of the 
State of incorporation governs the formation, operation 
and also the dissolution of the entity in question. No other 
legal relationship could exist outside the purview of the law 
of the State of incorporation or registration, or of the con-
trolling centre or siege social or central of the organization 
or entity. Because of the special nature of the law and the 
resulting legal relationship, no other systems oflaw seem to 
be applicable. Thus the exclusive application of the law of 
:i 
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the State of incorporation makes it difficult or impossible 
to imagine the applicability of another law or another sep-
arate and independent legal system. 
108. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the 
exclusive applicability ofa law implies the exclusive com-
petence of the State of incorporation. The existence of rules 
of conflict of laws and private international law presup-
poses the possibility of a choice oflaws to be made by any 
competent court or any tribunal with concurrent jurisdic-
tion. But for a highly specialized branch of the law, such as 
that relating to patents and trade marks (article 16) or 
company law or law concerning bodies corporate (article 
18), the jurisdiction of the State of incorporation and place 
of head office of the corporate bodies is practically exclus-
ive. No other jurisdiction seems better entitled to exercise 
the specialized competence or to apply with accuracy and 
consistency the complex system of company law or as-
sociation law of another State, which at best would be alien 
to it. 
109. Thus any court foreign to the applicable law is 
invariably a forum non conveniens. Only the court of the 
State of incorporation or the place of head office could be a 
forum conveniens or an appropriate adjudicatory tri-
bunal. 
3. PRESUMPTION OF CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF SOLE 
JURISDICTION BY THE STATE OF INCORPORATION 
110. If the only applicable law coincides with the sole 
jurisdiction of the State of incorporation and customary 
international law requires other States to respect the appli-
cable local law of the place of incorporation or of the place 
of business operation, as the case may be, the presumption 
is almost irrebuttable that any extraterritorial State acquir-
ing shares in a company or membership of a body cor-
porate established under the law of another State must 
have understood and consented to be bound by the very 
same law which creates the legal obligations contracted 
and, failing other available jurisdictions, also agreed to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the competent court of that legal 
system in all matters relating to or arising out of the legal. 
relationship connected with the company or body cor-
porate in question. No other explanation makes any 
sense. 
4. AN ACQUIRED PLACE 
Ill. It is thus becoming increasingly clear that, in this 
particular area of "shareholdings and membership of 
bodies corporate", the principle of State immunity does 
not and cannot truly apply without creating a legal vacuum 
which can never be filled. This area may be said to have 
acquired a rightful place in the current stage oflegal devel-
opments as an inevitable and uncontested exception to the 
doctrine of State immunity. 
B. The practice of States 
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
difficulty, not unlike the area of patents, trade marks and 
other intellectual properties, where very few decisions 
have been cited and discussed. In this area, as in others, 
including that of fiscal liabilities and customs duties, in 
which case-law is scanty ifnot non-existent (except for the 
few instances in the United States), the noticeable absence 
of judicial pronouncements does not alter the facts oflegal 
developments and evolution. Other sources of State prac-
tice need to be examined to supplement what appears to be 
lacking in judicial reaffirmations. 
2. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
(a) National legislation 
113. It IS sufficiently clear, in the absence of judicial 
decisions to the contrary, that in the practice of the coun-
tries which have adopted national legislation limiting or 
restricting State immunity in this specified area, immunity 
is denied a foreign State in proceedings relating to its 
membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body 
or a partnership, and in those arising between the State and 
that body or its members, or between partners. It is 
interesting to note the requirement that another member 
(or members) must not be a State (or States). One of the 
three links or substantial connections, namely the place of 
incorporation indicating the system of incorporation, 
charter or constitution; the place of control; or the princi-
pal place of business (siege socia/), must be in the State of 
the forum to substantiate the presumption of consent to the 
exercise of juriSdiction by such closely connected forum. 
114. Thus section 8 of the United Kingdom State Im-
munity Act 197889 provides: 
Exceptions from immunity 
8. (I) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to its 
membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated body or a partnership 
which: 
(a) has members other than States; and 
(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of the United Kingdom 
or is controlled from or has its principal place of business in the United 
Kingdom, 
being proceedings arising between the State and the body or its other 
members or, as the case may be, between the State and the other part-
ners. 
(2) This section does not apply if provision to the contrary has been 
made by an agreement in writing between the parties to the dispute or by 
the constitution or other instrument establishing or regulating the body or 
partnership in question. 
115. Similar provisions are contained in Singapore's 
State Immunity Act, 1979,90 Pakistan's State Immunity 
Ordinance, 1981 91 and other legislative texts.92 The 
Canadian Act and that of the United States of America 
appear to have included this area under the wider excep-
tion of commercial activities.93 
89 See footnote 58 above. 
90 See footnote 61 above. 
91 See footnote 62 above. 
112. The absence of judicial decisions directly concern- 92 See, for example, section 9 of South Africa's Foreign States Im-
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(b) International or regional conventions 
116. The 1972 European Convention on State Immun-
ity94 and the 1983 Inter-American Draft Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity of States 9S appear to have in-
cluded this exception under a larger heading of trade or 
commercial activities conducted or undertaken in the State 
of the forum. 
3. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
117. International opinion is not so prolific in this area of 
"shareholdings and membership of bodies corporate". The 
draft convention prepared by the International Law Asso-
ciation's Committee on State Immunity prefers to have 
this limited area of exception partially or fully covered by 
the wider notion of "commercial activity".96 Even under 
that larger exception, questions relating to shareholdings 
and membership of bodies corporate are not always com-
pletely or wholly covered. In any event, article 12,97 as 
provisionally adopted by the Commission, refers to "com-
mercial contracts" rather than the entire field of trading or 
commercial activities. Accordingly, if originally the reason 
for including article 18 might have been fragile, there now 
appears to be stronger justification in practice. There are 
no compelling views of writers on this particular issue.98 A 
flexible attitude is therefore recommended. Jurisdiction of 
the State of incorporation or 6fprincipal place of business 
or control may be presumed, for without it there may be no 
court competent to try the subject-matter of the litigation. 
In the interest of justice, and however narrow the special 
area designated under this exception may be, a provision 
would be useful in any effort to codify or progressively 
develop rules regarding State immunity and the extent of 
their practical application. 
C. Formulation of draft article 18 
118. An attempt has thus been made to formulate article 
18 to cover the exception of "shareholdings and member-
ship of bodies corporate", keeping intact the freedom of 
contract of the parties to opt out of the provision, and 
establishing a firm link between the exercise of jurisdiction 
and the preponderant, ifnot obviously exclusive, applica-
bility of the law of the State of the forum, which is the law of 
the place of incorporation or association, or the law of the 
principal place of business or of the place of control. The 
draft article might be formulated as follows: 
9) See section 5 of Canada's 1982 Act (see footnote 60 above), and 
section 1605, subsection (a) (2), of the United States 1976 Act (see footnote 
36 above). 
94 See footnote 49 above. 
95 See footnote 66 above. 
96 See article III, section B, of the draft convention (see footnote 68 
above). 
97 See footnote 21 above. 
98 See, for example, 1. Crawford, Rapporteur for the draft Australian 
legislation on the immunities offoreign States (see footnote 63 above), in 
Australian Law Reform Commission, "Foreign State Immunity Research 
Paper No.4" (Canberra, 1983). 
Article 18. Shareholdings and membership 
0/ bodies corporate 
1. A State cannot invoke immunity from the jurisdiction 
of a court of another State in a proceeding relating to the 
determination of its rights and obligations arising from its 
shareholdings or membership of a body corporate, an unin-
corporated body or a partnership between the State and the 
body or its other members or, as the case may be, between 
the State and the partnership or the other partners, pro-
vided that the body or partnership: 
(a) has members other than States; and 
(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of the 
State of the forum or is controlled from or has its principal 
place of business in that State. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if provision to the con-
trary has been made by an agreement in writing between the 
parties to the dispute or by the constitution or other instru-
ment establishing or regulating the body or partnership in 
question. 
ARTICLE 19 (Ships employed in commercial service) 
A. General considerations 
1. SPECIAL STATUS OF SHIPS 
119. Ships or seagoing vessels have a special status dis-
tinct from other types of State property. In the first place, 
they are endowed with a nationality. There is always a State 
which exercises jurisdiction over a ship, wherever the ship 
may be, and that is the flag-State or the State whose flag the 
ship flies. Seagoing vessels may also have their places or 
port of registration separate or distinct from their flag-
State. A land-locked State is entitled to have its flag. The 
place of registration may serve a different legal purpose, 
whereas the flag that a ship flies at least serves to indicate 
her nationality, and the nationality ofa vessel in turn may 
serve to decide a number of questions, including allegiance 
to a sovereign State, involving its protection and the appli-
cation of the laws of the flag-State, when on the high seas or 
otherwise, even outside the territorial waters or exclusive 
economic zones of the flag-State. A ship without a nation-
ality is often regarded, not as a stateless ship, but as a pirate 
ship, while the flag-State may disown or denounce any of 
the ships flying its flag, once it is established that such a 
ship is engaged in acts of piracy on the high seas or is 
otherwise perpetrating an international crime known as 
piracy jure gentium. 
120. Apart from the usual requisite of nationality which 
necessarily attaches to a seagoing vessels, the ship is also 
sometimes considered as a piece of floating territory of the 
flag-State. It is treated for several purposes as if it were an 
extension of the landed area of the territory of the State 
whose flag it flies. Although merely a fiction, the extrater-
ritoriality of a seagoing vessel is a concept that carries 
far-reaching implications in actual practice. All kinds of 
legal or juristic acts may be performed or celebrated on 
board a seagoing vessel, including marriage, birth, burial or 
cremation, and treated as valid under the applicable laws 
of the flag-State. In short, several types of civil status of 
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ing territory, even on the high seas. The officer who may 
initiate the act is the captain or commander of the ship. 
This master or skipper of the ship may exercise extensive 
power of registration and administration concerning the 
civil status of persons. The territorial character of a ship 
even within foreign territorial waters or anchored in a 
foreign port may be illustrated by the possibility of asylum 
being given on board the ship and the surrender of a person 
by and from the ship, in the form of extradition for an 
extraditable offence in appropriate circumstances. 
121. The combination of the two elements, namely 
nationality and territory, makes the status of a ship unique 
in more ways than one. In addition to its unique capacities 
and qualities, a seagoing vessel is often personified, in the 
sense that it may be likened to a natural or legal person as it 
is so recognized in several legal systems. Thus, more not-
ably in the Anglo-American and other common-law coun-
tries, a ship could be proceeded against by an action in rem 
in admiralty, a distinct legal status incomparable to any 
other object or any personified subject oflaw. Such a pro-
cess in rem is basically directed against the ship itself, 
which could be considered as coming under part IV of the 
draft, concerning immunities of State property from at-
tachment and execution. No separate treatment would be 
necessary, if such were to be the case. However, it is now 
the practice in common-law systems that a process in rem 
against a ship, whether to repair physical damage caused by 
careless navigation of such a ship or to recover moneys in 
respect of salvage services, or in pursuit of a maritime lien, 
followed by seizure or arrest of the same, really has the 
purpose of compelling the owner to enter an appear-
ance.99 
122. It has now become the practice even in a process in 
rem in admiralty for the writ to be addressed not only to the 
ship, but also to all persons interested in it, including the 
owner, charterer and operator, as well as the owners of the 
cargoes carried on board the vessel at the time of seizure. 
Referring to the peculiarities of the procedures of British 
admiralty, G. G. Phillimore remarked: 
... it [the British admiralty) had peculiar procedures: it could proceed in 
rem against property situated wi thin its juri diction by issuing a writ 
specifically against the ship and by seizure, or it could proceed in personam 
against the owner of the ship or the person actually in command. 100 
123. This practice has operated to nullitY what might 
otherwise have been a most effective means for a private 
litigant wishing to obtain redress against the trading ships 
ofa foreign State. If that practice had not existed, he might 
have issued a writ in rem against the ship and secured his 
redress without disturbing or indeed impleading the 
foreign sovereign. But since the practice does exist, he can 
only issue such a writ in rem by addressing it not only to the 
ship, but inevitably also to all persons interested in it and 
its cargoes. If such persons are foreign sovereigns or States 
99 See the dictum of Sir Francis Jeune in The "Dictator" (1982) (The 
Law Reports, Probate Division, 1892, p. 304), followed by the Court of 
Appeal in The "Gemma" (1899) (ibid., 1899, p. 285, especially p. 292); cf. 
Lord Justices Bankes and Scrutton in The ''Jupiter'' No. 1 (1924) (ibid., 
1924, p. 236, at pp. 241-242). 
100 G. G. Phillimore, "Immunitl: des Etats au point de vue de la juri-
diction ou de I'execution forcee", Recueil des cours de I'Academie de droit 
international de La Haye, 1925-IIl (Paris, Hachette), vol. 8 (1926), 
p.461. 
or Governments, they will necessarily be impleaded. Thus, 
because of its personal consequences, the admiralty rule as 
to a process in rem in the common-law countries, on the 
face of it impersonal, has become unworkable against 
vessels in which foreign States are interested. Conse-
quently ships, though primajacie governed by rules differ-
ent from those to which common law submits other mov-
ables, are in the final analysis subject to such rules, and the 
courts "will not by their process, whether the sovereign is a 
party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property 
which is his or of which he is in possession or con-
trol" .101 
2. OWNERSHIP, POSSESSION OR CONTROL 
124. If ships, with their special status and peculiarities 
under the major legal systems, are also essentially property 
and subject equally to rules applicable to special kinds of 
movables, then the persons interested in a ship against 
which a process in rem is being directed must include all 
persons who are owners of the vessel or who have pos-
session or control of it. 
125. The concept of ownership is not irrelevant to the 
question of nationality. Apart from the possibility ofa flag 
of convenience, which may be attributed to a ship for 
convenience sake and regardless of its true nationality, 
several legal systems impose certain minimum require-
ments for a ship to have the nationality of the flag-State or 
the State of its registration. Thus, in Thailand, to have Thai 
nationality a ship must be owned by Thai nationals; or, if 
the owner is a corporate body organized under Thai law, at 
least 70 per cent of the shares must be owned by Thai 
nationals. 102 On the other hand, a company could be estab-
lished in Thailand and registered with Thai nationality but 
with less than 70 per cent of its shares owned by Thai 
nationals. However, to own a Thai vessel with the right to 
fly the Thai flag, the company itself must be at least 70 per 
cent Thai-owned. 103 Otherwise, the vessel could not fly the 
Thai flag on the ground of insufficient ownership by Thai 
nationals . 
126. Similar requirements exist regarding the classifi-
cation of ships as being State-owned. Ownership of a vessel 
by a State will have to meet certain minimum require-
ments to justify the State's claim to own the vessel, sub-
stantially or principally if not wholly. Ownership by the 
foreign State clearly determines the fact that a proceeding 
impleads a foreign Government even if it is only inciden-
tally against its owners. As has been seen in a different 
context, the flag implies the possibility of exercise by the 
flag-State of certain sovereign rights and powers or duties 
of protection, but not necessarily involving impleading the 
State whose flag the ship happens to fly, unless the ship 
actually belongs to the flag-State. The flag flown by a ship 
does not imply its ownership by the flag-State or by any 
State, it merely indicates the nationality of the vessel, 
101 See the opinion of Lord Atkin in The "Cristina" (1938) (The Law 
Reports, House of Lords ... , 1938, p. 490). 
102 See section 7 of the Thai Ships Act as amended by section 3 of the 
Thai Ships Act (Third Act) (B.E. 2521). 
103 If it is owned by a registered partnership, all the partners must be 
Thais. 
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which entails legal consequences that, to some extent and 
for some purposes, could be less extensive or limited, as the 
case may be. The extent of ownership of a vessel by a 
foreign State may determine whether the State is being 
impleaded or not when a process in rem is directed against 
that ship. Because ofthe variety of requirements governing 
the nationality of a ship, the ship may fly a different flag 
from that of the State owning it, having been registered 
under a flag of convenience or otherwise. 
127. The question of possession or control of a ship is 
basically relevant to the consideration of State immunities. 
Possession by the State could be constructive or actual, for 
instance through the captain, commanding officer, skipper 
or master of the ship obeying instructions from the State. 
Control could be more remote, and yet actual, through the 
same medium of the captain loyal to the owner State and 
following the instructions of the State or of one of its re-
sponsible agencies or instrumentalities. Persons interested 
in the ship cover a wider group than the owners or co-
owners of the ship, including the corporation or its share-
holders who are also classed as shipowners, and also own-
ers or assignees of cargoes laden on board the vessel when 
seized, and charterers, operators or those responsible for 
the operation and navigation of the ship, be it the master 
and his crew or others. A State can thus remain in posses-
sion or control of a vessel through its captain, commanding 
officer or master and crew. A charter-party may contain 
provisions indicating the division of control according to 
whether it is a bare-boat charter or a charter-party for 
certain portions or containers or parts of the vessel, with or 
without the crew or master. 
3. CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS 
128. It would seem pertinent to touch briefly upon the 
classification of vessels, especially for the purpose of 
immunities. Whatever the criterion-ownership, pos-
session or control-a warship or man-of-war in active ser-
vice belongs to a category of State-owned or State-operated 
ships or public vessels which enjoy extensive immunities 
from jurisdiction, arrest, detention and execution by the 
court of any other State, apart altogether from the wide-
ranging sovereign power that a warship could display even 
on the high seas and through territorial waters. Vessels of 
war belong to the armed forces of the State, adding to its 
military strength and might, and as such lie outside the 
reach and jurisdiction of the courts of other States. This 
rule is applicable whether or not the ship is owned by the 
State. The fact ofits service is determinative of its immun-
ity. Its employment or commission as a man-of-war vests 
upon the vessel the character ofa warship independently of 
its ownership at any particular moment. The ship could be 
commissioned under a requisition decree, chartered, 
bought on hire-purchase or made available on loan from 
another Government or a private party, so long as it is 
employed or used by the State as a man-of-war for pur-
poses of national defence. 
129. In international law, in time of peace or even in the 
event of an armed conflict, warships or men-of-war have a 
special status, special privileges, and admittedly cannot be 
proceeded against, unless they have been decommissioned 
or condemned as lawful prizes by a prize-court, an insti-
tution which has gone out of fashion. 104 Ordinarily, now-
adays, since war is outlawed and the current instances of 
armed conflicts offer little or no illustration of such a pos-
sibility of adjudication of lawful prizes, it would not be 
unrealistic to regard such customs and tradi tions of prize as 
having fallen into desuetude. 
130. The nature or character of service or employment of 
vessels appears therefore to afford a decisive criterion for 
classifying them. Warships or men-of-war of all types, 
including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, government 
yachts, submarines, auxiliary vessels, military transports, 
hospital ships, supply ships, etc., constitute a class apart, 
for which immunities from jurisdiction as well as from 
seizure and execution seem to have been well settled 
beyond controversy.105 Other types of ships stand in need 
of a more precise designation or division for the different 
purposes for which ships are to be classified. Thus ships 
have been classified as public vessels or private ships 
according to the criterion of ownership, i.e. State-owned or 
privately-owned, or according to their service or use (a) as 
ships employed or used exclusively on governmental and 
non-commercial service, including the cargoes carried by 
such vessels not being subject to seizure, attachment or 
detention, 106 or (b) as ships owned or operated by a State for 
commercial and non-governmental purposes, which are 
assimilated to private vessels. 107 
131. Ships have also been classified, for the purposes of 
the law of the sea, as (a) warships on the high seas, having 
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State 
other than the flag-State, (b) ships owned or operated by a 
State and used only on governmental non-commercial ser-
vice, which are assimilated to warships, and (c) govern-
ment vessels operated for commercial non-governmental 
service, which are assimilated as far as possible to private 
merchant vessels without immunity of any kind. lOB The 
classification adopted in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on 
the law of the sea 109 appears to have been confirmed, ifnot 
strengthened, by the classification adopted in the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,110 of 
which article 236, entitled curiously enough "Sovereign 
104 See, for example, The "Twee Gebroeders" (ISOO) (c. Robinson, 
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty 
(London), vol. III (IS02), p. 162); The "Helen" (1801) (ibid., p. 224); The 
"Porto Alexandre" (1920) (The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, 
p.30). 
105 See, for example, article 3 of the 1926 Brussels Convention (para-
graph 203 below). 
106 See, for example, article I of the 1934 Additional Protocol to the 1926 
Brussels Convention (paragraph 206 below). 
107 See, for example, article I of the 1926 Brussels Convention (para-
graph 20 I below). 
108 See, for example, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (Geneva, 29 April 1958) (United Nations, Treaty Series. 
vol. 516, p. 205), and the Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 29 April 
1958) (ibid., vol. 450, p. II). 
109 The General Assembly by its resolution II 05 (XI) of 21 February 
1957, convened an international conference of plenipotentiaries to ex-
amine the law of the sea. The conference held at Geneva from 24 February 
to 27 April 1958, prepared and opened for signature four conventions, of 
which the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and 
the Convention on the High Seas have direct bearing on the immunities of 
public ships. 
110 See Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, vol. XVII (United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.S4.V.3), p. 151, document NCONF.62/122. 
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immunity", assimilates the status of vessels or aircraft 
owned or operated by a State and used, at the time, only on 
governmental non-commercial service, to that of any war-
ship or naval auxiliary} II 
4. THE EXTENT OF STATE IMMUNITY 
132. The above general considerations serve in some 
small way to illustrate the relevance and extent of involve-
ment of the question of State immunity in respect of State-
owned and State-operated vessels. The basis for immunity 
from jurisdiction as well as from seizure, attachment and 
detention appears to lie in the actual operation or employ-
ment of the vessels by the State on governmental non-
commercial service, thus leaving exposed to the normal 
exercise of local or territorial jurisdiction by the courts of 
competence all public vessels or vessels owned or operated 
by a State and used by it exclusively on non-governmental 
and commercial service. It is the purpose of the present 
study to examine the practice of States, both judicial and 
governmental, in order to .scertain the precise extent of 
immunity to be recommended or recognized in respect of 
ships employed by a State exclusively on commercial and 
non-governmental service. To what degree or extent can it 
be said that the position of such government-owned or 
government-operated vessels, used exclusively on com-, 
mercial non-governmental service, is to be assimilated to 
that of privately owned or privately operated merchant 
marine or trading vessels? 
133. It is also relevant to examine the possible use of 
public vessels in the carriage of goods and passengers for 
governmental and non-commercial services, such as the 
carriage of mail, the performance of a postal service,1I2 or 
the carriage of food supplies by government ships or even 
warships to relieve a famine-stricken area, or medical sup-
plies for a disease-ridden population. The nature of the 
service, namely the carriage of goods and passengers on 
ordinary commercial lines, seems fairly simple and 
straightforward, but the purpose of the supply or transport 
of foodstuffs, medicine and manpower may bear no re-
lation to any commercial pursuit or gain, yet such carriage 
is designed more significantly to ensure the livelihood and 
welfare of a people, which is a legitimate government func-
tion and concern, as distinct from a commercial or trading 
transaction and as opposed to commercial service or 
operation. Legal developments traceable in the judicial 
and governmental practice of States will afford a service-
able guide in the planning and preparation ofa draft article 
on this important aspect of the topic. It will also be seen to 
what extent the exercise of jurisdiction by a competent 
court of the local or territorial State will implead a foreign 
sovereign, and to what extent the foreign sovereign could 
be said to have consented to the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion as against State-owned or State-operated ships used 
exclusively on commercial non-governmental service, and 
the relationship this question may have with the question 
of immunity of State property in general from attachment 
and execution. 
III Article 236 is contained in section 10 of part XII, entitled "Protec-
tion and preservation of the marine environment." 
112 See, for example, The "Parlement beige" (\880) (The Law Reports, 
Probate Division, vol. V (1880), pp. 219-220), 
5. THE BASIS FOR JURISDICTION 
134. It is admittedly outside the scope of the present 
inquiry to examine the legitimacy of claims lor the cxcrcise 
of jurisdiction by the courts of a State in any given set of 
circumstanC(~s. The question of the appropriateness of or 
justification for the exercise of such jurisdiction is a matter 
essentially and primarily within the exclusive domain ofa 
sovereign State. Of course, the jurisdiction of a State is not 
unlimited; there are some clear territorial limitations, and 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is in principle 
subject to the rules not only of private international law, 
but also of the law of nations or public international law. 
However, this question will not be directly examilled in the 
present study, as it is a question that must recur in any 
event, whenever there is an exercise of jurisdiction by a 
court ofa State beyond the bounds of its national frontiers 
or territorial confines. It belongs, therefore, to the much 
larger subject of the scope and content of jurisdiction as an 
aspect of the sovereign authority of a State. 
135. The points at issue, of which there are several in this 
particular connection, appear singularly inherent in the 
peculiarities of admiralty rules in the common-law coun-
tries, which permit a process in rem against a vessel, fol-
lowed by its seizure, as a foundation for the commence-
ment of an action or a legitimate ground upon which to 
found and exercise jurisdiction. Thus the physical presence 
of a ship within a harbour or port, or indeed lying anchored 
in territorial waters, could provide a firm ground for start-
ing a process in rem or an action to seek relief for damages 
for collision at sea, or salvage services, or a salvor's or 
repairer's lien on the vessel. But British admiralty rules 
contain more points of obscurity than readily imaginable. 
For instance, the foundation of jurisdiction need be neither 
real nor indeed personal,' it may often be a mere kinship or 
association. Through a thread of common ownership, for 
example, the law could fasten liabilities, both in rem and in 
personam, it would seem, on an entirely different ship not 
identified in any way with the ship in dispute which was at 
fault or the ship for which salvage services had been ren-
dered, except by the relationship of mere sharing of com-
mon owners, or the association with the same fleet of 
ships-the sisterhood, as it is sometimes strangely called, 
of ships of the same fleet or company. This fiction of sister-
ship jurisdiction, strange as it may seem, has afforded 
practical grounds and provided a convenient basis for the 
aggrieved party to commence an action or process in rem in 
admiralty against a sister ship in respect of the wrongs or 
harms done by another sister ship.113 Without commenting 
on the pros and cons of the rationale for such sister-ship 
jurisdiction, suffice it to recognize that, in the legal practice 
of States, the basis for jurisdiction seems incredibly wide, 
but nevertheless reasonably practical and flexible. 
B. The practice of States 
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
136. It should be observed at this point that the practice 
of States with regard to State imm unity in general started in 
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many countries almost inevitably with the recognition of 
the immunities of public armed ships. Thus the immun-
ities of States, as a whole and in all subsequent manifes-
tations, were first recognized in connection with men-of-
war. The immunities of public warships in foreign ports 
and territorial or national waters became established as 
early as 1812 in the celebrated case concerning a libel in 
rem against the schooner exchange. which had been seized 
by persons acting under a decree issued by Napoleon I 
and subsequently converted into a public armed ship, then 
lying in the port of Philadelphia. In the classic case, 
The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon and others. 114 
Chief Justice Marshall considered public armed ships as 
constituting a part of the military force of the nation, 
and accepted as "a principle of public law, that national 
ships of war, entering the port ofa friendly power, open for 
their reception, are to be considered as exempted by 
the consent of that power from its jurisdiction".lls 
137. This classic dictum of Chief Justice Marshall could 
scarcely be said to have derived from the desire on the part 
of a colonial Power or a developed country to perpetuate its 
subjugation of Asian or African peoples or its domination 
of foreign territories, or indeed to maintain its superiority 
over newly emerged States. If anything, the exact reverse 
seems much closer to the truth. Thus Jean Hostie, writing 
on the case-law of the American Supreme Court for that 
period 116 when the United States was just a newly born 
State, had this to say about the sensitive awareness of its 
own national sovereignty and independence: 
This same solicitous concern for its independence - quite natural for a 
young State. especially as it was the first colonial State to become sover-
eign, ... and quite justifiable. given the external circumstances and the 
novelty of the constitutional experience - this same concern is reflected in 
a doctrine that was to have a major role in the case-law of the Supreme 
Court.''' 
138. This decision of the United States Supreme Court is 
therefore remarkable in that it laid down for the first time, 
in no uncertain terms, the principle of State immunity in 
general and the immunities of men-of-war in particular. I IS 
It represented a timely recognition of the equality of States 
at a time when the European Powers were not predisposed 
to accept such absolute equality for all States, although 
subsequent practice made it abundantly clear that an 
alternative, either in the form oflegal inequality or super-
114 W. Cranch. Reports o/Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme 
Court 0/ the United States (New York). vol. VII (3rd ed.) (191 I). 
p.116. 
lIS Ibid., pp. 143 and 145-146. 
116 See also Glass v. The Sloop "Betsey" (1794)(A. J. Dallas, Reports 0/ 
Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts o/the United States and 0/ 
Pennsylvania (New York), vol. III (2nd ed.) (1912), p. 6); Church v. Hub· 
bart (1804) (Cranch, op. cit., vol. II (3rd cd.) (1911). p. 187); The "Ante-
lope" (1825) (H. Wheaton. Reports 0/ Cases Argued and Adjudged in the 
Supreme Court o/the United States (New York). vol. X (4th ed.) (1911), pp. 
66 and 122). 
117 J. Hostie. "Contribution de la Cour supreme des Etats-Unis au 
developpement du droit des gens". Recueil des cours ... , 1939-111 (Paris. 
Sirey). vol. 69 (1939). pp. 282-283. 
118 The decision ofChiefJustice Marshall in The Schooner "Exchange" 
was cited by the English Admiralty Court in The "Prins Frederik" (1820) 
(J. Dodson. Reports o/Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of 
Admiralty (London), vol. II (1815-1822) (1828). p. 451). 
iority of the major Powers before the law, would be unac-
ceptable. The principle enunciated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall received judicial endorsement and governmental 
approbation in subsequent State practice. It was discussed 
at length in the United Kingdom after 1820,119 until finally 
confirmed in The "Constitution" (1879).120 In France, the 
Foreign Minister made a declaration to the same effect less 
than a decade later in relation to a case concerning the Ville 
de Victoria and the Sultan (1887).121 In Germany, the same 
principles were applied in 1891 in a case concerning a 
Chilean ship, the Presidente Pinto, and in 1901 in a case 
relating to the Assari Tewfik. a Turkish vessel. 122 
139. At that time, international law was still essentially 
and exclusively of European origin. But the innovation by 
the American Supreme Court had begun a series of en-
couraging breakthroughs to update and internationalize 
the process of international law-making. If States were to 
be regarded as equally sovereign and none could have nor 
exercise jurisdiction over the others, the very first case of 
likely contact, or indeed conflict or overlapping of sover-
eign authority or jurisdiction, between States could not 
have actually occurred unless one State moved into the 
territorial confines of another. Normally no territory of a 
State could overlap that of another State. But the mobility 
of seagoing vessels and the fiction of their territoriality 
provided precisely for this eventuality. It was therefore not 
surprising that the doctrine of State immunity first came to 
be recognized and accepted as a proposition oflaw in cases 
involving "floating territory" of one State which happened 
to sail into the territorial or national waters of another 
State, with the result that the principle of sovereign equal-
ity could not permit the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
territorial sovereign over the floating territory, which 
formed part of the armed forces of another, equally sover-
eign State. This was actually how the basic principle of 
State immunity or sovereign immunities of States in gen-
eral came to be recognized and settled as a natural outcome 
of international intercourse and an inevitable principle of 
international law. The first concrete illustration of its 
application is to be found in cases of public armed vessels 
or warships. The likelihood of their movement into the 
territory of another State was self-apparent, owing to the 
inherent nature of their mobility across national maritime 
frontiers. 
140, Gradually and progressively, the principle of State 
immunity which was first applicable to warships was 
actually applied to the State itself, its organs, agencies and 
others instrumentalities. Other public ships, not answering 
the definition of warships, nor used for defence purposes, 
were later accorded the same jurisdictional immunities, so 
long only as they were public vessels, or ships owned or 
operated by a State for public purposes or employed on 
governmental and official or non-commercial service. 
119 The "Prins Frederik" (I 820) (see footnote 118 above). It was admit-
ted by the parties that the Prins Frederik was a public ship of war, anne en 
flute, owned by the King of the Netherlands and employed in the carriage 
of spices and other goods. 
120 The Law Reports, Probate Division, vol. IV (1879), p. 39. 
121 See G. Gidel, Le droit international public de fa mer (Paris, Sirey). 
vol. II (1932), p. 303. 
122 See C. Baldoni. "Les navires de guerre dans les eaux territoriales 
etrangeres", Recueil des cours ... , 1938-111 (Paris, Sirey). vol. 65 (1938). 
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Thus it came about that the immunities originally granted 
to States in respect of their public armed vessels were sub-
sequently extended, notably in Anglo-American case-law, 
to all kinds of public ships which, at the outset, were not 
employed on commercial service but were later used for 
the carriage of cargoes as freight earners or in the carrying 
trade. Since the First World War, it has become common 
practice among modern coastal States to keep a merchant 
fleet or create and maintain a merchant marine in order 
better to promote the national economy and external or 
overseas trade in the severely competitive international 
markets of the world. In view of these ever-increasing 
maritime commercial activities of States, it has become 
more and more questionable whether the tendency to 
extend immunities in a sweeping manner could bejustified 
on any logical or juridical grounds, if such an extension 
finds no firm support in the overall practice of States in 
general. 
141. It is in the light of this question that the closest 
attention should be paid to contemporary State practice 
regarding the matter under consideration. It is not without 
interest to note that the practice of States has been neither 
logically consistent nor progressively harmonious. In fact, 
the attitude of one and the same State is often different as a 
claimant of immunity for its own merchant fleet, when it 
demands complete and unquestioning concession of State 
immunity in any circumstances, from when it displays 
more judicious deliberation and restraint in the recog-
nition and granting of like immunities for foreign public 
vessels operated and employed by a State or one of its 
agencies exclusively on commercial and non-governmen-
tal service. It will be seen whether there is room for consist-
ency or harmony, ifnot uniformity, in the general practice 
of States, taking into account the different political and 
economic structures and ideologies prevailing in various 
legal and social systems and the intermittent interplay of 
the concept and practice of reciprocity. 
2. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
(a) A brief historical sketch of relevant practice 
142. As has been noted in the general observations 
above, the immunities of States in respect of their public 
armed vessels were the first to have receivedjudicial recog-
nition, as early as 1812,123 followed by recognition and 
endorsement in the practice of States. At that time, States 
were still employing their ships mainly for the purposes of 
defence. Even the protection of overseas trade with their 
colonial territories had an imperial ring sufficient to con-
jure up the official function of national defence or protec-
tion of the ships flying their flags. Such protection was 
considered necessary in international or foreign waters 
infested by countless fleets of pirate ships hunting for prey 
and bounty. Ships owned and operated by States originally 
had this basic function of policing the sea-ways or patrol-
ling the sea lanes to ensure the safety of maritime transport 
or the safe conduct and undisturbed freedom of navigation 
for national ships. 
123 See The Schooner "Exchange"v. McFaddon and others (I S 12)(foot-
note 114 above). 
143. Later on, States found it necessary and convenient 
to employ public ships not only to suppress piracy on the 
high seas, or outwardly to protect vessels flying their flags 
in peacetime as well as to engage in time of war in the arrest 
and seizure of foreign neutral or enemy ships as lawful 
prizes, but more practically in the performance of other 
public duties not necessarily connected with national de-
fence, such as postal services,124 or to serve as government 
pleasure yachts,12S or as patrol boats to suppress illegal 
traffic or trade. 126 Immunities of public armed ships were 
gradually extended to all such vessels employed on public 
or governmental service. However, the First World War 
had necessitated the new practice. In order to ensure the 
supply of vital goods for areas affected by enemy blockade, 
Governments had to engage directly in the carriage and 
transport of such supplies as food, medicines, oil and other 
necessities for the sustenance of human life. The end of the 
First World War left States with seagoing vessels, freighters 
and tankers on hand, either publicly owned or privately 
owned but requisitioned, or seized from enemy fleets, to 
fulfil the wartime needs of the nation. Once engaged in the 
maritime trade and keenly a\\'are of the need for such ser-
vices, it was difficult for maritime nations to disengage 
themselves at the close of hostilities and to return to nor-
malcy as if the war had never happened. The question to be 
asked in connection with the judicial practice of States is 
whether, and to what extent, vessels owned or operated by 
States exclusively on commercial and non-governmental 
service would be accorded immunities from the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of another State. 
144. The practice of various legal systems in the past 
appears to reveal a substantial reluctance to give full recog-
nition to the need for such unqualified immunities. The 
qualification of immunities appears to have been centred 
on the nature of the service or the exclusive use of the 
vessel by a State for trading purposes, that is to say on 
commercial and non-governmental service. It is both cru-
cial and useful to examine the judicial practice of States 
having the most favourable inclination towards an unqual-
ified doctrine of State immunity. It should be borne in 
mind that, in some countries, such as in socialist legal 
systems, where government practice clearly favours an 
absolute rule of sovereign immunity for ships owned by the 
State itself regardless of their employment or the nature of 
their service, there has nevertheless been no judicial prac-
tice supporting the converse situation, where foreign States 
could be given recognition or accorded appropriate im-
munities for their vessels, however employed or regardless 
of the nature of their service. As no other judicial system 
could be said to have gone as far as the British and United 
States systems, it is only appropriate that the present inves-
tigation of judicial practice should begin with the so-called 
Anglo-American practice. 
(i) United Kingdom 
145. The case-law of the United Kingdom is probably the 
richest in the field of State immunities in respect of public 
124 For example, in The "Parlement beige" (18S0) (see footnote 112 
above), immunity was recognized for a mail packet. 
12S See, for example, The "Newballle" (IS85) (The Law Reports. Probate 
Division. vol. X (1S85), p. 33). 
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vessels. It has indisputably shown the greatest propensity 
towards absolute or unqualified immunity in regard to 
State-owned or State-operated vessels. But this propensity 
belongs now to a remote past which is not likely to recur. 
As has been noted (paragraph 121 above), a process in rem 
against a ship, followed by arrest or detention, is con-
sidered to implead the owner. However, a process in rem, 
not followed by arrest or detention, could proceed against a 
vessel not owned by a foreign State but requisitioned by it. 
An historical survey of English case-law regarding immun-
ities of foreign public vessels reveals an interesting 
phenomenon of uncertainty and changing positions in the 
practice of the courts. 
146. English case-law began with a period of uncertainty 
from 1800 to 1873. Early nineteenth-century cases were 
concerned with prize law. 127 The "Prins Frederik" 
(1820) 128 was probably the first case involving a public ship 
of war, arlne en flute, owned by the King of the Nether-
lands; but the dispute was finally settled out of court by 
arbitration. Reported cases before 1873 had little or no 
bearing on public vessels employed in trade, since States 
had not generally employed their ships in the carriage of 
merchandise for freight. Cases like The "Marquis of Hunt-
ley" (1835),129 The "Athol"(1842) 130 and The "ThomasA. 
Scott" (1864)131 were either concerned with ships of war or 
related to questions of municipal rather than international 
law. 
147. The second period was from 1873 to 1880, that is to 
say between The "Charkieh" (1873) \32 and The "Parle-
ment beIge" (1880).133 This could be considered as corres-
ponding to the acceptance ofa restrictive rule of immunity. 
Sir Robert Phillimore, an unsurpassed authority on British 
admiralty law in the nineteenth century since Lord Stowell, 
held that the commercial nature of the service or employ-
ment of the vessel disentitled it to State immunity. Since 
the Charkieh was, inter alia, engaged in trading ventures, it 
was not accorded immunity. Another lesser ground for 
rejecting immunity was the fact that it was owned by the 
Khedive of Egypt, probably in his private capacity. Fur-
thermore, it was chartered to a British subject at the time 
126 See, for example, The "Dictator" (1892) (footnote 99 above); The 
"Gemma"(1899) (ibid .. ); and The "Jassy" (I 906) (The Law Reports. Pro-
bate Division. 1906. p. 270). 
127 See, for example, The "Twee Gebroeders" (1800) (footnote 104 
above); The "Helen "(1801) (ibid.); The "Anna" (1805) (C. Robinson, op. 
cit .• vol. V (1806), p. 373); The "Comus"(ISI6), referred to in connection 
with The "Prins Frederick" (Dodson, op. cit .• vol. II (1815-1822), p. 464). 
Cf. The "Charkieh" (1873) (footnote 132 below) and The "Thomas A. 
Scol/" (1864) (The Law Times Reports (London), vol. X (March-Septem-
ber 1864), p. 726). 
128 See footnote 118 above. 
129 J. Haggard, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High 
COlin of Admiralty (London), vol. III (1833-1838) (1840), p. 246. 
130 W. Robinson, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High 
COllrt of Admiralty (London), vol. I (1838-1842) (1844), p. 374. See also 
The "Swallow" (1856) and The "Inflexible" (1856) (M. C. Swabey, Reports 
of Cases Decided in the High COllrt of Admiralty. 1855-1859 (London, 
1860), pp. 30 and 32); and The "Ticonderoga" (1857) (Swabey, op. cit .• 
p.215). 
131 See footnote 127 above, in fine; the term "ships of war" was held to 
include a transport owned by a State. 
132 The Law Reports. High Court of Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts. 
vol. IV (1985), p. 59; see also C. F. Gabba in Journal du droit international 
prive (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 17 (1890), p. 41. 
113 See footnote 138 below. 
the proceeding had started. Sir Robert Phillimore, in his 
oft-cited dictum, stated per curiam: 
... No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no 
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorise a 
sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader, when it is for his 
benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw ofT, 
if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming for his 
own benefit, and to the injury ofa private person, for the first time, all the 
attributes of his character. 134 
148. The reign of restricted immunity was confirmed in 
regard to the domestic sovereign in The "Cybele"( 1877) \3S 
by Sir Robert Phillimore himself, who also, in the later case 
of The "Constitution" (1879),136 distinguished between an 
American vessel of war entitled to immunity, although at 
the critical time it was carrying cargo for the Paris Exhibi-
tion, and a public ship employed for commercial purposes, 
which would not be accorded jurisdictional immunity. Sir 
Robert Phillimore went a step further in the more contro-
versial case The "Parlement beIge" (1879),137 concerning a 
ship used only partly, not exclusively, for commercial pur-
poses. 
149. His decision rejecting immunity was reversed in 
1880 \38 by the Court of Appeal, which, per Lord Justice 
Brett, accorded immunity on the grounds, inter alia, 
that 
. .. the ship has been mainly used for the purpose of carrying the mails, 
and only subserviently to that main object for the purposes of trade. The 
carrying of passengers and merchandise has been subordinated to the duty 
of carrying the mails. 139 
Besides, the Parlement beIge was intrinsically a mail 
packet, owned by the King of Belgium in his sovereign 
capacity, and at no time was it exclusively employed on 
commercial and non-governmental service. Nevertheless, 
the reversal of Sir Robert Phillimore's decision by the 
Court of Appeal in 1880 marked a decline in the attrac-
tiveness of the restrictive doctrine and, owing to a system 
of rigid adherence to stare decisis, the 40-year period fol-
lowing The "Parlement beige" (1880) 140 until 1920 has 
been characterized perhaps less accurately as a period of 
uncertainty, with a tendency in favour of a more unquali-
fied rule of State immunity. The uncertainty was more of 
an erroneous appreciation of the true nature of the service 
or the preponderant employment of the Parlement beige in 
the carriage of mail. In addition, under the bilateral treaty 
then in force between Belgium and the United Kingdom, 
134 The Law Reports. High Court of Admiralty ...• vol. IV (1875), 
pp.99-100. 
135 The Law Reports. Probate Division. vol. II (1877), p. 224. See also 
Young. Master of SS "Flirnesia" v. ss "Scotia" (1903)(The Law Reports. 
House of Lords . ..• 1903. p. 505). 
136 See footnote 120 above. 
137 The Law Reports. Probate Division. vol. IV (1879), p. 129. After 
reviewing English and American cases, Judge Phillimore concluded that 
the Parlement beIge was neither a ship of war nor a pleasure-boat and was 
thus not entitled to immunity. 
138 Ibid.. vol. V (18S0), p. 197. 
139 Ibid .. p. 220. 
140 See footnote 138 above. See also F. Wharton, "Le cas du vapeur 
postal: Ie Parlement beige". Revue de droit international et de /egisla/ion 
comparee (Paris). vol. XII (IS80), p. 235. 
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mail packets such as the Parlement beIge, regardless of its 
subsidiary employment, which was partly commercial, 
were to be treated as men-of-war for the purposes of juris-
dictional immunities. 141 Lord Justice Brett, after an inten-
sive review of earlier cases, recognized that 
... as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign 
authority .... each and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts 
any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or 
ambassador of any other State. or over the public property" of any State 
which is destined to public use" .. 142 
150. The principle thus laid down does not appear to be 
incompatible with a restrictive view of immunity, for the 
public property of a foreign State is further required to be 
destined for public use (publicis usibus destinata) or in use 
for public purposes in order to be entitled to State immun-
ity. The case Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878) 143 was therefore 
cited in support of the view that the public property of a 
foreign sovereign in use for public purposes was exempt 
fr )m the jurisdiction of English courts. The requirement of 
public use or public purposes of the public property was 
weakened by a further dictum of Lord Justice Brett in The 
"Parlement beIge", which contained a suggestion that a 
declaration of a foreign sovereign as to the nature or 
character of the use of his public property was determina-
tive and was binding on the courts. 144 This suggestion was 
subsequently overruled by English courts in a series of 
much more recent cases, the first of which was Juan 
Ysmael & Co. Inc. v. Government of the Republic o/Indo-
nesia (1954).145 In the meantime, 'however, a more un-
qualified rule of State immunity continued to assert 
itself in British practice in all its various aspects, except 
directly on the point under investigation, namely the 
exclusive use of public vessels on commercial and non-
governmental service. 
151. In the 40 years that followed The "Parlement beIge" 
(1880), which have been classified as a period of un~er­
tainty with a favourable tendency towards absolute Im-
munity, and also for a few years after, a series of cases were 
decided which clarified a number of salient points regard-
ing procedures in admiralty and the circumstances in 
which it could be said whether or not a foreign sovereign 
would be impleaded in a process in rem against a ship not 
141 Article VI ofthe postal Convention of 17 February 1876 between the 
United Kingdom and Belgium provides: 
"VI. ... 
"These vessels shall be considered, and treated ... , as vessels of war, 
and be there entitled to all the honours and privileges which the inte-
rests and importance of the service in which they are employed 
demand. 
(British and Foreign State Papers. 1875,1876 (London), vol. LXVII 
(1883), p. 21). See also, concerning foreign mail packets, Lord McNair, 
International Law Opinions (Cambridge, University Press), vol. I (1956), 
pp. 95 et seq. 
142 Loc. cit. (footnote 138 above), pp. 214-215. 
143 The Law Reports. Chancery Division, vol. IX (1878), p. 351. The case 
concerned quantities of shells bought in Germany by the Emperor of 
Japan. The shells were destined for use in guns to be fitted to battleships 
forming part of the Japanese imperial fleet. 
144 Loc. cit. (footnote 138 above), pp. 212-213. 
145 The Law Reports. Houseo/Lords . ... 1955. p. 72. Cf. the Hong Kong 
Aircraft case (1953) (ibid.. 1953. p. 70). 
owned by a foreign sovereign, but in his possesion, without 
other interests such as the right to possess.1 46 Thus it fol-
lows that actions in rem could be brought against privately 
owned vessels at any time regardless of the actual employ-
ment by the State, provided that the proceedings did not 
relate to the activities of the State operating them, while 
actions in personam were equally permissible against the 
private owners in respect of acts unconnected with the 
employment by the State. 147 A writ in rem could be issued 
against a privately owned vessel which did .nothing to 
interfere with the use of the vessel by the sovereIgn State. 148 
An action in rem could be instituted against a requisitioned 
ship, but no arrest could be made while it was in public 
service or use or in the possession of a foreign Govern-
ment. 149 It appears that the real purpose of this "suspended 
action in rem" was to enable a writ to issue, to prevent the 
running of time against the plaintiff, who would thus be 
able eventually to call the owner to account with the pos-
sibility of attaching the property when it reverted to him. ISO 
It follows that, after the termination of public service of a 
privately owned vessel, actions in rem which had been 
suspended could now proceed against the vessel inasmuch 
as they did not touch the personal liability of the foreign 
Government. Thus actions for salvage services have been 
allowed, while actions for damage by collision during the 
employment of the ship by a foreign State have been set 
aside for impleading the foreign State, as the State was 
responsible for the safe navigation of the ships, while in the 
former case the private owners had benefited from the 
salvage services. 151 Lastly, it should also be noted that no 
maritime lien could attach to privately owned ships while 
in the public service of a foreign Government. IS2 Pre-
existing maritime liens, prior to requisition or charter of a 
ship by the State, would be suspended during the term of 
State employment, after which they would once again 
become operati ve. IS3 
146 See, for example, The "Broadmayne" (1916) (Annual Digest o/The 
Times Law Reports (London), vol. XXXII, p. 304); The "Messicano" 
(1916) (ibid., p. 159); The "Erissos" (1917) (Lloyd's List (London), 23 
October 1917); The "Eolo" (1918) (The Irish Law Reports. vol. 2, p. 78); 
The "Crimdon" (1918) (Annual Digest o/The Times Law Reports, vol. 
XXXV p. 81)' The "Koursk" (1918) (Lloyd's List, 19 June 1918); The 
"Espoz~nde" <1918) (ibid., 18 and 25 February 1918); and The "Jupiter" 
No.1 (1924) (see footnote 99 above, injine. and Annual Digest .. .. 1925-
1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), p. 136, case No. 100). 
147 See, for example, The "Messicano" (1916), The "Erissos "(1917) and 
The "Crimdon" (1918) (cases referred to in footnote 146 above). 
148 See the opinion of Judge Hi1I in The "Crimdon" (1918), (footnote 
146 above). 
149 See the opinion of Sir Samuel Evans in The "Messicano" (1916) 
(ibid.). 
150 See The "Gagara"(1919) (The Law Reports, Probate Division. 1919. 
p. 95, especially p. 101). In this case, immunity was. accorde~ to a. sh.ip 
requisitioned by the Estonian Government and whl~h remamed m ,Its 
possession. Cf. the opinion expressed by Lord Justice Bankes In Ihe 
"Jupiter" No. I (1924) (footnote 99 above), and the refusal of immunity in 
The "Jupiter" No.2 (\ 925) (The Law Reports, Prob~te Division. 1925. p. 
69), where the Soviet Government was no longer In possession of the 
Jupiter and claimed no interest in it. 
151 See The "Meandros" (1924) (The Law Reports. Probate Division. 
1925. p. 61). The owners were held liable for the salvage services ren-
dered. 
152 See The "Sylvan Arrow" (1923) (ibid.. 1923. p. 220). The personal-
ized liability in rem ofa ship for a delict depended on the amenability to the 
local jurisdiction of the persons operating it. 
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152. It is interesting to note that, on the eve of 1920, 
Judge Hill made a suggestion in The "Annette"; The 
"Dora" (1919) 154 that a ship chartered or requisitioned by a 
Government and merely employed in ordinary trading 
voyages was to enjoy no immunity. This commendable 
suggestion was rejected by the Court of Appeal the follow-
ing year in The "Porto Alexandre" (1920).155 The Porto 
Alexandre was formerly a German privately-owned vessel 
named the Ingbert, adjudged lawful prize by the Portu-
guese Prize Court in 1917. She had earlier been requi-
sitioned by the Portuguese Government and handed over 
to the Committee of Services of the Transportes Maritimos 
do Estado (TMDE) 156 and had since been employed exclu-
sively in ordinary trading operations, earning freight for 
the Government. In the Admiralty Division of the High 
Court, Judge Hill declined jurisdiction, setting ~side the 
writ in rem against the ship, her cargo and freight, and 
against her owners in so far as the ship and freight were 
concerned, pointing out the undesirability of ~uch hard 
cases, but having to assert then what he "conceived to be 
the law".157 Absolute immunity was applied with reluc-
tance. The Court )f Appeal showed no less hesitation in 
confirming this decision. Lord Justice Bankes felt the dif-
ficulty but deemed himself, rightly or wrongly, bound by 
the decision of the same court in The "Parlelnent beIge". 158 
Lord Justice Warrington was ofa similar opinion. 159 Lord 
Justice Scrutton appreciated the difficulty and shared the 
doubts felt by Judge Hill in the court below, but refused the 
judicial remedy sought and went out of his way to suggest 
some practical remedies which were extra-legal. H.e ob-
served: "no one can shut his eyes, now that the fashIOn of 
nationalization is in the air ... and if these national ships 
wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs will 
become difficult" .160 The phrase publicis usibus destinata 
was much discussed, while on the whole Judge Hill and the 
Court of Appeal appear to have gratuitously declared 
themselves bound by the authority of The "Parlement 
beIge". The principles favouring an absolute view of State 
immunity as laid down in The "Porto Alexandre" ~ere 
admitted by counsel in The "Jupiter"No. I (1924) 161 With-
out any argument and were applied in subsequent cases, 
"Utopia" (1893) (The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1893, p. 492), 
especially the opinion of Sir Francis Jeune (pp. 497 and 499); and The 
"Castlegate" (1892) (ibid., p. 38), especially the opinion of Lord Watson 
(p.52). 
IS4 The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1919, p. 105 especially pp. 112-
113. 
ISS Ibid., 1920, p. 30. 
156 An organization similar to the United States Shipping Board 
(USSB). 
157 The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p. 31. 
158 Lord Justice Bankes stated: 
"But in modern times sovereigns have taken to owning ships, which 
may ... be employed as ordinary trading vessels engaged in ordinary 
trading. The fact of itself indicates the growing importance ?,f the par-
ticular question, if vessels so employed are free from arrest. (ibId., p. 
34.) 
159 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
160 Ibid., pp. 38-39. An accurate resume of the position in. ~nglish case-
law before 1921 is given in A. D. McNair, "Judicial recogmtlOn of States 
and Governments and the immunity of public ships", British Year Book of 
Illlernational Law, 1921-22 (London), vol. 2, p. 74 (d) and (e); cf. W. R. 
Bisschop, "Immunity of States in maritime law", ibid., 1922·23, vol. 3, 
p.159. 
161 See footnote 99 above. 
such as Campania Mercantil Argentina v. United States 
Shipping Board (1924).162 This rule was applied in a long 
line of recognition cases during the Spanish civil war.163 
153. The next period in the history of English case-law on 
the point under review started with The "Cristina" 
(1938).164 It was another period of uncertainty, with tend-
encies towards more and more restrictions, culminating in· 
the final confirmation of absence of State immunity in 
respect of ships employed by a foreign State exclusively 
on commercial and non-governmental service. The 
"Cristina" was a turning-point in 1938; the vessel was in 
use for public purposes and not employed in trading 
voyages. The five Law Lords in the House of Lords took 
occasion to express their views on the question. State 
immunity was allowed for privately owned ships chartered 
or requisitioned by foreign States. It was held, per 
Lord Atkin, that the courts would not, by their process, 
seize or detain "property which is ... [the sovereign's] or 
of which he is in possession or control".165 In his view, 
immunity would have applied also to public property used 
for purely commercial purposes. That view was shared 
also by Lord Wright, approving the correctness of 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in The "Porto 
Alexandre" (1920) 166 and the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in The "Pesaro" (1926),167 but observing: 
"This modern development of the immunity of public 
ships has not escaped severe, and, in my opinion, 
justifiable criticism on practical grounds of polic~, at 
least as applied in times of peace. "168 Lord Macmillan 
reserved his opinion, and expressed his doubts: 
I confess that I should hesitate to lay down that it is part of the Law of 
England that an ordinary foreign trading vessel is immune from civil 
process within this realm by reason merely of the fact that it is owned by a 
foreign State, for such a principle must be an importation from intcr-
national law and there is no proved consensus of international opinion or 
practice to this effect. 169 
154. This marked absence of consensus of international 
opinion or practice seems to go a long way towards denying 
any pre-existing principle of State immunity for vessels 
employed by foreign Governments exclusively in trading 
162 Law Journal Reports, 1924, King's Bench Division (London), vol. 93, 
p. 816; Annual Digest ... , 1923-24 (London), vol. 2 (1933), p. 138, case 
No. 73. 
163 See, for example, The "El Condato"(1937) (Lloyd's List Law Reports 
(London) vol. 59 (1937), p. 119); The "Rita Garcia" (1937) (ibid., p. 140); 
The "Arr~iz"(1938) (ibid.. vol. 61 (1938), p. 39); The "El Neptuno"(1938) 
(ibid., vol. 62 (1938), p. 7); The "Arantzazu Mendi" (1939) (The Law 
Reports, House of Lords ... ,1939, p. 256); The "Abodi Mendi"(1939)(The 
Law Reports. Probate Division, 1939, p. 178); The "Kabalo" (1940) 
(Lloyd's List Law Reports, vol. 67 (1940), p. 572). See also Annual Digest 
...• 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942), cases Nos. 25 and 88-92. 
164 The Lal>' Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938, p. 485. See also H. 
Lauterpacht, "The Cristina", The Law Quarterly Review (London). vol. 
LIV (1938), p. 339; F. A. Mann, "Immunity of foreign States", The 
Modern Law Review (London), vol. II (1938-1939), p. 57; R. Y. Jennings, 
"Recognition and sovereign immunities", ibid., p. 287; notc in The British 
Year Book of International Law, 1938 (London), vol. 19, pp. 243-249. 
16S The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938, p. 490. 
166 See footnote 155 above. 
167 See footnote 179 below. 
168 The Law Reports, House of Lords . ... 1938, p. 512. 
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courts to deny an immunity which our government has 
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds 
which the government has not seen fit to recognize."193 
American judges were predisposed to regard the interpre-
tation of a foreign State's use of its vessels as a matter of 
diplomatic rather thanjudicial determination. 194 The judi-
cial primacy in this field has therefore been relegated. The 
trend in the Supreme Court in favour offollowing the lead 
of the political branch of the Government in this connec-
tion is significant in view of the restatement of the policy of 
the United States Government limiting immunity in cer-
tain classes of case, as enunciated in the famous Tate Letter 
of 19 May 1952. 195 
161. The Tate Letter put an end to any lingering doubts 
regarding the policy to be followed by the executive, as well 
as by the courts. Restricted immunity based on a distinc-
tion between public acts Uure imperii) and private acts 
Uure gestionis) was adopted and the practice of the State 
Department of making suggestions of immunity gradually 
developed. The role of the judiciary became that of a "sec-
ond chamber''' and the practice of pre-trial by the politi-
cal branch of the Government grew, until it became too on-
erous to maintain. 196 Thus the legislative branch of the 
Government intervened to restore a new balance in the 
form of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. 197 
The determination of questions of jurisdictional immun-
ities and their extent was once again restored to the original 
authority. namely the judiciary, with far less likelihood of 
interventions by the executive branch of the Govern-
ment. 198 What is clear, however, is that, since the Tate 
19J Uniled SImes Reporls. vol. 324 (1946), p. 30, at p. 35. Cf. the opinion 
of Chief Justice Stone in Ex parte Republic oj Peru (1943) (ibid., vol. 318 
(1943), p. 578. at pp. 588-589). See also F. W. Stone Engineering Co. v. 
Petroleos .\lexicallos (1945) (Pennsylvania State Reports, vol. 352 (1946), 
p. 12; Annual Digest ... , 1946 (London), vol. 13 (1951), p.76, case 
No.31); Uniled States oj Mexico et al. v. Peter Schmuck et al. (1944) 
(Reports oJCases Decided in the Court of Appeals oJthe State oJNew York, 
vol. 293 (1945). p. 264; Annual Digest ... , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12 
(1949), p. 75, case No. 21); A. B. Lyons, "The conclusiveness of the 'sug-
gestion' and certificate of the American State Department", The British 
Year Book oj IllIernational Law, 1947 (London), vol. 24, p. 116. 
194 For example, in The "Maipo"(1919) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 259 
(1920), p. 367). Judge Hough considered that, if a Government engaged in 
trade, it should be subject to the same liabilities as private individuals, but 
this would invoke the Chilean Government's interpretation of what was a 
public function. It was, as such, a matter of diplomatic ratherthan judicial 
determination. C£ The "Roseric" (1918) (footnote 192 above). 
195 The Department oj State Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXVI, 
No. 678 (23 June 1952), pp. 984-985. See also W. W. Bishop, Jr., "New 
United States policy limiting sovereign immunity", The American Journal 
oj International Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 47 (1953), p. 93. 
196 Pre-1976 judicial practice was to a greater or lesser extent influenced 
by the "views" or "suggestions" of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment, especially when they were favourable to the granting of immunity. 
See Chemical ./o,,'atural Resources v. Republic oj Venezuela (1966) (Inter-
national Lall Reports (London), vol. 42 (1971), p. 119); Isbrandtsen Tan-
kers v. President oj India (1970) (International Legal Materials (Washing-
ton, D.C.). vol. X, No.5 (September 1971), p. 1046); Amkor Corporation 
v. Bank oj Korea (1969) (International Law Repo'ts (Cambridge), vol. 53 
(1979), p. 291). 
191 See footnote 282 below. 
198 The procedure still exists for foreign Governments to ask the State 
Department to intervene through the Department of Justice as amicus 
curiae. See, for example, Maritime International Nominees Establishment 
v. Republic oj Guinea (1982) (footnote 38 above), in which the United 
States of America was an intervener; the conclusions of the United States 
are reproduced in International Legal Materials (Washington. D.C.), vol. 
XX, No.6 (November 1981), pp. 1436 et seq. 
Letter (1952), it has become settled law in the practice of 
the United States that State ships operated exclusively on 
commercial and non-governmental service are not granted 
immunities from seizure, attachment or detention. 
162. It should also be observed that, even prior to and 
during the period between Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS 
"Pesaro"(1926) 199 and the dictum of Chief Justice Stone in 
Republic 0/ Mexico et al. v. Hoffinan (1945),200 when ships 
employed by foreign Governments exclusively on com-
mercial and governmental service were accorded immun-
ity from the jurisdiction of United States courts, immunity 
was subject to further restrictions and qualifications. Un-
like English practice, which gave prominence to ownership 
by a foreign sovereign, United States practice based im-
munity on actual possession. Thus immunity was recog-
nized if the ship was either owned and possessed, or merely 
possessed and controlled or managed by a foreign Govern-
ment, as in The "Roseric"(1918)201 and The "Carlo Poma" 
(1919).202 Conversely, immunity was denied in cases like 
The "Attualita" (1916) 203 and The "Beaverton "; the 
"Daisai Maru" {l919),204 where the ship in question was 
neither owned, nor r )ssessed, nor operated by the State, 
though it was chartered or requisitioned by it. The require-
ment of actual possession as evidence of dedication to 
public service was regarded as determinative. In United 
States law, property does not necessarily become a part of 
the sovereignty because it is owned by the sovereign. To 
make it so it must be devoted to the public use and must be 
employed in carrying on the operations of the Govern-
ment,2°s 
163. There are also strict requirements as to the methods 
of claiming immunity in United States practice. Not only 
must immunity be positively claimed, but also it must be 
properly claimed according to the lex /ori. 206 Immunity 
would not be considered d'office or proprio motu but must 
be claimed through a proper channel, otherwise it could 
not be considered by reason of inadmissibility of evi-
dence. 207 Immunity of a public ship may be effectively 
199 See footnote 179 above. 
200 See footnote 193 above. 
201 See footnote 192 above. 
202 See footnote 184 above. 
20J See footnote 181 above. See also The "Mina"; the "Altualita "(1917) 
(The Federal Reporte" vol. 241 (1917), p. 530). Cf. Maru Navigation Co. v. 
Societa Commerciale Italiana di Navigazione (1921) (ibid., vol. 271 (1921), 
p.97). 
204 The Federal Reporter, vol. 273 (1921), p. 539; this decision followed 
United States v. Wi/de, (1838) (The Federal Cases, vol. 28 (1896), p. 601, 
case No. 16,694) and The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24 (1916) (The 
Federal Reporter, vol. 231 (1916), p. 365). 
205 Opinion ofChieflustice Waite in The "Fidelity"(1879) (sec footnote 
182 above); see the opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Republic oj Mexico et 
af. v. Hoffman (1945) (ioc. cit. (footnote 193 above), p. 37). See also The 
"Davis" (1869) (Wallace, op. cit., vol. X (1909), p. 15); Long v. the "Tam-
pico" (1883) (The Federal Repo'ter, vol. 16 (1883), p. 491, especially 
pp. 493-494); The "Uxma/" (1941) (Federal Supplement, vol. 40 (1942), 
p. 258); The "Katingo Hadjipatera" (1941) (ibid., p. 546; on appeal, Fed-
eral Reporter, 2d Series, vol. 119 (1941), p. 1022; and United States 
Reports, vol. 313 (1941), p. 593); The "Ljubiea Matkovic" (1 943)(Federal 
Supplement, vol. 49 (1943), p. 936). 
206 Unlike United States practice, British courts, instead of qualifying 
the methods of claiming immunity, have laid down stricter requirements 
for a valid waiver of immunity. 
201 Societa Commerciale Italiana di Navigazionc v. Maru Navigation 
Co. (The "St. Charles ", The "Tea", The "Armando") (1922) (The Federal 
L 
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claimed through the diplomatic channel,208 or by direct 
intervention of the foreign Government concerned ;209 al-
ternatively, the public status of the ship may be brought to 
the notice of the courts by the State Department.2lO Im-
munity has been withheld where the claim was represented 
by the master of the ship or by private counsel,211 or by a 
consuFI2 or by an ambassador of a third country.213 
(iii) France 
164. The position of public vessels in France is different 
from that in the Anglo-American world. France does not 
recognize admiralty actions in rem. Damage resulting from 
the use of government vessels generally entails actions in 
personam against the State owning the ships or the captain 
commanding the vessels. 214 Immunity of public ships per 
se is considered only in connection with their liability to 
seizure, either in a saisie conservatoire or prfdiminaire or 
preventive, or in a saisie executoire or execution or defini-
live. 215 Owing to certain technicalities of a saisie conserva-
loire, attachments of public vessels have been frequent, 
while cases arising from a saisie executoire have been com-
paratively rare,216 and would have closer relations to part 
IV of the draft articles than to the present study. 
Reporter, vol. 280 (1922), p. 334); The" Uxma/" (1941) (see footnote 205 
above). 
20' See, for example, The "Maipo" (1918) (The Federal Reporter, 
vol. 252 (1919), p.627); The "Maipo" (1919) (ibid., vol. 259 (1920), 
p.367); The "Rogdai" (1920) (ibid., vol. 278 (1922), p.294); Berizzi 
Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro"(1926) (footnote 179 above). The "Secundus" 
(1926) (The Federal Reporter, 2d Series, vol. 13 (1926), p. 469; ibid., 
vol. 15 (1927), p. 711). 
209 Fields v. Predionica i Tkanica (1941) (Nell' York Supplement, 2d 
Series, vol. 31 (1942), p. 739). 
210 The "Florence H." (1918) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 248 (1918), 
p. 1012); The "Lake Monroe" (1919) (United States Reports, vol. 250 
(1923), p. 246); The "Western Maid" (1922) (see footnote 182 above). 
211 See, for example, Ex parte in the Matter of Muir, Master of the 
"Gleneden"(I92I) (footnote 185 above); The "Roseric" (1918) (footnote 
• 192 above). 
212 See, for example, The "sao Vicente", The "Murmugao"-Rose v. 
Transportes Maritimos do Estado (1922) (The Federal Reporter, vol. 281 
(1922), p. III); The "sao Vicente"-Transportes Maritimos do Estado v. 
T. A. Scott Co. (1924) (ibid., vol. 295 (1924), p. 829). 
211 See, for example, The "Gill DJemaf" (1920) (1922) (The Federal 
Reporter, vol. 296 (1924), pp. 563 and 567); The "Gul Djemal" (1924) 
(['nited States Reports, vol. 264 (1924), p. 90). During suspension or sev-
erance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey, the 
Spanish Ambassador could not claim immunity for a merchant ship op-
erated by the Turkish Government. Such a claim should be made through 
the United States Department ofStatc. 
114 See, for example, The "Hungerford" (1918) (1919) (footnote 222 
below); cf. E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States before French Courts 
(New York, Macmillan, 1929); and C. J. Hamson, "Immunity of foreign 
States: the practice of the French courts", The British Year Book of Inter-
national Law, 1950 (London), vol. 27, p. 293. 
215 A saisie conservatoire is by way of cautio judicalUm solvi, i.e. security 
for judgment. In commercial cases, any creditor who has a reasonable fear 
of the debtor's insolvency may apply for such a saisie without the ap-
pearance of the defendant. A saisie execution is an attachment in execution 
of a judgment rendered against the owner or possessor of the property 
seized. 
216 A saisie prelim ina ire is afail accompli before the owner has a chance 
to assert his public status, while a saisie conservatoire against State-owned 
property is generally not allowed. See Veuve Caratier- Terrasson v. Direc-
twn generale des chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine (1885) (Dalloz, Reclleil 
1>('llOdiqlle et critique de jurisprudence, 1885 (Paris), part I, p. 341); 
lIal/ar('/ v. Ephrussi (1889) (Journal du droit international prive (Clunet) 
165. Before the First World War, French courts appear to 
have applied a principle of unqualified immunity. Since 
then, the contradiction between the principle ofinviolabil-
ity of State-owned property 217 and the application of the 
distinction between actes de puissance publique and actes 
de gestion privee or actes de cOillmerce 218 has given rise to 
considerable inconsistency in the judicial practice of 
France with regard to the immunity from arrest and at-
tachment offoreign public vessels employed exclusively in 
commerce-dans un but commercial et non gouvernemen-
tal. In The "Campos" (1919),219 The SS "Balosaro" 
(1919) 220 and The "Englewood" (1920), m there were traces 
of a more absolute principle being applied, as it was held 
that ships employed by foreign States for trading purposes 
could not be seized or attached, 
166. Such traces were overshadowed by the distinction 
formulated in The "Hungerford" (1918) by the Tribunal de 
commerce of Nantes between State ships employed for 
public purposes and vessels employed in ordinary trading 
voyages. Although the judgment of the commercial court 
was reversed by the Court of Appeal ofRennes (1919), the 
distinction formulated was restated and adoI .ed, At the 
time the proceedings started, the Hungeljord, a merchant 
ship requisitioned by the British Admiralty, was carrying a 
cargo of wheat and wool for the British and French 
Governments. It was therefore conceivable, as was found 
by the Court of Appeal ofRennes, that the Hungerford was 
employed in public law activities. 222 The distinction was 
upheld in a number of subsequent cases.223 
167. It is of interest to note that, although France had 
signed the 1926 Brussels Convention, but was not to ratify 
it until 1955, the Tribunal de commerce of La Rochelle, 
in Etienne v. Gouvernement des Pays-Bas (1947),224 
(Paris), vol. 16 (1889), p. 461); but see J. G. Castel, "Immunity ora foreign 
State from execution: French practice", The American Journal of Inter-
national Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 46 (1952), p. 520. 
217 See, for example, The "Campos" (1919) (Journal du droit inter-
national (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 46 (1919), p. 747; Revue internationale du 
droit maritime (Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p. 600) . 
218 See the cases cited in Annual Digest . .. , 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 
(1942), pp. 241-242. 
lt9 See footnote 217 above; G. Ripert was of the opinion in this case that 
a vessel employed by the Brazilian Government for commercial purposes 
could not be attached (Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris), 
vol. XXXIV (1922), p. 19). 
220 La Gazette des Tribunaux, 1920 (Paris), part. 2, p. 93. 
2lt Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 47 (1920), p. 621 ; 
Revue internationale dll droit maritime (Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921), 
p. 602: the Tribunal civil of Bordeaux lifted the attachment of the vessel 
Englewood, which was owned by the United States Government. See also 
The "Glenridge" (1920) (Revue internationale du droit maritime, 
vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p.599); The "Avensdaw" (1922) (ibid., 
vol. XXIV (1922), p. 1074). 
12l Sociell? maritime auxiliaire de transports v. Capitaine du vapeur 
anglais "Hungerford" (1918) and Capitaine Seabrook v. Societe maritime 
auxiliaire de transports (1919) (Rente internationale du droit maritime 
(Paris), vol. XXXII (1920-1921), p. 345). With regard to the immunities of 
requisitioned ships, contrast the judgments concerning the Axpe Mendi 
(Rousse et Maber v. Banque d'Espagne et aulres (1937)) and the 1txas Zuri 
(Societe Cementos Resola v. Larrasquil1l el Etat espagnol (1937» (Jollrnal 
du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 65 (1938), pp. 53 and 287). 
113 See, for example, Hertzfeld v. Dobroj/otte (1930) (Journal du droit 
international (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 57 (1930), p. 692); lfertz/eld v. Union 
des Republiques socialistes sorietiqlles (1938) (ibid., vol. 65 (1938), 
p. 1034). 
224 Case concerning the vessel Ittersllm (Recueil Dalloz, 1948 (Paris), 
p.84). 
" j, 
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expressed its approval of the principles of the Conven-
tion limiting immunity in regard to public ships engaged 
in commercial activities, although jurisdiction was 
declined in that case on the ground that the Ittersum was 
employed by the Netherlands for political purposes, namely 
the carriage of wheat for revictualling the country. 
(iv) Germany 
168. Before the First World War, German courts appear 
to have applied the principle of unqualified immunity with 
little hesitation. 22S War vessels were accorded complete 
immunity.226 By the close of that war, the legal status of 
Government-owned vessels employed in trade was ju-
dicially determined. In the few years following the end of 
the war, immunity was recognized for foreign State ships 
even when engaged in commercial activities. In The 
"Schenectady" (1920),227 the Supreme Court (Reichsge-
richt) dismissed an appeal against immunity from seizure 
and attachment of a vessel owned by the United States of 
America for failure to deliver some 100 bales of cotton as 
contracted. The same court affirmed the decision of the 
higher regional court (Oberlandesgericht) in The "Ice 
King" (1921) 228 and upheld immunity, although the vessel 
was operated by the United States Shipping Board (USSB) 
for commercial purposes. On the same day, the court 
reversed the judgments of the lower courts in The "West 
Chatala" (1921),229 granting immunity to another ship 
employed by USSB on the ground that the American line 
was acting merely as agent for the United States Govern-
ment. 
169. In The "Coimbra" (1923),230 the regional court 
(Landgericht) affirmed an order of attachment against a 
vessel apportioned to Portugal after the First World War, 
but equipped and maintained by a private company. 
Assuming that the practice of German courts during the 
decade that followed the war tended to favour an absolute 
view of immunity, that tendency was reversed by Ger-
many's ratification of the 1926 Brussels Convention, at 
least in so far as public ships and cargoes were concerned. 
The "Oituz" (1930)23\ was probably the last case in which 
The "Ice King" was followed. There, immunity was ac-
m See, for example, E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States before 
German Courts (New York, Macmillan, 1928). See also Heizer v. Kaiser-
Franz-Joseph-Bahn A.G. (1885) (Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt fur das 
Konigreich Bayern (Munich), vol. I (1885), pp. 15-16). Cf. article 7 of the 
Harvard Law School draft convention on competence of courts in regard to 
foreign States (Supplement to The American Journal of International Law 
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 26 (1932), pp. 533-534). 
226 See, for example, The "Ismir"; the "Assari Tewjik" (1901) (Zeit-
schrift fur Internationales Privat- und (jiJentliches Recht (Leipzig), 
vol. XIII (1903), p. 397). 
227 Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung (Hamburg), vol. XLII (1921), p.76, 
No. 38. 
228 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Berlin), vol. 103 
(1922), p.274, No. 82; Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris), 
vol. XXXIII (1922), p. 868. 
229 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts ... , vol. 103 (1922), p.280, 
No. 83; Revue internationale du droit maritime, vol. XXXIV (1922), 
p.668. 
2)0 Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung (Hamburg), vol. XLIV (1923), p. 178, 
No. 101; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 4 (1923), p. 89. 
231 Juristische Wochenschrift (Leipzig), vol. 60 (1931), p. ISO, No.6; 
Annual Digest ... , 1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), p. 129. 
corded to a government ship employed for commercial 
purposes. The reversal of the absolute rule of immunity 
was pronounced in The "Visurgis"; the "Siena" (1938),m 
in which the extent and limits of the immunities of public 
vessels both before and after the Brussels Convention 
and its Additional Protocol were fully discussed. 233 
(v) Netherlands 
170. Before the First World War, State immunities were 
not recognized by Netherlands courtS. 234 In 1917, the 
executive filled the gap by introducing a general enactment 
recognizing the immunities of foreign States in accordance 
with international law. 235 In 1921, immunity was admitted 
by the courts in regard to acts jure imperii. 236 In regard to 
public ships, it appears from two leading cases237- one of 
which was, however, decided before the entry into force of 
the 1926 Brussels Convention - that State-operated vessels 
employed in trade would be accorded immunity from 
arrest and that the distinction between the private and 
public character of the service of the ship was irrelevant. 
On the other hand, since the entry into force of the Brussels 
Convention and the Netherlands' deposit of its instrument 
of ratification, there has been no question that such 
immunity would no longer be recognized except to the 
extent and subject to the limitations provided in the Brus-
sels Con ven tion. 238 
(vi) Italy 
171. Italy has been regarded as being foremost among 
States which have adopted a restrictive view of immunity 
from the very beginning. The distinctions between alli 
d'impero and aUi di gestione and between the State as ente 
politico and ente civile were recognized by Italian courts as 
early as 1886. 239 Apart altogether from this restrictive prac-
tice, the problem of State immunities in respect of public 
vessels employed in trade does not arise in Italian law, 
owing to certain peculiarities ofthe intemallaw. The per-
sonification of seagoing vessels has been pushed to its log-
232 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts ... , vol. 157 (1938), p. 389, 
No. 62; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 39 (1939), p.50; 
Annual Digest . .. , 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 284, case No. 94. An action in 
rem was permissible, although the arrest of the ship while it was in the 
service of a foreign State was not allowed. 
233 For further discussion of the application of the Brussels Convention, 
see paragraph 207 below. 
234 See Phillimore, lac. cit. (footnote 100 above), pp.466-467. 
m See, for example, article 13 (a) of the Act of Parliament of 26 April 
1917 (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (The Hague, 1917), 
No. 303). 
236 Union of South Africa v. Herman Grote (1921) (Nederlandse Juris-
prudentie (Zwollen, 1921), p. 849; Annual Digest. .. , 19/9-1922 (London), 
vol. I (1932), p. 22, case No.8). 
231 F. Advokaat v. /. Schuddinck & den Belgischen Staat (1923) (Week-
blad van het Recht (The Hague), No. 11088; Annual Digest . .. , /923-1924 
(London), vol. 2 (1933), p. 133, case No. 69); and The "Garbi" (1938) 
(Weekblad van het Recht en Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Zwollen, 1939), 
No. 96; Annual Digest ... , 1919-1942 (London), vol. II (1947), p. 155, 
case No. 83). 
238 See paragraphs 199 et seq. below. 
139 See, for example, Gllttieres v. Elmilik (1886) (II Foro Italiano 
(Rome), vol. XI, part I (1886), p. 913, especially pp. 920-922. 
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ical extreme, so that, with the exception of ships of war, 
seafaring vessels within Italian waters are amenable to the 
jurisdiction ofItalian courts and are governed by the same 
law as private persons. 240 It should be further noted that 
Italy has also ratified the 1926 Brussels Convention and 
consistently followed the principle enunciated therein. 
(vii) Belgium 
172. In Belgium, as in France, the problem of immunity 
of public ships arises only in connection with the invio-
lability or exemption from seizure, arrest and attachment 
of property of foreign Governments. In this connection, it 
appears, quite contrary to the established practice of Bel-
gian courts in favour of a restrictive view of immunity 
from jurisdiction,241 that, since the First World War and 
until recently,242 the immunity of public property from 
attachment and execution has been regarded as absolute. 
In the cases concerning the J oulan (1920) 243 and the Lima 
and the Pangim (1921),244 it was held that a public vessel in 
use for commercial purposes did not lose its immunity 
from arrest by way of attachment or execution. It was alSO 
held in a number of cases that the act of requisition by a 
foreign State was an actum imperii over which Belgian 
courts had no jurisdiction.245 The position of State-trading 
vessels was brought into line with the principle of restricted 
immunity by Belgium's ratification, both international 
and constitutional,246 of the Brussels Convention. A direct 
application of this Convention is to be found in Saez 
,.0 See, for example. the case concerning the collision between the 
Soviet vessel Plekhano{{and the Italian vessel Generale Petiti: Societa di 
Nal'igazione Generale' "Gerolimich" v. Rappresentanza commerciale 
del/'URSS in ltalia (court of first instance, 1934, and Court of Appeal of 
Genoa, 1936) (Ril'ista di dirillo internazionale (Rome), 27th year (1935), 
p. 419; ibid.. 30th year (1938), p. 226), and Rappresentanza commerciale 
del/'URSS v. Sofieta di Navigazione Generale "Gerolimich" (Court of 
Cassation, 1938) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. LXIII (1938), p.1216; 
RiI'ista del dirillo della navigazione (Rome), vol. IV -I (1938), p. 460, with a 
note by R. Quadri; II Dirillo maritimo (Rome), 40th year (1938), p. 465, 
with a note by B. Bissaldi: Journal du droit international (Clunet) (Paris), 
vol. 66 (1939), p. 180; Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 39 
(1939), p. 190;Annllal Digest. .. , 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 247, case No. 84). 
See also Phillimore, loc. cit. (footnote 100 above). 
241 See, for example, Etat du Perou v. Kreg/inger (1857) (La Belgique 
judiciaire (Brussels), vol. XVII (1959), p. 331). 
242 See, for example, Socobelge et Etat beige v. Etat hellenique, Banque 
de Grece et Banque de Bruxelles (1951) (Journal du droit international 
(Clunet) (Paris), vol. 79 (1952), p. 244). 
243 West Russian Steamship Company Ltd. V. Capitaine SucksdorfJ 
(Pasicrisie beige, 1922 (Brussels), part 3, p. 3; Annual Digest . .. , 1919-
1922 (op. cit.), p. 152, case No. 103). 
244 Etat portugais v. Sauvage (Journal du droit international (Clunet) 
(Paris), vol. 49 (1922), p. 739; Annual Digest ... , 1919-1922 (op. cit.), 
p. 154, case No. 104). 
245 See, for example, Brasseur et consorts v. Repub/ique hellenique et 
Societe Socobel (Tribunal civil of Anvers, 1932) (Journal du droit inter-
national (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 59 (1932), p. 1088), (Court of Appeal of 
Brussels, 1933) (Pasicrisie beige, 1933 (Brussels), part. 2, p. 197; Annual 
Digest ... , 1931-1932 (London), vol. 6 (1938), p. 164, case No. 85); Capi· 
taine Urrutia et capitaine Amollobieta V. Martiarena et consorts (1937) 
(Revue de droit maritime compare (Paris), vol. 38 (1938), p. 69; Annual 
Digest ... , 1935-1937 (London), vol. 8 (1941), p. 237, case No. 94). 
246 See the Act of 28 November 1928 for the introduction into Belgian 
law of provisions corresponding to those of the 1926 Brussels Convention 
(Recuei/ des lois et arretes royauxde Belgique, 1929, p. 74); cf. the note by 
M. R. Hennebicq concerning the Socobelge case (lac. cit., footnote 242 
above). 
Murua v. Pinillos et Garcia (1938),247 in which the Court of 
Appeal of Brussels permitted the arrest of a vessel em-
ployed by Spain in trading. 
(viii) Egypt 
173. The mixed courts of Egypt have been consistent in 
denying immunity to foreign States with regard to their 
actes de gestion privee, jure gestionis. 248 The same is true 
regarding government ships. It was held in Capitaine Hall 
v, Capitaine Bengoa (1920)249 that the immunity of a pub-
lic ship applied only where the act complained of was per-
formed in the exercise of the powers of the State in its 
public capacity, and not where a civil wrong had been done 
by an employee of the State in the management of its 
private interests. As regards the nature of the service of 
public ships, the courts have been somewhat arbitrary in 
giving immunity in one case to merchant ships chartered 
for the transport of troops 250 and denying it in another case 
concerning a public ship employed in the carriage of pil-
grims, although the ship was designed for coastal de-
fence. 251 On the other hand, the seizure of two Egyptian 
vessels by the Soviet Government was held to be outside 
Egyptian jurisdiction, for the act of seizure was a clear 
manifestation of the sovereign authority of the Soviet 
Union. 
(ix) Portugal 
174. In The "Cathelamet" (1926),252 the Court of Appeal 
of Lisbon exercised jurisdiction in respect of a vessel of 
commerce owned and employed by the United States 
Shipping Board for trading purposes. On the other hand, in 
1920, immunity was claimed by the Portuguese Govern-
ment in connection with an attempted seizure of the Porto 
Alexandre, a ship employed by the Transportes Maritimos 
do Estado wholly in commercial activities (see paragraph 
247 Revue critique de droit international (Paris), vol. XXXIV (1939), p. 
317; forthejudgrnent of the Court of Cassation (1939), see Pasicrisie beige, 
1939 (Brussels), part 2, p. 116; Annual Digest ... , 1938-1940 (op. cit.), 
p. 289, case No. 95. 
248 See Gouvernement egyptien V. Chemins de fer de l'Etat palestinien 
(1942) (Bulletin de /egislation et de jurisprudence egyptiennes (Alexandria), 
vol. 54(1941-1942), part 2, p. 242; Annual Digest. .. , 1919-1942 (op. cit.), 
p. 146, case No. 78). 
249 The "Sumatra" case (Bulletin de /egislation et de jurisprudence egyp· 
tiennes, vol. 33 (1920-1921), p. 25; Journal du droit international (Clunet) 
(Paris), vol. 48 (1921), p. 270; Annual Digest, .. , 1919-1922 (op. cit.), 
p. 157, case No. 107), 
250 Stapledon & Sons v. S. E. Ie Premier lord de l'Amiraute britannique 
(1924) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. XIV 
(1923-1924), p. 253; Annual Digest ... , 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 140, case 
No. 74), 
251 Sagliello v. Tawill (1923) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte, 
vol. XIV ... , p. 252; Annual Digest .. . , 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 144, case 
No. 77). See also The National Navigation Company of Egypt v. Tavou· 
laridis et Cie (1927) (Gazelle des tribunaux mixtes d'Egypte, vol. XIX 
(1928-1929), p. 251), 
m Gazeta Judicial (Ponta Delgada, Azores), vol. II, No. 170, 2nd 
series, p. 68; Annual Digest .. " 1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), p. 184, 
case No. 133. See, however, The "Curvello"(1922) (Gazeta da Relariiode 
Lisboa, vol. 18, p. 36), in which a Brazilian State·owned ship carrying 
passengers and goods, as well as government mail, was entitled to im-
munity from jurisdiction and seizure. 
, I 
42 Documents of the thirty-sixth session 
152 above). There appears to be an inconsistency between 
the judicial practice and the practice of the executive 
branch of the Government in the recognition or granting of 
immunity, on the one hand, and in making a like claim on 
behalf of the State, on the other. 
(x) Scandinavian States 
175. From the few reported cases available,2S3 it can be 
gathered that the distinction between acts jure imperii and 
acts jure gestionis has been recognized and accepted in the 
practice of the Scandinavian States. 254 In Norway, the 
immunities from attachment and execution of merchant 
ships employed in commerce have been upheld so long 
only as the vessels remained in the possession of the foreign 
Governments.255 In Sweden, in the well-known case of The 
"Rigmor" (1942),256 the Supreme Court, applying the 1926 
Brussels Convention, upheld the immunity from arrest of a 
vessel requisitioned by the Norwegian Government and 
appropriated to the public service of the British Ministry of 
War Transport. When the proceedings started, the Rigmor 
was in the possession of the British Government and 
employed by it in the carriage of non-commercial cargo for 
public purposes. It may be added that Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway were among the 13 countries that ratified the 
1926 Brussels Convention before the Second World War, 
and that Norway has actually applied the principles of the 
Convention in two interesting cases concerning Norwegian 
ships requisitioned by German occupying authorities. 
176. Thus, in a case decided in 1949 concerning the 
Fredrikstad, a Norwegian ship requisitioned by German 
occupation authorities in Norway, the Supreme Court held 
that no maritime lien could attach to ships employed by an 
occupying power for State purposes in respect of collision, 
on the ground that no execution could be levied against the 
ships so used. The distinction was maintained between 
public ships being used exclusively for State purposes and 
other ships.257 On the other hand, in AIS Irania under 
Public Administration v. AIS Franmaes mek. Verksted 
m Cf. H. Lauterpacht, "The problem of jurisdictional immunities of 
foreign States", The British Year Book of International Law, 1951, vol. 28, 
pp.264-265. 
254 See, for example, A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (Lon-
don. Longmans, 1947), p. 190; F. Castberg, Folkerett (Oslo, Lindkvist, 
1948). p. 100. See also Co mite maritime international, Bulletin No. 57. 
Conference de Londres (octobre 1922) (Anvers, 1923), pp. 122 et seq. and 
p. 194, concerning, in particular, trading vessels; and the more recent work 
of L. Pelin, Statsimmunitetens omfattning (Juridiska Fiireningen i Lund 
No. 29), Acta Societatis Juridicae Lundensis (1979). 
255 The "Guernica" (1938) (Norsk Retstidende, 1938 (Oslo), p.584; 
Annual Digest ... , 1919-1942 (op. cit.), p. 139, case No. 73); and The 
"Hanna J" (1948) (Norsk Retstidende, 1948, p. 706; Annual Digest . .. , 
1948 (London), vol. 15 (1953), p. 146, case No. 46). 
256 See The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.), 
vol. 37 (1943), p. 141; Annual Digest ... , 1941-1942 (London), vol. 10 
(1945), p. 240, case No. 63. See also Russian Trade Delegation v. Carlbom 
No.2 (1944) (Nytt luridiskt Arkiv, 1944 (Lund), p. 269; Annual Digest . .. , 
1943-1945 (op. cit.), p. 112, case No. 31). The court dedinedjurisdiction 
against the Toomas on the ground that the vessel was in actual possession 
of the Soviet Union and that the seizure was in execution of a judgment 
against the master of the Toomas and not against the Soviet Union, so that 
the law implementing the 1926 Brussels Convention was inapplicable. 
257 Fredrikstad Havnevesen v. AIS Bertelsens mek. Verksted (1949) 
(Norsk Retstidende, 1949, p. 881; International Law Reports, 1950 
(London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 167, case No. 42). 
(1950),258 it was held by the Court of Appeal that a Nor-
wegian ship requisitioned by German authorities could be 
detained by a Norwegian shipyard in respect of repairs 
carried out on the ship by order of the German authorities, 
the latter having failed to pay for the repairs. The ship in 
question was found not to have been used exclUSively on 
governmental and non-commercial service, as provided in 
the 1926 Brussels Convention, having been employed for 
the transport of edible fats to merchants in Norway.2S9 
(xi) Latin-American States 
177. It would be presumptuous to refer to the practice of 
Latin-American States in a generalized way. There seems 
to be a clear indication in the practice of some of the Latin 
American systems limiting State immunity with respect to 
State ships engaged in trade, In Argentina, two decisions 
clearly illustrate this. In The "Cokato" (1924),260 the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction over a Govern-
ment-operated vessel engaged in trade despite its owner-
ship by the United States Shipping Board. On the other 
hand, in The "Ibai" (1937),261 the same court declined 
jurisdiction against a Spanish requisitioned ship on the 
grounds, inter alia, that its voyage was not of a commercial 
nature and that it was employed for national defence, 
which had nothing to do with speculation or gain, but was 
prompted by the necessity of providing efficiently for the 
defence of the State. 262 It may be added that, by 1938, 
Chile 263 and Brazil 264 had deposited their ratifications of 
the 1926 Brussels Convention. 
(b) A tentative indication 
178. The preceding survey of legal developments in the 
judicial practice of States does not in itself furnish con-
clusive evidence of an established set of rules of interna-
258 Nordiske Dommer i Sjofartssaker, 1950 (Oslo), p. 181; International 
Law Reports, 1950 (op. cit.), p. 168, footnote I. 
259 By comparison with English admiralty practice, the two cases could 
be distinguished on the further ground that the former was a collision case, 
in which allowing a maritime lien would have impleaded the foreign 
sovereign, while the latter concerned repairs effected on a privately owned 
ship, and upholding immunity would have allowed unjust enrichment in 
favour of the private shipowner for the repairs. 
,.0 Jurisprudencia Argentina (Buenos Aires). vol. 14, p. 705: Annual 
Digest . . " 1923-1924 (op. cit.), p. 136. case NO.7!. 
261 Ibarra y Cia v. Captain of the "Ibaf" (Fa/los de fa Corta Suprema de 
Justicia de fa Nacion (Buenos Aires), vol. 178, p. 173; Revue de droit 
maritime compare (Paris), vol. 38 (1938), p. 50; Annual Digest . .. ,1935-
1937 (London), vol. 8 (194\), p.247, case No. 100; Annual Digest . .. , 
1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 293, case No. 96). 
262 See also Gobierno de ltalia v. Consejo Nacional de Educacion (1940) 
(Jurisprudencia Argentina, vol. 71, p. 400; Annual Digest .. . , 1941-1942, 
(op. cit.), p. 196, case No. 52). 
263 See, for example, Pacey v. Barroso (1926) (Revista de dereeho, juris-
pruden cia y eieneias sociales y Gaceta de los Tribunales (Santiago, Chile), 
vol. 25, parte II, p. 49; Annual Digest ... , 1927-1928 (London), vol. 4 
(1931), p.369, case No. 250); and the Chayet case (1932) (Revista de 
dereeho . .. y Gaeeta de los Tribunales, vol. 30, p. 70; Annual Digest . . " 
1931-1932 (op. cit.), p. 329, case No. 181). 
264 See, for example, The "Lone Star" (1944) (Diario da Justil;:a (Rio de 
Janeiro), No.45 (24 February 1945), annex; Annual Digest . .. , 1947 
(London), vol. 14 (1951), p. 84, case No. 31); and the Gilbert case (J 944) 
(Diario da Justir,:a (Rio de Janeiro), No. 190 (21 August 1945), annex; 
Annual Digest ... , 1946 (London), vol. 13 (195\), p. 86, case No. 37). 
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tional law governing jurisdictional immunities in respect 
of ships owned, possessed or employed by States. Yet it 
may serve as a strongly persuasive indication of the direc-
tion in which the case-law or judicial practice of States has 
been developing in the recent past. One outstanding fact is 
clearly beyond controversy: that is the marked absence ofa 
consistent practice of States in support of immunities in 
respect of State-owned or State-operated vessels, regard-
less of the nature of their service or employment. When-
ever a court has exercised or disclaimed jurisdiction in a 
given case on the point under examination, it has done so 
on grounds which invariably related to the nature of the 
service or employment of the ship in question. 
179. Owing to the existence of certain technicalities 
peculiar to the law and practice of the various legal systems 
on the points examined, the survey of reported decisions 
does not and cannot lend itself to a general conclusion 
applicable to all systems, but it appears to indicate certain 
developments favouring a number oflegal propositions. In 
the first place, it has helped to delineate or delimit the areas 
where the question of State immunities could arise in re-
spect of State-owned or State-operated vessels. Vessels 
owned by or in the possession of States are generally 
immune if employed in the governmental or public service 
of the State, whereas privately owned vessels chartered, 
hired or requisitioned by a foreign Government, as long as 
they continue to be possessed and operated by it, are to 
some extent immune from measures of arrest, seizure, 
detention, attachment and execution, but not necessarily 
from actions in rem not followed by arrest or attachment. 
Nor subsequently could a maritime lien attach to such 
ships by reason of collision caused during operation or 
possession by the foreign Government. In other words, 
actions against vessels owned, possessed or operated by 
States may be allowed to proceed if they in fact do not 
implead the foreign Governments, whether the actions are 
in rem against the vessels, or in personam against their 
private owners or private operators. There is no State 
immunity because the question simply does not arise. In 
The "Visurgis"; the "Siena", decided in Germany in 1938 
(see paragraph 169 above), the court declared: 
Allowing for minor differences of view in the matter of the definition of 
State ships and of the extent of the immunities accorded to them, it is 
possible to summarize Continental, British and American practice as fol-
lows: "A vessel chartered by a State but not commanded by a captain in the 
service the State does not enjoy immunity if proceedings in rem are 
brought against it; still less can the owner of the vessel claim such immun-
ity in an action for damages."26' 
180. The second proposition rests on the unmistakable 
and cogent evidence indicating almost conclusively that 
the practice of States has undergone some changes since the 
First World War. Shipping came under direct State control 
and indeed the control of a group of States. 266 An English 
judge once described this state of affairs: "In 1917-18 any 
shipowner who had a tanker free from government control 
could have become rich beyond the dreams ofavarice."267 
'" English translation in Annual Digest . ... 1938-1940 (op. cit.), p. 287, 
case No. 94. 
1 .. See J. A. Salter, Allied Shipping Control. An Experiment in Inter-
nalional Administration (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921). 
261 Opinion of Judge Hill in The "Sylvan Arrow" (1923) (The Law 
Reports. Probate Division. 1923. p.230). 
This rather sudden change of circumstances was vividly 
pictured by G. van Slooten as follows: 
Before the war, there had been very few opportunities for States which 
owned vessels other than those used for national defence or public service 
to invoke jurisdictional immunity for themselves or immunity from 
seizure for their vessels. Once the war was over and peace treaties entered 
into force, the situation changed abruptly. Several States were in posses-
sion of sizeable merchant fleets; ... [they] became shipowners in earnest, 
engaged in the carriage of passengers and cargo .... 268 
181. If, in some jurisdictions, there were decisions during 
the last century and even in the mid-1920s upholding the 
immunities of privately owned but State-operated vessels 
from arrest and attachment and the immunities of State-
owned or State-possessed 269 vessels from all judicial pro-
ceedings irrespective of the trading or commercial nature 
of their service or employment, such decisions have now 
been overruled or reversed, ifnot rejected or disavowed, by 
the courts themselves, or with the assistance of the legis-
lature, or upon application of the relevant provisions of an 
international convention. There is today no outstanding 
judicial decision which has not been overruled or which 
has been reconfirmed as still valid that upholds an absolute 
rule of immunity for vessels owned or operated by States 
regardless of the nature of their service or employment. It 
follows accordingly that, whatever may have been the 
belief in the nineteenth century which may have lingered 
into the first quarter of the present century, contemporary 
State practice does not require States to grant jurisdictional 
immunities in respect of public vessels employed by other 
States exclusively on commercial and non-governmental 
service. This does not mean that States are in any way 
prevented by law from displaying courtesy or forbidden by 
custom to extend especially courteous treatment to trading 
vessels of friendly neighbours or allies, should States so 
wish or should their courts feel so inclined. Such in any 
truly reflects the essentially flexible nature of the rule of 
international law regarding State immunity. 
182. A third proposition appears to emerge as a necessary 
consequence, namely that the practice of States as exam-
ined in the brief general survey of judicial developments is 
indicative of a clear and irreversible trend in favour of 
non-recognition of jurisdictional immunities in respect of 
a category of public vessels, or vessels requisitioned, em-
ployed or operated by States, based on the criterion of their 
exclusive commercial use or service and absence of con-
nection with any governmental service. Immunity need 
not be accorded to ships employed by States exclusively on 
commercial and non-governmental service, while such 
public ships employed on governmental and non-commer-
cial service continue to enjoy the privilege or protection of 
268 G. van Slooten, "La Convention de Bruxelles sur Ie statutjuridique 
des navires d'Etat", Rente de droit international et de legislation comparee 
(Brussels), 3rd series, vol. VII (1926), p. 457. Cf. L. van Praag, "La question 
de I'immunite dejuridiction des Etats etrangers et celie de la possibilitc de 
I'execution desjugements qui les condamnent", ibid .. 3rd series, vol. XVI 
(1935), pp. 116 et seq. 
269 Possession of a ship by a State is generally considered to be sufficient 
evidence of its State ownership; cf. R. E. Megarry in The Law Quarterly 
Review (London), vol. 71 (1955), p. I. See also The "Manuel Arnus"(I944) 
(Federal Reporter. 2d Series. vol. 141 (1944), p. 585), in which the United 
States Supreme Court disclaimed jurisdiction over a vessel in the pos-
session of the United States under a claim of ownership (United States 
Reports. vol. 323 (1945), p. 728). 
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State immunities from measures of attachment, seizure, 
detention and execution to the extent indicated in the first 
proposition, depending on the type of proceedings or 
causes of actions brought, on whether the vessel in ques-
tion is privately owned, State-owned, requisitioned, char-
tered or government-operated, and on the fact of actual 
possession by the foreign Government claiming its im-
munity. 
183. The rules of State immunity as applied to vessels 
owned or operated by States were restated with accuracy by 
Lord Wilberforce in The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981), 
as follows: 
... I would unhesitantly affirm as part of English law the advance made 
by The "Philippine Admiral" with the reservation that the decision was 
perhaps unnecessarily restrictive ,n, apparently, confining the departure 
made to actions in rem. In truth an action in rem as regards a ship, if it 
proceeds beyond the initial stages, is itself in addition an action in per-
sonam. viz. the owner of the ship (see The "Cristina" . .. ), the description in 
rem denoting the procedural advantages available as regards service, arrest 
and enforcement. It should be borne in mind that no distinction between 
actions in rem and actions in personam is generally recognized elsewhere 
so that it would in any event be desirable to liberate English law from an 
anomaly if that existed. In fact there is no anomaly and no distinction. The 
effect of The "Philippine Admiral"ifaccepted, as I would accept it, is that, 
as regards State-owned trading vessels, actions, whether commenced in 
rem or not, are to be decided according to the "restrictive" theory.270 
184. As shown in the above examination of legal devel-
opments, it has taken the House of Lords more than a 
century and a half to rejoin the starting-point made by 
Lord Stowell in The "Swift" (1813), where he said: 
The utmost that I can venture to admit is that, if the King traded, as 
some sovereigns do, he might fall within the operation of these statutes 
(Navigation Acts). Some sovereigns have a monopoly of certain commod-
ities, in which they traffick on the common principles that other traders 
traffick; and, if the King of England so possessed and so exercised any 
monopoly, I am not prepared to say that he must not conform his traffick 
to the general rules by which all trade is regulated.271 
185. As also examined earlier, judicial pronouncements 
by United States judges have been more consistent, with 
the exception of the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro" (1926).272 Thus, in 
Ohio v. He/vering (1934),273 the court said: "When a State 
enters the market-place seeking customers, it divests itself 
ofits quasi sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the charac-
ter of a trader." This dictum merely reaffirmed the view 
expressed a century earlier by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Bank oj the United States v. Planters' Bank oj Georgia 
(1824),274 where he observed: "It is, we think, a sound 
principle that, when a Government becomes a partner in 
any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the 
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, 
and takes that of a private citizen." That was but a rep-
270 The All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1070. 
27\ Dodson, op. cit., vol. I (1815), p. 339; see also the opinion of Sir 
Robert Phillimore in The "Charkieh" (I 873)(see paragraph 147 and foot-
note \34 above) and The "Parlement beige" (1879) (see footnote 137 
above), a judgment overruled by the Court of Appeal (1880) (see footnote 
138 above). 
272 See footnote 179 above. 
273 United States Reports, vol. 292 (1934), p. 360, at p. 369. 
274 Wheaton. op. cit., vol. IX (4th ed.) (1911), p. 907. 
etition of an earlier observation made by the same Chief 
Justice in The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon and 
others (1812), where he said: 
... there is a manifest distinction between the private property of the 
person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which supports 
the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of a 
nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may 
possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial juris-
diction; ... 275 
3. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
(a) Relative relevance oj views and attitudes 
oj Governments 
186. It is dIfficult to assess the relevance of views and 
attitudes of Governments expressed or reflected in certain 
actions or statements as evidence or indications of govern-
mental practice on questions relating to the immunities to 
be accorded to vessels owned or operated by Govern-
ments. The first practical problem is one of determining to 
whom to attribute a particular view expressed by a certain 
official of a State organ, or an attitude adopted or reflected 
in a statement or declaration by a representative of a 
Government. Views or considered opinions given by legal 
advisers to a Government on matters of general concern or 
on a particular issue may be regarded as views of that 
Government at a particular time. To what extent the 
expression of such views in an official capacity by an 
authority of the State could constitute evidence of State 
practice is another matter, for practice refers to concrete 
acts performed by the State rather than mere expression of 
considered reflections. Statements or declarations made by 
representatives of a Government before the judicial 
authorities of other States as regards the status of certain 
government agencies, government ownership of State 
property and claims of jurisdictional immunities for such 
agencies or property may afford evidence of the positions 
taken by Governments, which, if sufficiently clear or con-
sistently maintained, could furnish proof of usage or prac-
tice of a State on a particular question. 
187. Another difficulty relates, therefore, to the ascer-
tainment of views or attitudes of Governments on a par-
ticular issue at the material time, for Governments change 
as often as do their views and attitudes on a particular 
question. It is not surprising, therefore, that the views 
expressed officially by internationally recognized experts 
who may also hold positions or bear certain responsibility 
within a Government do not necessarily reflect the views 
or attitude of that Government; and even when they do 
formally represent the views of the Government, such 
views are subject to changes and modifications without 
notice. Such is the prerogative of the sovereign authority 
with which the State, like its executive branch, is vested. If 
the views and attitude attributable to one Government or 
to one State may change at will, as they are susceptible to 
sudden alteration, modification, clarification or indeed 
reversal without prior notice, the views of various 
m Cranch, op. cit. (footnote 114 above), p. 145; cf. J. G. Hervey, "The 
immunity of foreign States when engaged in commercial enterprises: a 
proposed solution", Michigan Law Rel'iew (Ann Arbor, Mich.), 
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Governments on the same questions can and do vary 
according to their vital interests, political ideologies, econ-
omic theories and social backgrounds. 
188. This is on the assumption that thc views sought 
relatc to the same aspect of the issue. In reality, however, 
there are often several questions involved in a particular 
situation and even one and the same issue may have more 
than one aspect. There is always the other side of the coin, 
as demonstrated by the views and attitudes of Govern-
ments regarding State immunity, which may vary with the 
side of the coin, whether it is heads when it is the duty of the 
Government to recognize and accord State immunity to 
another Government, or tails when the Government ex-
pects to be the recipient or beneficiary of State immunity to 
be recognized and accorded by the courts of another State. 
Thus it is not surprising that Governments which are 
obliged to submit their publicly owned or State-operated 
vessels to their own national or territorial jurisdiction 
would think twice before agreeing to submit such vessels 
employed exclusively on commercial service to the juris-
diction of the courts of another State. Examples in the 
judicial practice examined earlier amply demonstrate this 
phenomenon.276 As also frequently occurs, a Government 
is likely to support its own claim of State immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of another State in respect of 
the vessels owned or operated by one of its agencies, with-
out necessarily raising a similar objection when actions are 
brought against the vessel before one ofits own courts, and 
regardless of whether its own courts adhere to a restrictive 
or unqualified view of State immunity in regard to foreign 
vessels or vessels owned or employed by a foreign 
Government. A Government can maintain a consistent 
attitude and adhere strictly to the view that its own public 
vessels should be accorded absolute immunity by the 
courts of other States, subject always to the important 
reservation of reciprocity. When it comes to the granting of 
like immunity to the vessels of other States, reciprocity 
may in fact operate to prevent such recognition, either 
because of the restrictive practice prevailing in the State 
requesting immunity, or on the ground oflack of positive 
evidence that the same extent of jurisdictional immunity 
would, by law and practice, be assured, if not guaranteed, 
for the benefit of the vessels owned or operated by the State 
before whose courts immunity is being sought.277 It is not 
difficult, as in reality often happens, for one State to advo-
cate the theory or principle of absolute immunity for for-
eign public vessels, regardless of the nature of their em-
ployment or service, while in actual performance there 
is no concrete evidence to substantiate the adoption of 
the practice of such an unqualified principle, which in 
any event is invariably qualified by the principle of reci-
procity.278 
27. See, for example, Campania Mercantil Argentina v. United States 
Shipping Board (1924) (see footnote 162 above); the United States Ship-
ping Act, 1916 and Suits in Admiralty Act, 1920 (seefootnote 191 above); 
and The "Cathelamet" (I 926) (see footnote 252 above). 
277 See, for example, The "Jupiter" No. I (1924) (The Law Reports, 
Probate Division, 1924, p. 236), and compare with The "Jupiter" No.2 
(I 925)(ibid., 1925, p. 69); but in the latter case the Soviet Government was 
no longer in possession of the Jupiter and claimed no interest in her. The 
Italian Government's requirement of reciprocity is more exacting in prac-
tice than it might be in the case ofa possible claim of immunity before a 
Soviet court. 
278 See article 61 of the Fundamentals of Civil Procedure of the USSR 
189. It is subject to these cautions and bearing in mind 
the relative relevance of views and attitudes of Govern-
ments that governmental practice wilI be examined in thc 
light of national legislation and international agreements 
or conventions bearing on the questions under review. 
(b) Nationallegis/ation 
190. There appears to be a growing volume of national 
legislation dealing directly with, or closely relating to, the 
point at issue. In an effort to examine relevant provisions 
of national legislation, regard should be had to the com-
mentaries or views expressed in the replies to question 12 
of the questionnaire addressed to the Governments of 
Member States in 1979.279 National legislation directly in 
point includes laws regulating the extent of immunities 
accorded to vessels owned or operated by foreign States, 
which invariably depends on the governmental and non-
commercial nature of their service or the public, as 
opposed to private or commercial, purposes of their em-
ployment. 
191. In this particular connection, it will be noted in 
relation to States which have ratified the 1926 Brussels 
Convention and its 1934 Protocol that legislative enact-
ments have invariably been adopted giving effect to their 
ratification of the international agreement. Thus Norway's 
national legislation of 17 March 1939 280 may be cited as a 
typical example. The relevant sections provide: 
§ I. The fact that a vessel is owned or used by a foreign government, or 
that a vessel's cargo belongs to a foreign government, shall not-with the 
exemption of the cases mentioned in §§ 2 and 3-prevent proceedings 
being taken in this realm for claims arising out of the use of the vessel or the 
transport of the cargo-or the enforcement of such a claim in this realm or 
interim orders against the vessel or the cargo. 
§ 2. Proceedings to collect claims as mentioned in § I may not be 
instituted in this realm when they relate to: 
(I) Men of war and other vessels which a foreign government owns or 
uses when at the time the claim arose they were used exclusively for 
government purposes of a public nature. 
(2) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government and is carried by a 
vessel as mentioned under I. 
(3) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government, and is carried in a 
merchantman for government purposes ofa public nature, unless the claim 
relates to salvage general average or agreements regarding the cargo. 
§ 3. Enforcements and interim orders relating to claims as mentioned 
in § I may not be executed within this realm when relating to: 
(I) Men of war and other vessels which are owned by or used by a 
foreign government or chartered by them exclusively on time or for a 
voyage, when the vessel is used exclusively for government purposes ofa 
public nature. 
(2) Cargo which belongs to a foreign government and is carried in 
vessels as mentioned under I or by merchantmen for government purposes 
of a public nature. 
and the Union Republics of 1961 (United Nations, Materials on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities . . " p. 40). 
279 The replies to the questionnaire are published in United Nations, 
Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 555 et seq. 
280 Norges Lover, 1682-1961 (Oslo, Grondahl & Sons, 1962); English 
translation in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . . " 
pp. 19-20. 
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§ 4. By agreement with a foreign government it may be decided that a 
certificate from the diplomatic representative of the foreign government 
shan be considered proof for treating vessels and cargo under the stipu-
lations of § 3, I st paragraph, I and 2, when a requisition is made for the 
annulment of enforcements or interim orders. 
§ 5. This law win come into force on the day determined by the 
King. 
192. By 1980, some 20 countries, which included a wide 
variety of States, maritime as well as land-locked, Euro-
pean, Latin-American, African and socialist countries, had 
ratified the 1926 Brussels Convention and its 1934 Proto-
col and seven others had acceded to the Convention. Fur-
thermore, it is not insignificant to note that Estonia and 
Hungary also ratified the Convention in 1937. Although 
Poland and Romania subsequently denounced it in 1952 
and 1959, respectively, Poland reratified the Convention 
once again in 1976, effective 16 January 1977. Zaire, 
Greece, Turkey, Syria and Egypt were also bound by the 
Convention. There are therefore various legislative enact-
ments giving effect to the rules contained in the Conven-
tion. 
193. Among countries which have not ratified the Con-
vention, the United States of America stands out among 
the States which have adopted national legislation along 
the same lines. The United States explained its absence 
from the Brussels Conference in 1926 by stating that it had 
already given, effect to the wish for uniformity in the law 
relating to State-owned ships by adopting the Public Ves-
sels Act on 3 March 1925.281 But a more specific provision 
is to be found in a more recent act, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976,282 of which the relevant section 
reads: 
Section 1605. General exceptions 10 the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign State 
(b) A foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in admiralty is 
brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign 
State, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the 
foreign State: Provided, That: 
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the summons and 
of the complaint to the person, or his agent, having possession of the vessel 
or cargo against which the maritime lien is asserted; but such notice shall 
not be deemed to have been delivered, nor may it thereafter be delivered, if 
the vessel or cargo is arrested pursuant to process obtained on behalf of the 
party bringing the suit-unless the party was unaware that the vessel or 
cargo ofa foreign State was involved, in which event the service of process 
of arrest shall be deemed to constitute valid delivery of such notice; 
and 
(2) notice to the foreign State of the commencement of suit as provided 
in section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten days either of the delivery 
of notice as provided in subsection (b) (I) of this section or, in the case ofa 
party who was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign State was 
involved, of the date such party determined the existence of the foreign 
State's interest. 
28\ The Statutes at Large of the United States of Americafrom December 
1923 to March 1925, vol. XLIII, part 1, chap. 428,pp. 1112-1113, sects. 1,3 
and 5 (reciprocity); United States Code Annotated, Title 46, Shipping, 
Sections 721 to lIDO, sects. 781-799. 
282 United States Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 97; repro-
duced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 
55 et seq. 
Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b) (I) of this section, the 
maritime lien shaH thereafter be deemed to be an in personam claim 
against the foreign State which at that time owns the vessel or cargo 
involved: Prol'ided, That a court may not award judgment against the 
foreign State in an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo 
upon which the maritime lien arose, such value to be determined as of the 
time notice is served under subsection (b) (1) of this section. 
194, Section 10 of the United Kingdom State Immunity 
Act 1978 283 deals rather exhaustively with the question of 
absence or non-recognition of State immunity in respect of 
ships used for commercial purposes. It provides :284 
Exceptions from immunity 
10. (\) This section applies to: 
(a) Admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject of 
Admiralty proceedings. 
(2) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that State; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such 
a ship, 
if, at the time when the cause of action arose, the ship was in use or 
intended for use for commercial purposes, 
(3) Where an action in rem is brought against a ship belonging to a State 
for enforcing a claim in connection with another ship belonging to that 
State, subsection (2) (a) above does not apply as respects the first-men-
tioned ship unless, at the time when the cause of action relating to the other 
ship arose, both ships were in use or intended for use for commercial 
purposes. 
(4) A State is not immune as respects: 
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that State if both the 
cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the time when the cause of action 
arose, in use or intended for use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection with such 
a cargo if the ship carrying it was then in use or intended for use as 
aforesaid. 
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo belonging to 
a State include references to a ship or cargo in its possession or control or in 
which it claims an interest; and, subject to subsection (4) above, subsection 
(2) above applies to property other than a ship as it applies to a ship. 
(6) Sections 3 to 5 above do not apply to proceedings of the kind 
described in subsection (1) above if the State in question is a party to the 
Brussels Convention and the claim relates to the operation of a ship owned 
or operated by that State, the carriage of cargo or passengers on any such 
ship or the carriage of cargo owned by that State on any other ship. 
195. The United Kingdom State Immunity Act, which 
was adopted on 20 July 1978, was procedurally and sub-
stantively qualified by the State Immunity (Merchant 
Shipping) (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) Order 
1978,285 which came into operation on 22 November 1978, 
the same date as the Act itself. The Order provides: 
3. Notwithstanding section 13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, no 
application shall be made for the issue ofa warrant of arrest in an action in 
'83 United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978. part I, chap. 33, 
p, 715; reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 41 et seq. 
284 See also the United Kingdom's reply to question 12 of the question-
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rem against a ship owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or 
cargo aboard it until notice has been served on a consular officer of that 
State in London or in the port at which it is intended to cause the ship to be 
arrested. 
4. Notwithstanding section 13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, no 
ship or cargo owned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be 
subject to any process for the enforcement of a judgment or for the 
enforcement of terms of settlement filed with and taking effect as a court 
order. 
196. This Order has the effect of preserving the immunity 
from execution of ships and cargoes of the Soviet Union 
which would otherwise have been lost by virtue of section 
13 (4) of the State Immunity Act 1978, and requires notice 
to be given to a Soviet Consul before a warrant of arrest is 
issued in an action in rem against a ship of that State or a 
cargo on it. It gives effect to articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol 
to the Treaty on Merchant Navigation of 3 April 1968 
between the two countries.286 The special treatment ac-
corded to ships and cargoes belonging to the Soviet Union 
therefore constitutes an important exception to the general 
rule adopted by the United Kingdom in this connection. 
197. Section 10 of the United Kingdom State Immunity 
Act 1978 has served as a model for several other acts 
adopted by other countries, mostly within or related to the 
British Commonwealth. Thus section 11 (Ships used for 
commercial purposes) of Pakistan's State Immunity Ordi-
nance, 1981 287 literally reproduces the British provision, as 
do section 12 of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979288 
and section 7 of Canada's 1982 "Act to provide for State 
immunity in Canadian courts".289 Section 18 of the draft 
Australian legislation of 1984 on the immunities of foreign 
States, Foreign States Immunities Bill 1984, contains es-
sentially the same provision.290 
(c) International or regional conventions 
198. On the point under examination, several conven-
tions have been concluded having a more or less direct 
bearing on State practice, and having special relevance or a 
more general application; some have been ratified and 
come into operation, while others are yet to be processed 
and finalized for signature and ratification. It is useful to 
highlight the main features of some of the conventions, 
international or regional, which have a close relevance to 
the issue under consideration. 
(i) The Brussels Convention of 10 April 1926 and its 
Additional Protocol of 24 May 1934 
199. Pre-1926 efforts by jurists to assimilate the position 
of public trading vessels to that of private merchantmen 
285 United Kingdom, Statutory Instruments, 1978, Part III, Section I, 
p. 4553; reproduced in United Nations, Materials ... , pp. 51·52. 
286 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 857, p. 217. 
281 The Gazette of Pakistan (Islamabad), II March 1981 ; reproduced in 
United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 20 et seq. 
288 Reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 28 et seq. 
28. The Canada Gazette, Part III (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15{22June 1982). 
Cf. also section II of South Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981 
(reproduced in United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 34 et seq.). 
290 See International Legal Materials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XXIII, 
No.6 (November 1984), pp. 1398 et seq. 
were reflected in a number of draft conventions;291 but it 
was not until 1926 that the first international convention 
was adopted dealing directly with the question of the 
immunities of public ships engaged in trade. 
200. In 1922, Sir Maurice Hill, the celebrated English 
admiralty judge, proposed the abolition of jurisdictional 
immunities of public vessels, in particular regarding their 
commercial activities. That proposal was adopted in the 
resolutions ofthe International Maritime Committee at its 
1922 London Conference. 292 The draft treaty prepared at 
Gothenburg in 1923 and slightly modified at Genoa in 
1925 293 was finally submitted to the Conference diploma-
tique de droit maritime at Brussels. On 10 April 1926, the 
Conference adopted the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of 
State-owned Vessels, commonly referred to as the Brussels 
Convention. 294 That Convention, as Gilbert Gidel, the 
Rapporteur, put it, "avait pour raison d'etre essentielle les 
navires publics engages dans des operations commer-
ciales".295 
201. The main object of the Convention was to assimi-
late the position of State-exploited merchara ships to that 
of private vessels of commerce in regard to the question of 
immunities. Article 1 provides:296 
Article 1 
Seagoing vessels owned or operated by States, cargoes owned by them, 
and cargoes and passengers carried on government vessels, and the States 
owning or operating such vessels, or owning such cargoes, are subject in 
respect of claims relating to the operation of such vessels or the carriage of 
such cargoes, to the same rules of liability and to the same obligations as 
those applicable to private vessels, cargoes and equipments. 
202. Article 1 merely reaffirms the rule that public 
vessels and cargoes carried on State ships are subject to 
local laws with respect to their substantive liabilities. Arti-
cle 2 contains provisions relating more specifically to juris-
diction, as follows: 
2.1 The forerunners of the Brussels Convention include article 4, para-
graph 3, of the "Draft international regulations on the competence of 
courts in proceedings against foreign States, sovereigns or heads of State", 
adopted by the Institute ofinternational Law on II September 1891 and 
revised in September 1892 (Institute ofinternational Law, Tableaugeneral 
des resolutions (1873-1956) (Basel, 1957), pp. 14-15}; article 11 of the 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with 
respect to Collisions between Vessels (Brussels, 23 September 1910), and 
article 14 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law 
respecting Assistance and Salvage at Sea (Brussels, 23 September 191 O) (cf. 
G. Gidel, Le droit international public de la mer (Paris, Sirey, 1932), vol. I, 
p. 99}; article XVII of the "Barcelona Statute" of 1921 (ibid.); article XIII, 
paragraph I, of the "Geneva Statute" of 1923 (ibid.). See also N. Matsu-
nami, The Publication of "Immunity of State Ships" and its Sequences 
(Japanese edition, 1925), pp. 110 et seq. 
2.2 International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No. 57. London Con-
ference (October 1922) (Antwerp, 1923), p. V. 
2'3 International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No. 65. Gothenburg 
Conference (August 1923) (Antwerp, I 924), p. vi; and International Mari-
time Committee, Bulletin No. 74. Genoa Conference (September 1925) 
(Antwerp, 1926), p. V. 
2'4 League of Nations, Treaty Series. vol. CLXXVI, p. 199. 
295 Gidel, op. cit., vol. II, p. 362. 
2'6 In interpreting article I of the Convention, municipal courts have 
preferred the official English version. Thus the term exploites, which can 
mean "used" or "operated", has been interpreted according to the term 
"operated" which appears in the English text {see The "Visurgis"; the 
"Siena" (1938), footnote 232 above}. 
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Article 2 
For the enforcement of such liabilities and obligations there shall be the 
same rules concerning the jurisdiction of tribunals, the same legal actions, 
and the same procedure as in the case of privately owned merchant vessels 
and cargoes and of their owners. 
Article 2 thus assimilates the position of State-owned and 
State-operated ships engaged in trade and their cargoes to 
that of ordinary private commercial vessels and cargoes by 
subjecting the former to the jurisdiction of local courts. In 
addition, it also assimilates the position of States as 
shipowners and shippers to that of private persons engaged 
in the shipping business by making States accountable 
before the local courts in respect of maritime com-
merce. 
203. For the purposes of jurisdictional immunities, arti-
cle 3 draws a distinction between the exploitation of vessels 
by States and other governmental maritime activities. 
Paragraph I of article 3 is thus worded: 
Article 3 
§ I. The provisions of the two preceding articles shall not be applicable 
to ships of war, government yachts, patrol vessels, hospital ships, auxiliary 
vessels, supply ships, and other craft owned or operated by a State, and 
used at the time a cause of action arises exclusively on governmental and 
non-commercial service, and such vessels shall not be subject to seizure, 
attachment or detention by any legal process, nor to judicial proceedings in 
rem.297 
204. Even for public vessels for which immunities from 
local jurisdictions are provided, article 3 further author-
izes, in paragraph I, certain remedies before the courts of 
the countries that own or operate the vessels in question, 
recognizing the right of claimants to take 
. .. proceedings in the competent tribunals of the State owning or 
operating the vessel, without that State being permitted to avail itselfofits 
immunity: 
(I) In case of actions in respect of collision or other accidents of 
navigation; 
(2) In case of actions in respect of assistance, salvage and general 
average; 
(3) In case of actions in respect of repairs, supplies, or other contracts 
relating to the vessel. 
205. Article 3 includes similar provisions in paragraphs 2 
and 3 concerning State-owned cargoes carried on board 
public vessels of a governmental and non-commercial 
nature and State-owned cargoes carried on board merchant 
vessels for governmental and non-commercial purposes. 
206. By 1931, none of the signatories of the Brussels 
Convention had deposited its ratification at Brussels.298 
Meanwhile, doubts arose as to the correct interpretation of 
the phrase "operated by a State" in article 3. The United 
Kingdom objected to the extension of exemption from 
297 This provision operates to extend immunity from proceedings in 
rem to privately owned ships chartered or requisitioned by a foreign State 
and operated by it in governmental service. 
291 See J. W. Gamer, "Legal status of government ships employed in 
commerce", The American Journal of International Law (Washington, 
D.C.), vol. 20 (1926), p. 7S9. 
actions in rem to private vessels employed or operated, but 
not owned, by a State, which in English case-law was not 
entitled to immunity. That objection was sustained and the 
Brussels Convention was accordingly modified by the 
Additional Protocol signed at Brussels on 24 May 1934.299 
Article 1300 reads, in part, as follows: 
Vessels chartered by States either for a given time or by the voyage, 
provided they are exclusively used on governmental and non-commercial 
service, and the cargoes carried by such vessels, shall not be subject to 
seizure, attachment or detention of any kind, but this immunity shall not 
prejudicially affect any other rights or remedies open to the parties con-
cerned.· ... 
207. It is true that the Brussels Convention and its Addi-
tional Protocol cannot claim to have had universal appli-
cation. It is also true that the Convention has left out many 
important matters. Nevertheless, the Convention has pro-
vided most encouraging guidance for municipal courts to 
assume jurisdiction against foreign States in this particular 
connection of maritime transport or the carrying trade. 
The list of ratifications and accessions to the Convention 
and Protocol is not meagre, with 20 or so States ratifying 
and seven acceding to the Convention. The application is 
not confined to one region, nor to Europe alone, although it 
includes important European maritime nations such as 
Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Switzerland and 
some Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Po-
land, Romania and Yugoslavia have also adopted the Con-
vention. Adherents from other continents include Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Mexico, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Zaire. Its coverage is sufficiently scattered and fairly dis-
tributed. Its significance cannot be underestimated, espe-
cially in view of its ratification by the United Kingdom on 
3 January 1980 after more than half a century of silence 
since it signed the Convention. 
(ii) Codification conventions prepared by the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 
1958 
208. The United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, 
prepared and opened for signature four conventions, two 
of which have some bearing on the immunities of public 
ships. The first is the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone, done on 29 April 1958,301 part I, 
section III, of which deals, inter alia, with the position of 
ships exercising the right of innocent passage through 
foreign territorial waters. This section is divided into four 
subsections: A. Rules applicable to all ships; B. Rules 
applicable to merchant ships; C. Rules applicable to 
government ships other than warships; D. Rule applicable 
to warships. The distinction between merchant ships and 
warships has its counterpart in the subdivision of govern-
ment ships other than warships into (a) government ships 
299 League of Nations, Treaty Series. vol. CLXXVI, p. 21S. 
100 See also article II of the Additional Protocol. 
101 United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. S16, p. 20S. 
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operated for commercial purposes, and (b) government 
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A number of 
interesting points may be noted in connection with this 
classification of ships: 
(a) For the purposes of the Convention, ships are 
classified according to the nature of their service or activ-
ities. The old distinction between public and private ships 
based exclusively on ownership appears to have been 
abandoned. 
(b) Government ships other than warships are further 
subdivided according to the nature of their operation. 
Government ships operated for commercial purposes are 
treated in the same manner as merchant vessels, while 
those operated for non-commercial purposes may be com-
pared with warships. In terms almost identical with the 
provisions of the 1926 Brussels Convention, upholding the 
immunities of vessels employed exclusively on govern-
mental and non-commercial service,302 article 22 of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone reserves the immunities of government ships oper-
ated for non-commercial purposes; paragraph 2 provide' 
that "nothing in these articles affects the immunities which 
such ships enjoy under these articles or other rules of 
international law". 
(c) No reference is made in article 21 of the latter Con-
vention to the immunities of government ships operated 
for commercial purposes, either under these articles or 
other rules of international law. Indeed, paragraphs 2 and 3 
of article 20 give the coastal State jurisdiction to levy exe-
cution against or arrest foreign ships (including govern-
ment ships operated for commercial purposes by appli-
cation of article 21 p03 in certain cases in respect of ships 
exercising the right of innocent passage,304 and in all cases 
in respect of foreign ships lying in its territorial 
waters.30S 
209. The other convention is the Convention of the High 
Seas, done on 29 April 1958,306 which contains provisions 
concerning the status of ships on the high seas. Paragraph 1 
of article 8 provides: "Warships on the high seas have 
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State 
other than the flag State." Article 9 assimilates the position 
of "ships owned or operated by a State and used only on 
government non-commercial service" to that of warships 
inasmuch as these ships, like warships, "shall, on the high 
302 See article 3, paragraph 2, of the 1926 Brussels Convention (para-
graphs 203-204 above), 
303 ''Article 21 
"The rules contained in sub-sections A and B shall also apply to 
government ships operated for commercial purposes." 
30' Paragraph 2 of article 20 provides: 
"2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest the ship 
for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations 
or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the 
purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State." 
JuS Paragraph 2 of article 20 provides: 
"3. The provisions of the previous paragraph are without prejudice to 
the right of the coastal State, in accordance with its laws, to levy execution 
against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship 
lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after 
leaving internal waters." 
JUn United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 450, p. 11. 
seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any 
State other than the flag State". While this Convention 
expressly reaffirms State immunities as applied to ships, it 
limits the application of immunities to certain classes of 
public vessels only, viz. (a) warships, and (b) ships owned 
or operated by a State and used exclusively on govern-
mental and non-commercial service, thus precluding from 
participation in the enjoyment of State immunities ships 
owned or operated by a Government on commercial and 
non-governmental service and ships not exclusively em-
ployed for government and non-commercial service. 
210. In effect, these two codification conventions serve 
to reconfirm the principles of the 1926 Brussels Conven-
tion. In a sense, these provisions may be said to consolidate 
the existing rules of customary international law. While the 
absolute immunity of warships and government vessels 
operated for non-commercial purposes is kept intact, the 
position of government vessels operated for commercial 
purposes is assimilated as far as possible to that of private 
merchant vessels. Apart from reaffirming governmental 
policies regarding non-recognition of immunity of public 
vessels employed in commerce, the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion may be said to be declaratory of the existing practice of 
States in this particular connection. 
(iii) The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea 
211. This continuing trend seems to have been given 
added vigour by the incorporation of section 10, entitled 
"Sovereign immunity", into part XII, entitled "Protection 
and preservation of the marine environment", of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.307 
Artic.le 236, with the same strange title as the section, 
provIdes: 
Article 236. Sovereign immunity 
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and pre-
servation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval 
auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State used, for 
the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, 
each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not 
impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft 
owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner 
consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Conven-
tion. 
212. The scope of this Convention is intended to be uni-
versal. The provisions of this article are not without signifi-
cance in confirming again the distinction between ships 
operated by a State exclusively on governmental non-
commercial service and those operated on commercial 
non-governmental service. The criterion of the nature of 
the service or operation of the ship appears to be decisive in 
determining its status and the extent of State immunities to 
be accorded. 
(iv) Other miscellaneous conventions 
213. In addition to the three main conventions exam-
ined, thue are other miscellaneous conventions relating to 
307 Official Records oJthe Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
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navigation at sea which tend to distinguish between the 
position of vessels on the criterion of the nature of their 
service or operation, rather than on that of public owner-
ship or possession or control by the State. By way of exam-
ple, the Treaty on International Commercial Navigation 
Law, signed at Montevideo on 19 March 1940,308 contains 
the following interesting provisions: 
Art. 34. Vessels which are the property of the contracting States or 
operated by them, the freight and passengers carried by such vessels, and 
the cargoes which belong to the States, in so far as concerns claims relative 
to the operation of the vessels or the transport of passengers and freight, are 
subject to the laws and rules of responsibility and competency applicable to 
private vessels, cargo and equipment. 
Art. 35. The rule laid down in the preceding article does not apply to 
men-of-war, yachts, airplanes, or hospital-, coast guard-, police-, sani-
tation-, supply-, and public-works vessels; nor to other vessels which are 
the property of the State, or operated by it, and which are employed, at the 
time when the claim arises, in some public service outside the field of 
commerce. 
214. A further example of an international convention 
confirming this line of distinction is provided by the Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, signed at Brussels on 29 November 1969,309 of 
which article XI provides: 
Article XI 
I. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or 
other ships owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only 
on government non-commercial service. 
2. With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for 
commercial purposes, each State shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions 
set forth in Article IX and shall waive all defences based on its status as a 
sovereign State. 
(d) Treaty practice 
215. A similar "waiver clause" is to be found in a growing 
number of bilateral treaties, reaffirming a clear trend in the 
treaty practice of States supporting the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion by competent courts in admiralty proceedings in rem 
or in personam against vessels, cargoes and owners, regard-
less of the status of the sovereign States, provided the cause 
of action arose out of commercial shipping forming part of 
the business activities of the State, whether or not con-
ducted by a national enterprise, agency or instrumentality 
of government. A typical example of this trend in treaty 
practice is provided by article XVIII of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States of America and the Federal Republic ofGer-
many, signed at Washington on 29 October 1954:310 
(Foo/not£' ]{)7 ('()WIIII/cd) 
of the Sea, vol. XVII (United Nations publication. Sale No. E.S4.V.3), p. 
151, document NCONF.62/122. 
3n'See Supplement to The American Jourl/ol of International Law 
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 37 (1943), p. 109; United Nations, Materials on 
Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 177-17S. See also articles 36 to 42 of the 
Convention. 
309 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 973, p. 3. 
lIn Ibid., vol. 273, p. 3; see also the relevant provisions of other bilateral 
treaties cited in United Nations, Materials 011 Jurisdictional Immu-
nities ... , pp. 131-150. 
Article XVllI 
2. No enterprise of either Party, including corporations, associations, 
and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned 
or controlled shall, ifit engages in commercial, industrial. shipping or other 
business actil'ities* within the territories of the other Party, claim or enjoy, 
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, 
execution of judgment or other liability to which privately owned and 
controlled enterprises are subject therein. 
4. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
216. In contrast to the three preceding draft articles, 
international opinion on the question at issue in draft arti-
cle 19 is prolific. Views and attitudes of Governments, 
apart from being far from uniform, are also changing,311 
and they do have a bearing and a certain influence on the 
development of international opinion. Just as there are two 
mainstreams of theories and views regarding the immuni-
ties of States in general, including those of sovereigns and 
ambassadors, the opinions of writers and publicists arc 
divided in regard to the immunities of public vessels em-
ployed exclusively for trade into two groups: (a) those, 
favouring unqualified or more absolute immunity; 
(b) those supporting one or more criteria for restricting 
immunity. 
(a) Absolute immunity 
217. Writers who hold an absolute view of immunity 
generally think that State vessels are exempt from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts regardless of the nature of 
their service or employment, even if they are in fact oper-
ated solely for commercial purposes. Among these must be 
mentioned Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,312 Hackworth,313 
Hall,314 van Praag,315 Lawrence,316 Ross,317 Ushakov,318 
Wheaton 319 and Westlake.320 
311 See especially the replies of Governments to question 12 of the 
questionnaire, in United Nations, Materials . . " pp. 557-644. 
312 G. Fitzmaurice, "State immunity from proceedings in foreign 
courts", The British Year Book of International Law, 1933 (London), 
vol. 14, p. lOl. 
1Il G. H. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (Washington (D.C.), 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 423 et seq. 
314 W. E. Hall, Treaties on International Law (Sth ed.,) (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1924), pp. 307 et seq. 
315 L. van Praag, "La question de l'immunite de juridiction des Etats 
etrangers et celie de la possibilite de I'execution des jugements qui les 
condamnent", Revue de droit international et de !egis/ation comparee 
(Brussels), vol. XV (1934), p. 652; and ibid., vol. XVI (1935), p. 100. 
316 T. 1. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law(7th ed., rcvised 
by P. H. Winfield) (London, Macmillan, 1923), p. 225, sect. 107. 
317 A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law (London, Longmans, 
1947), pp.144-145, 179 and IS9. 
31B Memorandum presented by N. A. Ushakov to the thirty-fifth scssion 
of the Commission, see Yearbook ... 1983, vol. II (Part One), p. 53, 
document NCN.4/371. 
319 H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Philadelphia (Pa.), 
IS36); 6th ed., revised by A. B. Keith (London, Stevens, 1929), vol. I, 
pp.241-242. 
320 J. Westlake, International Law (2nd ed.) (Cambridge, The Univer-
sity Press, 1910), part I, p. 265. 
Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property 51 
218. The main argument in support of immunity of State 
trading vessels has been that the mere fact that government 
vessels are engaged in trading should not take away the 
immunities enjoyed by public vessels. 321 This argument 
presupposes the existence of a rule that immunity is 
accorded to all classes of State vessels, which is simply 
untrue historically. It should be noted, however, that in 
some jurisdictions in which immunities have been recog-
nized even for State ships employed in trade, two theories 
have been advanced in explanation of such practice. First, 
the position of ships is determined by that of their owners. 
The criterion of State ownership is determinative of im-
munity. Public merchant ships are also included in the 
category of "public property" (res publica, publicis usibus 
destinata). This theory of "public property" had received 
judicial countenance in the practice of British courts, 
which have now denounced it. 322 According to this theory, 
since States were exempt from foreign jurisdiction, their 
public property was also immune, for a judicial process 
against such property would directly implead the State 
owning it. 323 The logic of that proposition reflected the 
peculip"ity of the rules of British admiralty courts. It had 
been held that, if the owner ofa ship could not be sued, the 
ship could not be attached or arrested or proceeded against 
in rem, nor could a maritime lien exist or come into being 
during the continuing dominium or operation of that ship 
by the foreign Government. This theory was first pro-
pounded by the Crown Advocate in The "Prins Frederik" 
(1820). 324 It went back to the Roman law division of things. 
Res publicae are things which lie outside commerce, extra 
commercium quorum non est commercium, extra patri-
monia. The advocates of this theory appear to have bor-
rowed the Roman term without fully appreciating that 
"public property" in the Roman sense means things which 
are publicly owned. Moreover, they cannot be the subjects 
of private rights and their use is open to the public at large. 
It would also seem odd to regard ships actively engaged in 
commerce as res extra commercium. The phrase publicis 
usibus destinata (destined for public use) means in Roman 
law that the property can be used by any member of the 
public, and that no one can prevent another from using it. 
A public merchant ship could not be open to the public like 
ager publicus, highways or sea-shores. 325 In English law, the 
term "public property" merely means that a State has an 
interest in the property concerned, and the phrase publicis 
usibus destinata means "employed by a State for public 
purposes", or "in the public service of a State".326 
321 See, for example, the opinion of Lord Justice Brett in The "Parle-
ment beige" (1880) (see paragraph 149 above); W. Friedmann, "The 
growth of State control over the individual and its effects upon the rules of 
international State responsibility", The British Year Book of International 
Law (London), vol. 19 (1938), p. 118. 
m See, for example, The "I Congreso del Partido" (1981) (see para-
graphs 155-156 above). 
323 See, for example, the opinion of Lord Atkin in The "Cristina "(1938) 
(see paragaph 123, in fine, and paragraph 153 above). 
32. See footnote 118 above. 
m See, for example, the Institllles of Justinian, book 11.1: De rerum 
divisione; book 11.4: De usu fructu; book 1ll.19: De inutilibus stipula-
tionibus; and the Digest. book XLIIl.87: Ne quid in loco publico vel 
itinere fiat. 
326 See, for example, Juan Ysmae! & Co. Inc. v. Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia (1954) (see footnote 145 above), and the Hong Kong 
Am'raji case (1953) (ibid.). 
219. The second theory is that of "State possession", 
which found early acceptance in the courts of the United 
States of America. Under this theory, the public property 
of a State was exempt from the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts provided that, and so long as, it was in the actual 
possession of the foreign Government,327 regardless of the 
fact that a ship had been employed in ordinary trading 
voyages. Actual possession was believed to constitute suf-
ficient evidence of public use or government service. This 
theory is no longer followed in view of recent develop-
ments in the policy of the United States Government as 
confirmed by legislation. 
220. Both theories appear to have based immunity on the 
public character of the functions, employment, service, 
operation or purposes of ships. In England, for a long time, 
the test of that "public character" had been that of the 
foreign State and not of English judges. The varying nature 
of the English tvst had led to the granting of immunity in a 
number of commercial shipping cases. In the United 
States, the test ~of "governmental function" had been the 
"actual possession" of the property in question by a foreign 
Government. 328 
221. A third theory is the one recently propounded by 
Mr. U shakov ;329 although without the support of concrete 
evidence of judicial practice, it could be regarded as similar 
to views held by certain Governments. This theory of 
complete immunity is based on the principle of complete 
sovereignty and equally of States and on the fact that the 
origin of State immunity is also based initially on waiver of 
jurisdiction, express or implied, or on the consent of the 
State having territorial jurisdiction. It is conditional also 
on the principle of reciprocity, and immunity itself, like 
jurisdiction of a sovereign State, being an attribute of 
sovereignty, can in the same manner be waived by an ex-
pression or implication of consent, or communication of 
consent, express or implied. It will be seen how the various 
theories, including this one, could be reconciled in a mean-
ingful and objective approach to this difficult and delicate 
question. 
(b) Restricted immunity 
222. It is generally agreed among writers holding a re-
strictive view of State immunity that State-owned and 
State-operated ships are not entitled to jurisdictional im-
munities if employed by the State in commercial ventures. 
Recently, publicists have increasingly adopted such a view. 
Prominent among proponents of this thesis may be men-
tioned Bisschop,330 McNair,33I Sir Robert Phillimore,332 
J27 See, for example, Berizzi Brothers Co. v. SS "Pesaro" (1926) (sec 
paragraphs 157-158 above). 
l28 See, for example, the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Republic of 
Mexico et al. v. Hoffman (1945) (United States Reports. vol. 324 (1946), 
pp.39-40). 
l29 See footnote 318 above. 
llO W. R. Bisschop, "Immunity of States in maritime law", The British 
Year Book of International Law. 1922-23 (London), vol. 3, pp. 159 et 
seq. 
l31 A. D. McNair, "Judicial recognition of States and Governments and 
the immunity of public ships", ibid.. 1921-22. vol. 2, pp. 67-74. 
132 R. Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (3rd cd.) 
(London, Butterworths, 1882), vol. II, pp. 140-141. 
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G. G. Phillimore,333 Allen,334 Haycs,33S Hervey,m 
Borchard,m Garner,338 Gidel,339 Bonfils and Fauchille,340 
Ripert,34\ Fox,342 Nielsen, 343 Matsunami 344 and Watkins. 345 
223. No fewer than six arguments have been put forward 
in support of the proposition that State merchant vessels 
should be subject to the jurisdiction of competent foreign 
courts. It has been argued, in the first place, that even 
assuming that a rule of customary international law existed 
in the nineteenth century in favour of immunity for all 
types of State ships, it is now no longer tenable that such a 
rule could still have a general application. When the im-
munities of State ships became crystalized, it could not be 
predicted that coastal States would soon become engaged 
in maritime trade and employ their newly acquired mer-
chant fleets side by side with private shipowners in com-
mercial ventures. 346 There would appear to be a fallacy in 
the assumption that a rule of law concocted to suit the 
economic and social conditions of the nineteenth century 
should still apply today, when not only circumstances, but 
also theories and ideas are fundamentally different. 
224. Secondly, a closer inspection of government mer-
chant ships discloses some cardinal resemblances between 
this class of public vessels and ordinary trading vessels. 
Public merchantmen, in spite of State ownership and State 
operation, possess the same intrinsic characteristics as pri-
vate traders and are employed for the same commercial 
purposes. The reasons for assimilating their legal position 
to that of private ships of commerce seem stronger than the 
lJ3 G. G. Phillimore, "Immunite des Etats au point de vue de la juri-
diction ou de l'execution forcee", Recueil des cours ... , 1925-lll (Paris, 
Hachette), vol. 8 (1926), p. 461. 
334 E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States before National Courts 
(New York, Macmillan, 1933). 
335 A. Hayes, "Private claims against foreign sovereigns", Harvard Law 
Review (Cambridge, Mass.), vol. 38 (1924-1925), p. 599. 
336 J. G. Hervey, "The immunity of foreign States when engaged in 
commercial enterprises: a proposed solution", Michigan Law Review 
(Ann Arbor, Mich.), vol. 27 (1927), p. 751. 
331 E. M. Borchard, in a series of articles referred to by G. G. Phillimore, 
lac. cit. (footnote 333 above), pp. 469-471. 
338 J. W. Gamer, "Immunities of State-owned ships employed in 
commerce", The British Year Book of International Law, 1925 (London), 
vol. 6, p. 128. 
m G. Gidel, Le droit international de la mer (Paris, Sirey), vol. II (1932), 
pp. 337 et seq. 
340 P. Fauchille, Traite de droit international public, 8th ed. (revised) of 
Manuel de droit international public by H. Bonfils (Paris, Rousseau, 1925), 
vol. I, 2nd part, p. 1116, para. 625 (Navires marchands d'Etat). 
341 G. Ripert, in Revue internationale du droit maritime (Paris), 
vol. XXXIV (1922), p. I; cf. G. G. Phillimore, lac. cit. (footnote 333 
above), pp. 468-469. 
342 W. T. R. Fox, "Competence of courts in regard to 'non sovereign' 
acts of foreign States", The American Journal of International Law 
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 35 (1941), pp. 632-636 and 640. 
343 F. K. Nielsen, "The lack of uniformity in the law and practice of 
States with regard to merchant vessels", ibid .. vol. 13 (1919), pp. 12-21. 
344 N. Matsunami, Immunity of State Ships (London, Richard Flint, 
1924); cf. The British Year Book of International Law. 1925 (London). 
vol. 6, p. 239. 
345 R. D. Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant (Baltimore (Md.), The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), pp. 189-191. See also S. A. Riesenfeld, "Sov-
ereign immunity for foreign vessels in Anglo-American law", Minnesota 
Law Review (Minneapolis, Minn.), vol. 25 (1940), pp. 7 et seq. 
346 See, for example, van Praag, lac. cit .. 1935 (footnote 315 above, in 
fine), p. 116. 
argument that they should benefit from the immunities of 
States originally accorded to men-of-war. There appears to 
be no cogent reason for an ordinary vessel of commerce to 
be accorded immunity by the mere circumstance that it is 
owned or operated by a State. As Sibert suggested, public 
vessels should be further subdivided, for the purposes of 
immunity, into trading and non-trading vessels, public 
trading vessels being subject to the local jurisdiction like 
private ships.347 
225. Thirdly, it seems harsh and inequitable to draw a 
line of distinction, for the purposes of immunity, between 
public and private merchant vessels, while States are in fact 
competing with private shippers and shipowners. If it is 
open to States to enter the market of maritime trade, they 
should be placed on the same footing as other traders. The 
mere fact of ownership or operation by a State should 
provide no ground for distinguishing such public vessels 
from trading ships. The trading character or the com-
mercial nature of the operation of the vessels should be 
sufficient to assimilate their position to that of private 
merchan t vessels. 348 
226. Fourthly, to allow proceedings in rein against 
government ships employed in commerce is in no way in-
consistent with the dignity, equality, sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the States owning or operating the vessels,349 
nor does it appear that permitting such proceedings will 
interfere with the political arms of the Government in the 
conduct of foreign relations. 35o 
227. Fifthly, the ever-growing number of ships employed 
by States in ordinary trading voyages is all the more reason 
for restricting their exemptions from local jurisdiction. In 
the interest of safe navigation, it would seem undesirable to 
allow to navigate the seas so many vessels whose owners 
are aware that these ships can never be arrested while in the 
service of States, however negligently they may have navi-
gated. 351 Furthermore, there is a danger that immunity 
may operate to the detriment of States owning or operating 
such merchantmen, for shippers will hesitate to trade with 
them, and salvors will run few risks to save the property of 
States, if these ships are to be exempt from the jurisdiction 
of coastal States. 352 
347 M. Sibert, "Les voies de communication en droit international pub-
lie", COllrs de droit. Paris (1953-1954) (mimeographed), pp. 181-185 and 
203-204. According to Gidel, op. cit .. vol. I, pp. 98-99: 
"Le critere essen tiel dont on s'inspire it I'heure actuelle pour c1asser 
les navires et determiner leur statut juridique au point de vue du droit 
international public est Ie genre de nal'igation" effectue par ces navires. 
Ce qui importe. c'est leur affectation a telle ou telle activite et non pas la 
qualite de leurs proprietaires, particuliers ou personnes pUbliques. 
" 
3" See. for example, E. D. Dickinson, "The immunity of public ships 
employed in trade", The American JOllrnal of International Law 
(Washington, D.C.), vol. 21 (1927), p. 108. See also The "Allualita "( 1916) 
(footnote 181 above). 
3'. In The "Cristina "(1938) (/oc. cit. (footnote 164 above), p. 521), Lord 
Maugham posed the question: "Is it consistent with sovereign dignity to 
acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with ordinary shippers and 
shipowners in the markets of the world T' 
350 According to Judge Mack, in The "Pesaro" (1921) (/oc. cit. (footnote 
183 above). p. 485), "it seems improbable that in these days the judicial 
seizure of a publicly owned merchantman like the Pesaro would affect our 
foreign relations in any greater degree than the judicial seizure of a great 
privately owned merchantman like the Aqllitania. " 
);1 See the opinion of Judge Hill in The "Espozendc" (1918) (footnote 
146 above) and in The "Crillldon" (1918) (ibid.). 
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., LaSt. but not least, there is the argument that world 
2.~.. 'hich depends largely on carriage by sea, may suffer, 
trJ f~~\\\hippers will ship their goods on public merchant-
Wf for fear of accidents at sea and resulting loss of mer-
men disc with relatively little hope of salvage and without 
,~~nrc01cdies against the S~ates or their ~erchant, ships. I~ 
~'i's respect. free internatl?nal trade will be. dlffic~l.t If 
·!.ltCS and individuals contmue to carry on their mantlme 
S n'rce on different levels. Lord Justice Scrutton ad-
,(1m! l: . Th "P Al d" ' "d the same argument m e arlo exan re 
\ Jnll: 
(1 920),15J 
5. AN UNDEVIATING TREND 
"9 While there is no general agreement either in the 
~~~l1ce of States or in international opinion as to the basis 
(or n:ssels operated by States for commercial non-govern-
nll'ntal purposes, there appears to have emerged a clear and 
unmistakable trend in support of the absence of immunity 
f,;r vessels employed by States exclusively on commercial 
non-govcrnmental se~vice .. This t,rend ap.pears!o be ~n~e­
\l3ting and reasserts Itself m all Its manIfestatIOns: m JU-
dICIal practice, in the traditionally "absolute immunity" 
Jurisdictions, in legislation even in countries where the 
most unqualified theory of immunity had prevailed, such 
3\ the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
an the adoption of international conventions, such as the 
1926 13russels Convention, and in other more general con-
\l'ntlons, such as the law of the sea conventions of 1958 
and 1982. There seems to be emerging an inevitable trend 
an national legislation recognizing the possibility of assim-
Ilating the position of State-operated merchant vessels to 
that of private merchantmen. Romania's decree-law No. 
44J. of 20 November 1972,354 concerning civil navigation, 
may also be cited as re-enforcing this undeviating trend. It 
prll\'ides: 
AnKle 103. The provisions of art ides 97, 100 and 101 do not apply 
In mtlltary vessels or to vessels in government service flying a foreign 
I1J~ 
230. Writers whose opinions differed widely in the past 
appear to have narrowed their differences. Contemporary 
writers are more inclined to favour less unqualified im-
munity and sympathizers of the more absolute view of 
immunity have begun to recognize important quali-
fications and limitations, such as the principle of reci-
procity and the theory of implied consent or presumption 
of wai ver by conduct, in addition to the significant restric-
tion of express consent or explicit agreement.355 A com-
promise solution could be found along these lines which, 
while not completely satisfactory for all, might produce 
(:l'nerally tolerable results. 
.,' Sre Ihe opinion ofJudge Mack in The "Pesaro"(l 92 I)(footnote 183 
Ihme). 
'" ", , , no one can shut his eyes, now that the fashion ofnationalization 
1\ III the air, to the fact that many States are trading ... with ships ... ; and if 
:hc\c national ships wander about without liabilities, many trading affairs 
",II hecome difficult; ... " (The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, 
1'" JS·39), 
'" See United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities. , ., 
P ~7, 
." See, for example, Ushakov (footnote 318 above). 
C. Formulation of draft article 19 
231. It is against this background of an undeviating trend 
in favour of restricting State immunity with regard to 
trading vessels operated by States on commercial non-
governmental service that draft article 19 should be for-
mulated. Several elements of fundamental importance 
should be noted and be taken carefully into considera-
tion: 
(a) The question of State immunity in respect of attach-
ment and execution of its property as such is outside the 
scope of article 19, for it belongs properly to part IV of the 
draft articles- Immunities of State property from attach-
ment and execution. Thus ships owned or operated by 
States for commercial purposes, which form the subject-
matter of draft article 19, are not considered as public 
property or property of the State for the purpose of ex-
ecution of judgment against the State or attachment of 
State property in a proceeding against the State. 
(b) The question at issue concerns primarily the im-
munities of States from admiralty proceedings for public 
vessels employed by them exclusively on non-governmen-
tal and commercial service. 
(c) Such public vessels should not be accorded immun-
ities from jurisdiction in proceedings in rem against the 
vessels of their owners, the foreign States. 
(d) Privately owned vessels operated by a State for com-
mercial non-governmental purposes should not be ac-
corded any immunity, although while under requisition or 
charter to a foreign Government, they may be entitled to 
some special treatment in respect of suspension of 
measures such as seizure, arrest, detention or attachment 
while in the public or governmental and non-commercial 
service ofa foreign State. Proceedings in rem may certainly 
be permitted against privately owned ships at all times, 
although actual arrest, seizure, detention or attachment 
would have to be suspended pending operation or employ-
ment by the State on governmental non-commercial ser-
vice. 
(e) A fortiori, proceedings in rem followed by arrest, 
seizure, detention or attachment of privately owned ves-
sels are generally permissible while they are in the service 
ofa State, provided the nature of the service is exclusively 
commercial and non-governmental. 
(f) What has been said of vessels is also applicable to 
cargo belonging to the State. 
I. ALTERNATIVE A 
232. Accordingly, draft article 19 might be couched in the 
following terms: 
Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service 
1. This article applies to: 
(a) admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the 
subject of admiralty proceedings. 






54 Documents of the thirty-sixth session 
immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State ARTICLE 20 (Arbitration) 
in: 
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that 
State; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in con-
nection with such a ship if, at the time when the cause of 
action arose, the ship was in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes. 
3. When an action in rem is brought against a ship 
belonging to a State for enforcing a claim in connection with 
another ship belonging to that State, paragraph 2 (a) above 
does not apply in regard to the first-mentioned ship unless, 
at the time when the cause of action arose, both ships were 
in use for commercial purposes. 
4. Unless otherwise agreed, a State cannot invoke im-
munity from the jurisdiction of a court of another State 
in: 
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that 
State if both the cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the 
time when the cause of action arose, in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes; or 
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in con-
nection with such a cargo if the ship carrying it was then in 
use or intended for use as aforesaid. 
5. In the foregoing provisions, references to a ship or 
cargo belonging to a State include a ship or cargo in its 
possession or control or in which it claims an interest; and, 
subject to paragraph 4 above, paragraph 2 above applies to 
property other than a ship as it applies to a ship. 
2. ALTERNATIVE B 
233. Draft article 19 could take a more simplified form, 
on the model of article 12, and might read as follows: 
Article 19. Ships employed in commercial service 
1. If a State owns, possesses or otherwise employs or 
operates a vessel in commercial service and differences 
arising out of the commercial operations of the ship fall 
within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the State 
is considered to have consented to the exercise ofthatjuris-
diction in admiralty proceedings in rem or in personam 
against that ship, cargo and owner or operator if, at the time 
when the cause of action arose, the ship and/or another ship 
and cargo belonging to that State were in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes, and accordingly, unless other-
wise agreed, it cannot imoke immunity from jurisdiction in 
those proceedings. 
2. Paragraph 1 applies only to: 
(a) admiralty proceedings; and 
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the 
subject of admiralty proceedings. 
A. General considerations 
1. SCOPE OF ARBITRATION 
234. When a State agrees to submit a dispute or differ-
ence to arbitration, either in advance in a written agree-
ment or on an ad hoc basis, it is interesting to examine the 
extent to which that consent or agreement to submit to 
arbitration may constitute an exception to the application 
of State immunity. Clearly, arbitration is a well-known 
method of pacific settlement onegal disputes. As such, it is 
distinguishable from judicial settlement as a separate and 
different method of dispute settlement. However, a closer 
examination of procedures available in internal laws will 
reveal the closest connection between arbitration and ju-
dicial settlement, even to the extent that there are areas 
where the two methods of dispute settlement may and, in 
fact, do overlap, ifnot completely coincide with each other. 
In certain areas, the operation of one is inextricably linked 
to the other. Arbitration may exist as a legal process in 
court or out of court. As an out-of-court settlement, an 
arbitral proceeding is still not entirely free from judicial 
control, by way of judicial review, appeal or enforcement 
order. Thus it could be misleading to suppose that arbitra-
tion is always to be viewed in contradistinction to judicial 
settlement, or that the judiciary applies rules of law while 
arbitration applies equitable rules. In reality, apart from 
historical developments in English courts, law and equity 
are applicable alike by the courts just as much as they are 
by arbitral tribunals or by arbitration. 
235. In view of the twilight zone which blurs the distinc-
tion between arbitration and judicial settlement, it is dif-
ficult to state precisely in what manner an agreement to 
submit to arbitration constitutes submission to jurisdic-
tion or an inevitable eventual waiver of immunity from 
that jurisdiction. This, in turn, would appear to depend on 
the link between the arbitration to which a State has agreed 
to submit the dispute in question and the disposition of the 
court to exercise its otherwise competent and available 
jurisdiction. There are many types of arbitration, some of 
which may be to a greater or lesser degree subject to the 
control or under the jurisdiction of a court, or under ju-
dicial supervision, others being essentially part and parcel 
of the judicial process of adjudication. 
236. Having thus clarified the conceptual ambiguity in-
herent in this connection, it is still not easy to envisage the 
interplay of the two analogous concepts. Just as a court of 
law may appoint a commission of inquiry, ajury, or a panel 
of experts or assessors, a panel of arbitrators could be so 
appointed to consider certain questions assigned to it by 
the court. The court might also be called upon to approve, 
revise or enforce an arbitral award or judgment, as ifarbi-
tration merely formed part of the pre-trial phase of a ju-
dicial process. It is perhaps because of their closeness that 
the two notions cannot be sharply focused upon as distinct, 
but rather as overlapping concepts, the court rising above 
arbitration, which is inevitably eclipsed by the finality of 
judicial prerogative. This overlapping of concepts, result-
ing in a certain confusion, gives rise to a tendency to equate 
an agreement to submit to arbitration with consent to sub-
mit to jurisdiction. Arbitration could be viewed, at first 
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sight, as an exception to the exercise of jurisdiction, almost 
tantamount to exemption or immunity from the jurisdic-
tion ofa competent court; but on reflection it could at best 
operate only to postpone or temporarily suspend the exer-
cise of jurisdiction and only eventually to confirm the ulti-
mate submission to the jurisdiction or the expression of 
choice of jurisdiction. In the final analysis, therefore, arbi-
tration is more like an exception to jurisdictional immun-
ity than a substitute for jurisdiction or an alternative 
method of dispute settlement, as it may well be in the 
regulation of differences between States or settlement of 
disputes between Governments. Thus arbitration as a 
notion has more than one meaning, depending on the type 
of dispute and the status of the parties thereto. Arbitration 
between States or Governments as a method of dispute 
settlement is subject to public international law, while 
international arbitration in which parties are of different 
nationalities or in which there is a foreign element in-
volved, whether or not one of the parties is a State, belongs 
to the realm of internal law or private international law. 
2. TYPES OF ARBITRA nON 
237. It is therefore not irrelevant to mention the different 
types of arbitration in order to illustrate conceptual diffi-
culties in an initial approach to the question of "arbi-
tration" in relation to jurisdictional immunities of 
States. 
(a) Arbitration under internal law 
238. The most common of all types of arbitration, having 
the greatest relevance to the present study, is arbitration 
under internal, domestic or municipal law, or indeed 
national law, as opposed to public international law. In this 
sense, the expressions "internal law" or "internal legal sys-
tem" necessarily include the notions of private inter-
national law or of conflict oflaws. Arbitration under inter-
nallaw may take many forms. To take a simple example, 
section 210 of Thailand's Code of Civil Procedure (B.E. 
2477)356 provides: 
In any case pending before a court offirst instance, the parties may agree 
to submit the dispute, in reference to all or any of the issues, to one or more 
arbitrators for settlement, by filing with the court ajoint application stating 
the terms of such agreement. 
If the court is of the opinion that the agreement is not contrary to law, it 
shall grant the application. 
239. Under the Thai internal legal system, there are two 
types of arbitration, viz. arbitration appointed by the cou~t 
or within the court, and arbitration out of court. For arbI-
tration in the court under section 210 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, section 218 requires the arbitrators "to file their 
award with the court" and provides that the court "shall 
give judgment in accordance therewith". However, if t~e 
court is of the opinion that the award is contrary to law III 
any respect, it shall have the power to issue an order refus-
ing to confirm the award, or it may amend the award 
Jl6 The 1934 Code was enacted on 15 June 1935; unofficial translation, 
edited by Mr. Suchart Chivachart. 
within a reasonable time so as to confirm it by a judg-
ment. 
240. Section 221 provides that "where a dispute is sub-
mitted to arbitration out of court, if any party refuses to 
abide by the award, such award may not be enforced unless 
the court of territorial competence upon the request of the 
opposing party gives judgment in accordance with the 
award". It is further provided that "in such case, the court 
of territorial competence shall be the court designated by 
the parties in the agreement or, in the absence of such 
designation, the court which would have territorial juris-
diction and competence to try and adjudge the dispute". 
241. Thus both types of arbitration under the prevailing 
legal system of Thailand, arbitration in court and arbi-
tration out of court, are intimately linked to the existing 
machinery of justice, the administration of which is in the 
hands of the court in the name of the King under the 
country's Constitution. The closeness of the linkage or 
association with the court renders an agreement to arbitra-
tion equivalent to consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the competent court. 
242. In other internal systems, it is also conceivable that 
there could be other types ohrbitration more or less con-
nected with the framework of the judiciary or the system of 
administration of justice, depending for implementation 
and enforcement upon the existing machinery of justice. 
Even in the most independent type of arbitration, whether 
under internal law or in transboundary arbitration or inter-
national arbitration, the ultimate resort for enforcement is 
open to the judiciary for satisfaction or implementation of 
the award. 
(b) International commercial arbitration 
243. International commercial arbitration is but another 
type of arbitration under national law or an internal legal 
system, but in which the dispute involves a foreign element 
or two parties of different nationalities. In the field of 
commerce and trade, attempts have been made to provide 
for uniform rules or procedures for the settlement of dif-
ferences or disputes by commercial arbitration. 357 Thus 
the International Chamber of Commerce 358 and the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)359 have also prepared model rules to be 
adopted by parties seeking to settle their differences by 
arbitration, generally covering, but not necessarily con-
fined to, commercial activities. 
(c) Arbitration for investment disputes 
244. Another specific area in which international arbi-
tration between private enterprises and government agen-
117 See P. 1. Benjamin, "The European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration", The British Yl'ar Book of Intemationa! Law, 
1961 (London), vol. 37, pp. 478-487; International Union of Lawyers, 
Inremationa! Commercia! Arbitration, rapporteur general P. Sanders, 
vol. I (Paris, Dalloz et Sirey, 1956), vol. II (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1960), vol. III (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). 
ll8 P. Sanders, "ECAFE rules for international commercial arbitra-
tion", II/temationa! Arbitration: Liber Amicorum filr Martill Domke, P. 
Sanders, ed. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 252. 
119 See the report of UNCITRAL on the work of its twelfth session 
(C"OI//lIlIwt/OJllInf Ilagf'.) 
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cies has grown in practice is the settlement of investment 
disputes. 30o The Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States. opened for signature at Washington on 18 March 
1965,301 may be cited as an example of efforts to resolve 
investment disputes between States and foreign nationals 
by arbitration, which may be said to assume an inter-
national character, and whose award may depend for 
judicial enforcement upon several jurisdictions, where 
assets happen to be located or where enforcement 
measures are available. 
(d) International arbitration 
245. International arbitration in the sense of inter-State 
or intergovernmental arbitratiolJ is a method of pacific 
settlement of disputes between nations or States under the 
Charter of the United Nations. It can take many different 
forms, with one or more arbitrators applying various rules 
and different procedures. The Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration at The Hague is a striking example of an arbitral 
institution with a permanent panel of arbitrators, from 
which parties could propose or select international arbi-
trators. While international arbitration, being as such a 
means of pacific settlement of disputes between States, 
appears to lie outside the scope of the present study,362 an 
award of such international arbitration may well derive its 
force from municipal judicial authority for an eventual 
enforcement measure, which incidentally forms the sub-
ject of the next part of the study and need not be further 
discussed in relation to the present draft article. 
3. ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
246. An arbitration clause or compromis is a clause in a 
contract-in the present context a State contract, which 
could be a contract of loan,363 a commercial contract, or 
another type of transaction - whereby the parties, includ-
ing the State or government agency, agree to submit a 
dispute which has arisen or which may arise to arbitration 
of one type or another, with or without an effective means 
of enforcing the award. An arbitration clause depends on 
the volition of the parties at the outset, but may become 
obligatory or compulsory once the clause is adopted or 
incorporated in a contract or loan or other commercial 
transaction. 
B. The practice of States 
1. JUDICIAL PRACTICE 
247. Judicial practice on the point under examination is 
bound to be scanty, owing to the conceptual difficulty 
(Foo/l1ole 359 U11lf111lwd) 
(1979), Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, 
Supplement No. 17 (Al34/17), paras. 57-70. 
360 See, for example, American Society ofInternational Law, Proceed· 
ings of the International Investment Law Conference (Washington (D.C.), 
1956), part I, pp. 22-32; revised in The Business Lawyer (Chicago, Ill.), 
vol. 12 (1957), pp. 264-271. 
361 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 575, p. 159. 
362 See, for example, Societe commerciale de Belgique. judgment of 
which tends to becloud the issue. A State agreeing to sub-
mit to arbitration is entitled to insist on settlement by or 
through arbitration before judicial settlement. Should the 
case be brought before a court, it is not always clear 
whether the State could or should claim immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the court. The answer to this question is 
likely to depend on the stage of the proceedings, judicial or 
arbitral, since in more ways than one an arbitral award is 
essentially linked, in its initiation or enforcement, to ju-
dicial process. Of course, an agreement to submit to arbi-
tration may operate to suspend or postpone the initial 
exercise of jurisdiction by the court pending the appoint-
ment, examination and award of the arbitrators, especially 
if the court in question is that of a State which recognizes 
the type of arbitration to which parties have agreed to 
submit their difference or dispute. 
248. Thus, in 1982, in the arbitration case Maritime 
International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
Guinea (the latter being the appellant, and the United 
States of America the intervenor),364 the United States 
Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant was immune 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 365 and 
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm 
the award, as the suits were between foreign plaintiffs and 
foreign States. Had the court found itself with sufficient 
original jurisdiction without conferment by the arbitration 
clause in the contract, the question of immunity might 
have been only temporarily postponed and the award ju-
dicially confirmed. The type of arbitration selected by the 
parties was in conformity with the 1965 Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States. Such an agreement was not 
considered as a valid waiver of immunity under the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act. The connection between 
the enforcement or confirmation of the arbitral award and 
the agreement by Guinea to submit to arbitration was 
severed by non-immunity as a condition to subject-matter 
jurisdiction. To look at the decision in a different legal 
context, the agreement to submit to arbitration did not 
create new jurisdiction where none existed. If the decision 
appears to complicate still further the confusion between 
consent to arbitration and consent to the exercise of juris-
diction, it does clarify the distinction between agreement to 
submit to arbitration and absence of judicial jurisdic-
tion. 
2. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE 
(a) Nationallegis/ation 
249. National legislation in the field of jurisdictional 
immunities contains some reference to arbitration as an 
exception to State immunity from the existing jurisdiction 
of an otherwise competent court. An interesting provision 
15 June 1939, P. C.U., Series AlB, No. 78, p. 160; and the Socobelge case 
(see footnote 242 above). 
363 See, for example, M. Domke, "Arbitration clauses and international 
loans", The Arbitration Journal (New York), vol. 3 (1939), p. 161. 
364 See footnote 38 above. 
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is to be found in section 9 of the United Kingdom State 
Immunity Act 1978,366 which reads: 
Exceptions from immunit), 
9. (I) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which 
has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects 
proceedings in the courts of the United Kingdom which relate to the 
arbitration. 
(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in the 
arbitration agreement and does not apply to any arbitration agreement 
between States. 
250. Similar prOVlSlOns are found in section 10 of 
Pakistan's State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,367 section 11 
of Singapore's State Immunity Act, 1979368 and section 10 
of South Africa's Foreign States Immunities Act, 1981,369 
and in the draft Australian legislation, Foreign States 
Immunities Bill 1984. 370 Since consent of the State is all 
that matters with regard to arbitral competence and may 
imply, in some measure, submission to the jurisdiction 
of a court, neither the United States of America nor 
Canada has considered it necessary to include such a 
provision in its legislation. 
(b) International or regional conventions 
(i) 1972 European Convention on State Immunity 
251. The 1972 European Convention on State Immun-
ity 37t contains an interesting article 12,372 which reads as 
follows: 
Article 12 
I. Where a Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbi-
tration a dispute which has arisen or may arise out ofa civil or commercial 
malter, that State may not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a court 
of another Contracting State on the territory or according to the law of 
which the arbitration has taken or will take place in respect of any pro-
ceedings relating to: 
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement; 
(b) the arbitration procedure; 
(c) the setting aside of the award, 
unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides. 
2. Paragraph I shall not apply to an arbitration agreement between 
States. 
]66 See footnote 283 above. 
]67 See footnote 287 above. 
]68 See footnote 288 above. 
]69 See United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , 
pp.37-38. 
]70 See section 17 (footnote 290 above), which resembles more closely 
the provisions of the 1972 European Convention. 
]71 See Council of Europe, European Convention on State Immunity and 
Additional Protocol (1972), European Treaty Series (Strasbourg), No. 74 
(1972). 
172 See the commentary to article 12, Council of Europe, Explanatory 
Reports on the European Convention on State Immunity and the Additional 
Protocol (Strasbourg, 1972), p. 21. 
(ii) 1923 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses 
252. The Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, signed at 
Geneva on 24 September 1923,373 provides, in article I, for 
recognition of: 
... the validity of an agreement whether relating to existing or future 
differences between parties subject respectively to the jurisdiction of dif-
ferent Contracting States by which the parties to a contract agree to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences that may arise in connection with such 
contract relating to commercial matters or to any other matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take place in a 
country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties is subject. 
(iii) 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
253. In a different context, but not entirely irrelevant to 
the relationship between consent to submit to arbitration 
and waiver or renunciation of jurisdictional immunity in 
regard to judicial proceedings connected with the arbi-
tration, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed at New York on 
10 June 1958,374 contains provisions regarding, inter alia, 
recognition of an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration (art. II) and recognition of arbitral awards as 
binding and enforceable in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the State where the award is relied upon 
(art. III). 
3. INTERNATIONAL OPINION 
254. Leaving aside for the moment the question of 
enforcement of arbitral awards or of foreign arbitral 
awards by national courts, which will be taken up in part IV 
of the draft articles on immunities from attachment and 
execution, it is convenient at this juncture to note an 
emerging consensus oflegal opinion favouring arbitration 
as a means of settling international trade, loan or invest-
ment disputes. However, the extent of consent to submit to 
arbitration, being regarded also as consent to the exercise 
of jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances,.is.a mat~er f~r 
States to decide and agree upon. After all, It IS an Imph-
cation to be drawn from the expression of consent to sub-
mit current and future differences and disputes to arbitral 
settlement in regard to possible exercise of existing juris-
diction in relation to the arbitration, from the appointment 
of arbitrators and interpretation of arbitration clauses to 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.375 
4. AN IRRESISTIBLE IMPLICATION OF CONSENT 
255. Once a State agrees in a written instrument to sub-
mit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or may arise 
]7] League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XXVII, p. 157. 
374 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 330, p. 38. 
37S See, for example, International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for 
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between it and other private parties to a transaction, there 
is an irresistible implication, if not an almost irrebuttable 
presumption, that it has waived its jurisdictional immun-
ity in relation to all pertinent questions arising out of the 
arbitral process, from its initiation tojudicial confirmation 
and enforcement of the arbitral awards. A crucial point is 
the existence of available jurisdiction which is competent 
to consider the subject-matter, whether it be the appoint-
me,:t or challenging of arbitrators, arbitral procedures, the 
settmg aside or confirmation of an award, or judicial super-
vision of the arbitral process. 
C. Formulation of draft article 20 
256. In the light of the foregoing, draft article 20 might be 
formulated as follows: 
Article 20. Arbitration 
1. If a State agrees in writing with a foreign natural or 
juridical person to submit to arbitration a dispute which has 
arisen, or may arise, out of a civil or commercial matter, that 
State is considered to have consented to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a court of another State on the territory or 
according to the law of which the arbitration has taken or 
will take place, and accordingly it cannot invoke immunity 
from jurisdiction in any proceedings before that court in 
relation to: 
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agree-
ment; 
(b) the arbitration procedure; 
(c) the setting aside of the awards. 
2. Paragraph 1 has effect subject to any contrary pro-
vision in the arbitration agreement, and shall not apply to 
an arbitration agreement between States. 
